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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
“[I]n its broadest sense, corporate governance is concerned with holding 
the balance between economic and social goals and between individual 
and communal goals. The governance framework is there to encourage the 
efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the 
stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible 
the interests of individuals, of corporations, and of society.”  
(Sir Adrian Cadbury1
Proponents of ‘shareholder wealth maximization’ model assume that managers, engaged 
in ‘principal-agent’ relationship, work on behalf of investors and take care of their 
interests by exerting honest work effort. In the words of Blair and Stout (2001) this is 
‘shareholders primacy’ perspective of a firm. The premise is that after-tax-profits of a 
firm are shared in a way that investors get best return (dividends and capital gain) on 
their investments and managers get competitive pays such that they have no incentive to 
steal money from the firm, nor can they increase their monetary rewards by switching 
) 
 
The literature on corporate governance aims to explain the way corporations are 
governed. In order to understand and enhance performance of a firm it is necessary to 
take a comprehensive account of the interests and preferences of all stakeholders in the 
firm. It is frequently quoted that a firm is a ‘nexus of contracts’ and, unequivocally, it 
may be stated that the most important among those contracts is the bond between the 
investors and the managers of the firm. Other groups which have stake in the operations 
of a firm include regulatory bodies, suppliers of credit and raw material, buyers of firm 
products, competing firms in the industry, and, last but not least, society at large. 
Economic theory states that all of them are rational economic agents who interact with 
one another on the bases of legal and financial incentives. 
 
                                               
1 Forwards to ‘Corporate governance and development’ by Claessens (2003). 
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jobs to other firms.  Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2004) call this ‘broad rationality’ 
which is based on a set of beliefs of the investors and managers in the following sense: 
(a) investors believe that managers rationally respond to factors like better 
compensation contracts, labor market dynamics, takeover pressure from market for 
corporate control, and other corporate governance tools (shareholder activism, board 
oversight, third party monitoring, etc.); and (b) managers, on the other hand, assume 
they are operating in an efficient market environment, prices truly reflect economic 
fundamentals, and their control over resources will remain intact as long as they keep 
the firm as ‘going-concern’.  
 
However, when the paradigm of broad rationality is mapped onto the real world, its 
theoretical ideals are realized only partially. The key reason for this discrepancy is that 
preferences of the investors and managers are concentric but do not overlap completely. 
Talking about joint-stock companies Adam Smith2
Detailed analyses of equity ownership structure help us understand the connection 
between corporate governance and the agency problem. This relationship is analyzed in 
 envisions “the directors of such 
companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their 
own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their 
own” (1776, p 497). Berle and Means (1932) go one step further and highlight the split 
in principal-agent relation. They state, “the separation of ownership and management or 
control creates potential agency costs. Agency costs occur when managers or directors 
take actions adverse to shareholders’ interests”.  Therefore, in corporate world the 
perceptions investors and managers have about each others’ interests are at best 
incomplete. Talking about the interests of the managers and shareholders, Myers states 
“perfect alignment is implausible in theory and impossible in practice” (2001, p 95). 
This on-going debate on the interaction of investors and managers, both in cooperative 
and non-cooperative settings, has resulted in extensive theoretical and empirical 
research. The corporate governance literature contributes in this direction by focusing 
on stylized features of equity owners who are the residual claimants and risk bearers in 
a firm. The subject area which provides foundation for these studies is ‘agency theory’. 
 
                                               
2 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). 
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terms of interest-alignment versus managerial entrenchment hypotheses, and active-
monitor versus passive-voter hypotheses. While studying the relation of corporate 
governance with economic development, Claessens argues “A corporation’s ownership 
structure affects the nature of the agency problems between managers and outside 
shareholders, and among shareholders” (2003, p 12). He argues that the controlling 
shareholder has the ability and willingness to “closely monitor and discipline 
management” and, when ownership is concentrated “information asymmetries can also 
be assumed to be less” (ibid, p 12). In fact, various types of equity owners differ in 
terms of incentives and skills they have to monitor the managers and, thus, control 
agency costs. 
 
This study attempts to investigate the impact of equity ownership structure on (a) capital 
structure, (b) investment efficiency, and (c) overall firm performance. For that matter 
equity ownership has been explored in three dimensions namely direct ownership, 
ultimate ownership and ownership concentration. The study is based on data of more 
than 300 public listed Pakistani firms which has been hand collected for the period 2002 
to 2006. Main source of financial and corporate ownership information is the annual 
financial statements of the firms. 
 
The second chapter explores how ownership structure of a firm affects its leverage ratio. 
Debate on capital structure, one of the extensively researched topics in finance, started 
in 1958 when Modigliani and Miller proposed capital structure irrelevance theory. Later 
studies by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Miller (1977) proposed the Trade-off 
theory, which states that a firm trades off tax benefits of debt with financial distress 
costs. Myers and Majluf (1984) proposed the Pecking-order theory which explains how 
firms build a hierarchy of financing choices. Their theory is based on the premise of 
asymmetric information. Jensen (1986), using notion of moral hazard, highlighted value 
of debt in terms of controlling agency costs between managers and shareholders. In his 
words “debt reduces the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the cash flow 
available for spending at the discretion of managers. These control effects of debt are a 
potential determinant of capital structure” (Jensen, 1986, p. 324).  
 
In comparison to research on how capital structure of a firm is determined, there is 
relative scarcity of inquiries made on the relation between equity ownership and capital 
4 
 
structure. Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) studied relation among insider ownership, 
debt and dividend policy in a simultaneous framework and found that higher insider 
ownership is related to low debt levels. Brailsford, Oliver and Pua (2002) highlighted 
that the relation between managerial ownership and leverage is non-linear. The key 
argument is that both ownership structure and capital structure affect agency costs. As 
stated earlier, debt covenants restrict managerial discretion and control agency costs. 
Moreover, with regard to control over the firm, equity holders compete with debt 
holders and controlling or majority shareholders compete with minority shareholders. 
Therefore, a study of the interaction of ownership and capital structures in curtailing 
agency costs and in understanding the competition for control would be quite intriguing. 
 
Major findings of the second chapter are as following: Direct equity ownership by 
insiders and associated firms is inversely related to debt ratio. This implies that insiders 
seem to enjoy private benefits of control and they tend to protect their personal wealth 
against the bankruptcy risk by reducing leverage, and associated firms offer substitute 
source of funds for financing firm projects. Furthermore, shareholdings by financial 
institutions are related to high debt levels. As regards ultimate ownership, family control 
as an ultimate shareholder is related to more gearing. This implies that families try to 
protect their control over firms and safeguard it by using debt which finances firm 
projects. Lastly, ownership concentration is associated with low debt ratio, which 
indicates that ownership concentration substitutes debt in controlling agency cost and 
majority block holders are enjoying private benefits of control. 
 
The third and fourth chapters of this dissertation focus on the effects of different types 
of equity ownership on investment performance and overall firm performance, 
respectively. The relation of different ownership configurations with the agency 
problem has been explored in terms of incentive-alignment and managerial 
entrenchment hypotheses. Moreover, the incentive to keep corporate control is an 
important factor which influences the relation between equity ownership and 
performance measures. 
 
In third and fourth chapters performance measures – marginal Tobin’s q and average 
Tobin's q, respectively – have been regressed on equity ownership. In the third chapter, 
a model, as proposed by Mueller and Reardon (1993), and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), 
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has been applied to calculate marginal Tobin's q directly by regressing growth rate of 
market value of firm on the ratio of investment to one period lagged market value of 
firm.  
 
The main findings of the third chapter are as following: Equity ownership by insiders is 
positively related to investment performance. This shows convergence of interest of the 
insiders with the outside shareholders. The effect of shareholdings by financial 
institutions on investment efficiency is nonlinear – positive at lower level of voting 
rights and negative for higher levels. This shows that as shareholding by financial 
institutions increases their monitoring capacity is hindered by regulatory limits on their 
participation in firm affairs. This may leave the management entrenched in firm affairs. 
Foreigners as the largest shareholders have positive relation with investment 
performance, whereas the state as the largest owner affects investment performance 
negatively. Family and foreigners as ultimate owners affect investment performance 
positively. However, the state as ultimate owner affects investment performance 
negatively. 
 
Generally, firm performance is studied assuming that ownership and leverage are 
exogenous to firm performance, which may give biased results. However, chapter four 
of this dissertation ownership structure and capital structure have been jointly 
determined with firm performance – “endogeneity argument3
                                               
3 For further discussion see Lee and Ryu (2003). 
 a la Demsetz (1983)”, 
which has been further supported by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Cho (1998), and 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). To control for endogeneity instrumental variable two-
stage least squares estimation method has been applied on panel data of Pakistani firms. 
The main results from chapter four are as following: Equity holdings by insiders are 
positively related to Tobin’s q, which shows convergence of interest between the 
managers and large outside shareholders. However, shareholdings by associated firms 
and financial institutions affect firm performance negatively. This indicates towards 
possible rent extraction through pyramiding. Ultimate ownership by family is positively 
related to Tobin’s q. It seems that family control adds value to the firm.  
  
6 
 
Layout of the proceeding parts is as follows: the next section of this chapter presents an 
overview of corporate governance in Pakistan; chapter 2 explores the effect of equity 
ownership on the financing choice of firms; in chapter 3 the relation of equity 
ownership with investment performance has been explored; and chapter 4 investigates 
the impact of ownership structure on firm performance. Finally, chapter 5 presents 
overall summary of the results. 
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1.1 An Overview of Corporate Governance in Pakistan 
 
“[T]he evolution of the Pakistani corporate entities has, historically, closely 
followed the path taken by English corporate entities. The English 
Companies Act, 1844 provided the initial impetus to the development of 
corporations in undivided India. In 1855, the Joint Stock Companies Act 
was enacted in undivided India, which, for the first time, provided for 
registration of companies. This was followed by the Indian Companies Act, 
1882 and later by the Indian Companies Consolidation Act, 1913. Upon 
independence, Pakistan inherited the Indian Companies Consolidation Act, 
1913. In 1949, this Act was amended in certain respects, including its name, 
where after it was referred to as the Companies Act, 1913. Until 1984, when 
the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (the Companies Ordinance) was 
promulgated, following lengthy debate, Pakistani companies were 
established and governed in accordance with the provisions of the 
Companies Act, 1913.” (Manual of Corporate Governance4
With regard to legal and regulatory framework, corporate sector in Pakistan may be 
divided into financial and non-financial sectors such that there are several industries
, p 9) 
 
In the tradition of U.K. and U.S. Pakistan is a market-oriented economy with common 
law base. The Companies Ordinance (1984) is the main statute under which companies 
– both private and public – are constituted as legal persons and the ordinance provides 
foundation for their corporate governance. Besides following the provisions of the 
Companies Ordinance (1984), banking companies have to abide by the Banking 
Companies Ordinance (1962) which outlines special provisions for banking companies. 
 
5
                                               
4 ‘Manual of Corporate Governance’ has been issued by the Securities & Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan (SECP). 
5 Examples of industries in financial sector include banks, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual 
funds, investment companies, brokerage houses, etc., whereas textiles industry, energy sector, chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals, cement, sugar, engineering, telecom, transportations, and food processing are 
examples of industries in non-financial sector. 
 in 
each sector. Enjoying autonomy from the Government of Pakistan, there are two 
corporate sector supervisors namely the Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
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(SECP)6 established under Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997; 
and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)7 constituted under the State Bank of Pakistan 
Order 1948 with its charter as laid down in the State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956. 
Broadly speaking, the SECP is the apex regulator of corporate sector, capital markets 
and non-bank financial companies8, both listed and non-listed ones; whereas the SBP 
supervises banking sector (commercial banks, development finance institutions and 
microfinance banks). Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP) is a 
statutory body9
At the firm level corporate board is responsible for overseeing the management and 
overall control of the firm. According to the ‘Guide
 and plays significant role in improving corporate governance in the 
country.  
 
There are three stock exchanges in Pakistan – Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), Lahore 
Stock Exchange (LSE) and Islamabad Stock Exchange (ISE). KSE is the dominant 
stock exchange and other two exchanges just follow the trend in the KSE. Stock 
exchanges are independent joint stock companies (guarantee limited) and the SECP 
oversees their operations and rests the powers to constitute their board of directors and 
to vet the rules under which securities are traded in those stock exchanges. Additionally, 
Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 provides for the protection of investors, 
regulation of markets and dealings in securities. Listed Companies (substantial 
acquisition of voting shares and takeovers) Ordinance 2002 provides for substantial 
acquisition of voting shares and takeovers of listed companies.  
 
10
                                               
6 In 1999 the SECP succeeded Corporate Law Authority which was attached to the Ministry of Finance of 
the Government of Pakistan, and it was previously regulating the corporate sector in Pakistan.  
7 As a part of financial sector reforms, the SBP was granted autonomy in 1994; and in 1997, through an 
Act of the Parliament of Pakistan autonomy of the SBP was further strengthened and amendments were 
approved in State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956, Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 and Banks 
Nationalisation Act, 1974. For reference visit www.sbp.org.pk 
8 Non-banking industries, among others, include manufacturing industries and non-bank financial 
institutions. As listed on the SBP website NBFIs include “Leasing companies, Investment Banks, 
Discount Houses, Housing Finance Companies, Venture Capital Companies, Mutual Funds), Modarabas, 
Stock Exchange and Insurance Companies”. For reference visit www.sbp.org.pk 
9 Established in 1961 under the Chartered Accountants Ordinance (1961). 
10 Available at www.secp.gov.pk 
 on Shareholders’ Rights’ ordinary 
shareholders have the right to participate in the elections to the position of directors or 
use his vote to elect or remove directors from the corporate board. Details on the 
responsibilities of the directors and functions of the corporate board may be referred 
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from the Companies Ordinance (1984) and other relevant laws, rules, codes and 
statutory regulatory orders (SROs) as issued by the regulatory bodies.  
 
There are few research studies on corporate governance in Pakistan. Hamid and Kozich 
(2006) give a brief overview of the corporate governance structure in Pakistan. They 
have focused on the legal aspects and highlight that mostly the corporations in Pakistan 
are family-controlled and they must learn how to adopt modern governance techniques 
of their corporations. According to them corporate governance in Pakistan is weak 
because corporate laws and codes have very weak penal provisions, legal system is not 
effective and financial press is not very vocal on issues pertaining to corporate 
governance. 
 
Khalid and Hanif (2005) have studied corporate governance of banks in the South Asian 
region with special focus on Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. They give an overview of 
the corporate governance guidelines issued by the State Bank of Pakistan, Reserve Bank 
of India and Bangladesh Bank. They highlight that with the recent waves of 
privatization, deregulation and entry of the foreign banks, financial sectors in these 
countries is embracing the challenge of good corporate governance by reforming the 
supervisory role of the central banks, by restructuring the legal system and by 
introducing ‘best practices’ and ‘codes’ of corporate governance in the banking sector. 
Arshad, Goergen and Syed, (2006) studied corporate governance in the financial sector 
of Pakistan. They provide a review of corporate governance and banking sector reforms 
in Pakistan. They conclude that given a leading role of the banking industry in 
economic development of Pakistan, it should demonstrate its capacity to promote good 
corporate governance practices in the wider corporate sector. 
 
Recent Initiatives and Developments: 
 
In 2002 the SECP issued ‘Code of Corporate Governance’ which is a compilation of so 
called ‘best practices’ and provides general guidelines for companies to follow. 
Provisions of this Code have been integrated with the listing requirements11
                                               
11 For reference visit http://www.kse.com.pk/information/corporate_governance.php 
 of the stock 
exchanges in Pakistan, and a dedicated version of this Code, along with ‘Prudential 
10 
 
Regulations12
International Finance Corporation (IFC), private sector arm of the World Bank Group, 
has partnered in improving corporate governance practices in Pakistan. Apart from 
providing monetary and technical assistance, notable initiatives of the IFC include 
sponsoring Pakistan Corporate Governance Project (2005); holding various conferences 
 (for banks)’ has been issued by the SBP for banking companies to adhere 
to. The Manual of Corporate Governance of the SECP states, “Compliance with the 
provisions of the Code is mandatory except for two that are voluntary in nature. The 
mandatory provisions deal with such matters as directors' qualifications and eligibility 
to act as such, their tenure of office, responsibilities, powers and functions, disclosure of 
interest, training, meetings of the Board of directors and the business to be conduct by 
it, the qualifications, appointment and responsibilities of Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
and company secretary, the appointment and responsibilities of the Audit Committee, 
the appointment and responsibilities of internal and external auditors, and compliance 
by listed companies with the Code. The two voluntary provisions pertain to the 
appointment of independent non-executive directors and those representing minority 
interests on the Board of directors and the restriction for brokers to be appointed as 
directors of listed companies” (p 11). 
 
All listed companies in Pakistan are required to comply with the Code. The SBP 
required non-listed banks and development finance institutions to fulfill requirements 
set by the Code. Moreover, some banks include requirements to adhere to the Code in 
their loan agreements. There are rating agencies in the country which have started rating 
companies for their corporate governance. 
 
In 2004, the SECP and the SBP along with other various educational, professional and 
research institutions, laid foundation of Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance 
(PICG) – a project of public-private partnership. The PICG is primarily focused on 
training and awareness of corporate executives and boards, and conducts surveys for 
research and development purposes. Activities of the PICG are focused to provide and 
enabling environment for the implementation of Code of Corporate Governance as 
issued by the SECP.  
 
                                               
12 State Bank of Pakistan Prudential Regulation ‘G1 to G3’. 
11 
 
and workshops for private entrepreneurs, bankers, regulators, and judges; and 
conducting survey on corporate governance practices in Pakistan in 2007. 
 
Given the legal and institutional background on corporate governance in Pakistan, it 
may be stated that there is no dearth of relevant laws, rules, regulations and guiding 
principles. However, some weaknesses13
a) Acute shortage of trained and experienced personnel to sit on corporate boards, 
 in the corporate governance which are listed as 
follows need to be addressed to improve corporate governance in the country:  
 
b) Little or no protection is available to minority shareholders, 
c) Enforcement of the law with regard to investors’ rights is lacking; courts are 
overloaded and prosecution is very costly and time consuming, 
d) Generally financial disclosure by listed companies is adequate and timely; 
however, some black sheep in manufacturing sector and those which are owned 
and run by the state or state holding companies do not follow the rules (in fact 
the penalty for inadequate or delayed disclosure is so little that it does not 
motivate the corporations to abide by the law), and  
e) Using complex accounting practices, business groups execute transactions with 
related parties. 
 
  
 
                                               
13 Most of these weaknesses have been highlighted in International Finance Corporation (IFC) publication 
“A Survey of Corporate Governance Practices in Pakistan 2007” available at www.ifc.org 
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Chapter 2 
 
Ownership Structure and Capital Structure 
 
2.1 Theoretical background and Related Literature 
 
A blend of debt and equity constitutes capital or financing structure of a firm. Important 
decisions related to debt include types of creditors, forms of credit and their maturity 
matrix, whereas allocation of voting and cash flow rights are equity related issues. 
Capital structure, a set of interrelated complex decisions, is instrumental in allocation of 
risks and control rights, and it sets foundation for different players to play their part in 
the governance of a firm. In the words of Jan Mahrt-Smith “many aspects of the 
financial structure interact: the ownership dispersion of a particular class of claims 
among investors, the shape of their return rights, the presence of covenants and other 
restrictions, the representation of particular classes of securities on the corporate board, 
as well as features of the institutional environment, such as the bankruptcy law (p 788).” 
Therefore, apart from contextual factors, capital structure is likely to be influenced by 
equity ownership structure.  
 
2.1.1 Linkage between Ownership Structure and Capital Structure 
 
Capital and ownership structures are interrelated through agency problem and control. 
Capital structure of a firm depends on agency cost and asymmetric information, and 
ownership structure mitigates these costs while exhibiting shareholders’ preferences for 
control and highlights their incentive to monitor the management. The structural design 
in which ownership and capital structures create or control agency problem depends 
upon legal, financial and ethical parameters in an economy. 
 
14 
 
In an agency setting debt works as a tool to control agency costs14. Grossman and Hart 
(1982) argue that risk of bankruptcy will force the managers to mend their ways. In their 
words “clearly the efficacy of bankruptcy as a source of discipline for management will 
depend on the firm's financial structure – in particular, its debt-equity ratio”. Jensen 
(1986) argues that firms get collateral advantage of preferring debt over equity in terms 
of controlling the agency costs. He underlines that debt loosens managers' control over 
free-cash-flows and squeezes margin for misappropriation of firm resources. However, 
an increase in debt may result in asset substitution problem15
On the other hand, in the words of Denis and McConnell “controllers frequently have 
some degree of ownership of the equity of the firms they control; while some owners, 
 (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Myers 1977; and Smith and Warner, 1979). When debt ratio is high, managers 
and shareholders, taken together, would undertake risky projects (those with positive net 
present value but with low probability of success). Controlling shareholders, in 
connivance with managers, will over-invest when riskiness of projects undertaken by 
the firm is not known to debt-holders. This makes debt a riskier option and increases 
cost of debt. Therefore, dynamics among shareholders, debt-holders and managers 
creates a balance between allocation of risk and sharing control. 
 
Equity ownership is also associated with agency problem and it is instrumental in 
defining ‘corporate control’ (Denis and McConnell, 2003). Studies by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and (1997), 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), and Stluz (1988) argue that incentive structure of 
managers is affected by the ownership structure of a firm. There are two extreme 
scenarios: a) individual owner (or a few owners acting in concert) with concentrated 
ownership versus manager and b) highly dispersed small shareholders versus manager. 
In the former case individual owner has huge incentive to monitor the manager and has 
necessary information to influence major decision in the firm. However, in the latter 
case, dispersion of ownership discourages small individual owners to participate in firm 
affairs, which that there is free-riders problem. 
 
                                               
14 Substantial amounts of free cash flows would entice the managers to engage themselves in activities 
like expropriations. Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that debt works as a disciplinary device to put a 
check on this kind of managerial inefficiency.   
15 Gavish, B. and Kalay, A. (1983) state “agency cost of debt consists of (1) the opportunity loss of wealth 
caused by the impact of debt on the investment decisions of the firm; (2) the monitoring and bonding 
expenditures by the firm; and (3) the cost of bankruptcy and reorganization”. 
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by virtue of the size of their equity positions, effectively have some control over the 
firms they own. Thus, ownership structure (i.e. the identities of a firm’s equity holders 
and the sizes of their positions) is a potentially important element of corporate 
governance” (2003, p 3). Therefore, it may be argued that equity ownership which 
confers certain rights – right to vote and right to cash flows – provides ways and means 
to control a firm in such a manner that cash flows to shareholders are maximized. Some 
of the benefits of control are shared and others, known as private benefits16
In any discussion on agency problem management is the focal point. As regards debt 
managers consider ensuing financial distress risk and bankruptcy cost may result in loss 
of their employment. Additionally, debt covenants reduce their powers vis-à-vis bond 
holders; therefore they would like to reduce debt level as much as possible. With regard 
 of control, 
are not shared by all the shareholders. The control rights of an equity holder affect 
agency problem in a firm; for instance, large shareholders have incentive as well as 
capacity to better monitor the managers.  
 
Equity ownership structure (in terms of identities of direct and ultimate owners, and 
ownership concentration) defines and distributes control rights to different shareholders 
who value control rights differently. For instance, insiders (manager and directors) 
especially if they belong to same family and owners of private unlisted firms are the 
types of investors who have invested substantial amount of their wealth and human 
resources value control more than other investors do. Therefore, insiders, as separate 
voting-block, prefer to have less debt. Enjoying benefits of control they want to avoid 
dominance and monitoring by the debt holders. Similarly small investors, owning 
private firms, would like to keep their control and avoid debt even when it is accessible 
to them (Mueller, 2003).  Being founder owners they would keep control as a matter of 
prestige and stronger affiliation with the company. Another example is ultimate 
ownership by family who would protect their control by increasing leverage in the 
firms. This strategy would make their companies less attractive for raiders to takeover. 
These arguments motivate the inquiry that ownership structure, through dynamics of 
‘control’, is likely to influence capital structure. 
 
                                               
16 Investors extract private benefits – pecuniary and non-pecuniary – over and above their investments. 
Such benefits are available to those shareholders only who have meaningful control over the firm (Denis 
and McConnell, 2003).  
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to equity they face similar threat of loss of employment if the ownership is concentrated 
and the owner allows a takeover that replaces management. Therefore, managers who 
run a firm on day-to-day basis have immediate stake in deciding financing pattern of 
firm projects.  
 
2.1.2 Related Literature  
 
Over half a century ago Modigliani and Miller (1958) debated sources of finance for 
corporate ventures. They built an ideal world of perfect information that is free of 
transaction costs and taxes. They proposed capital structure irrelevance theorem for firm 
value. Later in 1963 they updated their model and postulated that debt is preferred over 
equity when there are tax subsidies on debt related interest payments. From that time 
onwards this topic has been examined, both theoretically and empirically, by many yet 
it still begs conclusion as to how firms decide about a mix of two options – debt and 
equity. Another related inquiry is about existence of target leverage ratio, and if there is 
one, how firms adjust towards that target ratio.  
 
Among others, work of Baxter (1967), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Miller (1977) 
refined the debate on Trade-off theory regarding leverage ratio. Baxter argued that 
excessive use of debt increases credit risk of firm, which, in turn, would increase cost of 
credit. Jensen and Meckling introduced costs of financial distress, and Miller 
incorporated personal taxes in the setting. The trade-off theory proposes that firms 
should increase their leverage to a level where marginal benefits of debt, in terms of tax 
saving, become equal to financial distress cost of debt. Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner 
(1989) introduced dynamic version of Trade-off theory. They argue if cost of adjusting 
leverage towards target debt ratio is higher than the cost of having a suboptimal capital 
structure, firms would deviate from the target debt ratio.  
 
Furthermore, studies on other aspects related to capital structure offer competing 
explanations. Ross (1977) argued that increase in debt signals positively about firm 
performance. However, signaling works when investors are poorly informed as 
compared to managers. In such case firm would be inclined to follow pecking-order 
financing behavior. On the contrary, when potential investors have adequate 
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information about the firm signaling role of debt is not expected to impact choice of the 
managers regarding issuing debt or equity.  
 
Later studies focused on the interaction between the managers (who hold private 
information about business risk) and investors (suppliers of credit). Myers and Majluf 
(1984) argued that to counteract the ‘private information advantage’ of the managers, 
the investors will tend to under-price the new stock issues. However, this foresight will 
deter the managers from issuing equity, instead they will resort to firm's internal 
resources for project financing, and if the internal resources are not sufficient then they 
will issue debt leaving equity issue as last option on the list. In order for this Pecking-
order theory to hold firms should keep financial slack - reserve capacity to issue debt. 
With regard to equity market timing, dynamic version of Myers and Majluf (1984) 
implies that in post high performance periods rational managers will issue equity. This 
will lower the debt ratio (Lucas and McDonald (1990); Baker and Wurgler (2002)). 
 
2.1.3 Motivation of Study 
 
Many empirical studies have tested different theories of capital structure by analyzing 
firm specific factors while ignoring ownership structure of a firm. Generally these 
studies employ a set of determinants of capital structure which are drawn from financial 
statements of a firm and they include, but are not limited to, firm size, asset structure, 
profitability, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shields, tax rate, firm risk, dividend 
payouts, share price performance, etc. Then competing theories of capital structure offer 
explanations on the direction and strength of relationship each of these contextual 
factors have with leverage. However, empirical evidence of a pattern that firms follow 
to finance their ventures is not shared universally. 
 
Challenging the assumption that owners constitute a homogeneous unit, it may be 
hypothesized that different types of owners – having different needs, preferences, values 
and strengths – would influence capital structure differently. However, most of the 
studies on capital structure ignore as to how equity ownership structure of a firm affects 
its choices to finance its projects. This disregard to equity ownership as a possible 
explanatory variable in determining the capital structure may cause model 
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misspecifications and loss in explanatory power of the models drawing questionable 
conclusions. 
 
Furthermore, studies on role of debt as disciplinary device and its relation to ownership 
structure are mostly based on the assumption that a shareholder has direct ownership 
stake such that his control rights are proportional to cash flow rights. There are few 
studies17
There are few research studies done on corporate sector in Pakistan. To our knowledge, 
capital structure choice of Pakistani firms has been studied in two international and in 
 which explore relation between ultimate shareholding (directly and indirectly 
through pyramids, multiple control chains and cross-holdings) and capital structure. If 
benefits of control exceed ownership rights in arrangements like pyramids or cross-
holdings, then debt may become partially ineffective in controlling agency cost. In such 
arrangements controlling owner may be expropriating rights of other stakeholders, 
especially minority shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; and 
Claessens, Fan and Lang, 2006). Furthermore, different types of ultimate owner would 
employ debt to fulfill different objectives; for instance, family as ultimate owner would 
use debt as shield against threat of takeovers. Therefore, analysis of ultimate ownership 
would give deeper insight into the interaction of ownership structure with capital 
structure and their role in mitigating agency cost and asymmetric information. 
 
Moreover, most of the empirical research on capital and ownership structures has been 
conducted using data from developed economies. In fact, it is the unavailability of 
corporate data in developing economies which puts barriers on research in corporate 
finance and industrial organization. Whilst legal, institutional and organizational 
arrangements in developing economies are rather weak, it provides an opportunity to 
test validity of corporate finance theories in developing economies. Therefore, 
considering Pakistan as a representative developing economy, it would be intriguing to 
know if relation between ownership structure and capital structure works the same way 
as it does in developed economies. This line of inquiry may produce results which 
would have strong implications for corporate governance in Pakistan.  
 
                                               
17 Du and Dai (2005); Bianco and Nicodano (2006); Manos, Murinde and Green (2007); and Paligorova 
and Xu (2009). 
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three Pakistan-focused studies. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV) 
(1997) examined the impact of legal structure on external finance, and they classify 
Pakistan in the group of countries with weak legal system and smaller markets for 
external finance. Focusing on arrangements for investor protection across 49 countries, 
they find that countries with weak legal structure have “smaller and shallower” capital 
markets. Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) have studied capital 
structure in 10 developing countries include Pakistan in their sample set. They highlight 
significance of country specific factors besides firm specific factors in determining 
leverage ratio. However, with regard to Pakistan their sample is biased as they focused 
on KSE-100 index18
                                               
18 KSE-100 index reflects the market capitalization of top 100 companies listed on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange, the largest stock exchange in Pakistan. 
 companies only.  
 
Pakistan-focused studies include one by Shah and Hijazi (2004) and the other by Shah 
and Khan (2007). Using four factors, the former did pooled regression analyses of 
capital structure choice of listed companies. The latter is an improvement of the first in 
terms of extending the time window from 1993 to 2002. Moreover, they added two 
more variables of interest and applied fixed effect panel regression to estimate their 
model. Third study by Hasan and Ali (2009) is on the impact of corporate governance 
and ownership on capital structure of listed Pakistani firms. They find that managerial 
shareholding has negative significant impact and institutional shareholding has positive 
yet insignificant impact on leverage ratio. Their study, using small sample of 59 firms, 
is based on pooled regression and provides limited coverage with respect to different 
types of owners.  
 
Motivation in this study is to build on the existing literature and study the impact of 
ownership structure on financing decisions of publicly listed firms on the KSE.  
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2.2 Overview of Data 
  
This study is focused on non-financial public listed firms19 in Pakistan. Major challenge 
has been data availability, especially details on equity ownership are hard to find. 
Though listed companies in Pakistan are obliged to make their financial and non-
financial information available to public yet absence of any comprehensive database 
makes data collection effort very difficult. I have hand collected data from annual 
financial statements of more than 350 firms listed on the KSE. The 'ownership' details 
have been gleaned directly from the financial statements of the firms. If possible, 
“investors’ relation” sections of websites of the listed firms have also been browsed and 
some valuable information regarding equity ownership structure, board members, and 
chains of relations with other listed and non-listed firms have been collected. Likewise, 
websites of some listed companies have been very useful in identifying the type of 
ultimate shareholders. As a supplementary source, publications of State Bank of 
Pakistan (SBP)20
Although financial data starting from 1997 is accessible, the estimates in the following 
study are based on five years annual panel data starting from year 2002, and reason for 
starting from year 2002 is that ownership information was made mandatory for public 
disclosure
 – central bank of the country – have been consulted. Market 
knowledge, like information contained in the financial press, has been collected and, in 
some cases, it has instrumental in exploring identities of ultimate owners, which have 
been cross-checked with information on shareholding patterns as disclosed in annual 
statements of the firms. 
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19 Financial institutions - banks, insurance companies, investment banks, etc. - have different investment 
and capital structure compared to non-financial institutions. Reference in point are Myers (2001), Gugler, 
Mueller, and Yurtoglu, (2002) and Bjuggren, Dzansi, and Palmberg (2007). 
20 The SBP publishes selected items from the financial statements of companies listed on the KSE under 
the title 'Balance Sheet Analyses of Joint Stock Companies'. 
21  Public disclosure about the shareholding is required by Section 236 of the Companies Ordinance of 
Pakistan (1984). However, the specific instructions on the public disclosure of the pattern and identity of 
shareholders have been laid down in the section XIX(i) of the 'Code of Corporate Governance', issued by 
the corporate supervisory authority (Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan). 
 only in 2002. Among other benefits, use of panel data allows more degrees 
of freedom and it helps in calculating efficient estimates by controlling co-linearity 
among explanatory variables and controls for unobserved heterogeneity. To cleanse the 
data I have excluded firms with missing variables and firms with data available for less 
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than 3 consecutive years. After doing that exercise 306 firms or 1,530 firm years have 
been used in this study.  
 
2.2.1 Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: Leverage is our dependent variable and it is defined as ratio of 
book value of debt as numerator, and market value of equity plus book value of debt as 
denominator22
Explanatory Variables: Ownership is main explanatory variable and it has been 
explored in three dimensions: direct ownership
. 
 
23
How equity ownership structure affects leverage ratio could be explained in terms of 
active-monitoring hypothesis versus passive-voters hypothesis. Studies by Jensen 
(1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Friend and Lang (1988) and Shome and Singh 
(1995) propose that a particular type of owners has the will, skill and fiduciary position 
to actively monitor the activities of the managers and stop them from behaving 
opportunistically. This is how they protect their interests in the firm and work as 
substitute to the debt in controlling the agency cost. On the other hand, Pound (1988)  
and McConnell and Servaes (1990) purpose that if a particular category of shareholders 
collude with the managers and work in a manner which is against the interest of the 
other (dispersed or minority) shareholders then shareholding by that category would be 
, ownership concentration, and ultimate 
ownership. Definition of ownership is mainly based on voting rights. 
 
It is an established argument that debt disciplines managers and controls agency cost of 
free cash flows. Ownership structure also plays a role in controlling agency cost. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to know if debt and ownership structure work as 
substitute or complement for each other in controlling the agency cost. In this regard 
research is expanding to estimate the interaction of ownership and capital structures. 
 
                                               
22 Due to almost non-existent market for trading debt, book value of debt has been used as a proxy for 
market value of debt. References include studies by Titman and Wessels (1988), and Friend and Lang 
(1988). Bowman (1980) has asserted that no noise is produced by using book value of debt in place of 
market value of debt. 
23  Types of direct owners introduced in this dissertation are consistent with those defined in the “Code of 
Corporate Governance” issued by the SECP in 2002. 
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negatively related to debt. The following paragraph presents the case of possible 
interaction of ownership by managers and its impact on capital structure. 
 
The principal-agent relation between investors and managers is translated as separation 
of ownership from control. If monitoring is lacking, managers have the incentives to 
shirk, misappropriate funds or to behave inefficiently if there is no one to monitor them. 
However, if managers acquire ownership stake in the firm, their interests would be 
aligned with that of outside shareholders – incentive-alignment hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, if ownership of managers keeps rising then at some level managers would 
entrench themselves – managerial-entrenchment hypothesis. Given this non-linearity in 
the behavior of managers, questions have been raised about the interaction between 
managerial ownership and leverage ratio – they substitute or complement each other in 
controlling agency cost. Leland and Pyle (1977), Berger et al. (1997) and Chen and 
Steiner (1999) show that managerial ownership and leverage are positively related, 
whereas Friend and Lang (1988), Jensen et. al. (1993), Bathala et. al. (1994), and 
Seetharaman et. al. (2001) show that managerial shareholding and leverage are 
negatively related. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991), Grier and Zychowicz (1994) and 
Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008) find negative relationship between institutional ownership 
and leverage. 
 
In the following table 2.1 definitions of the key terms related to equity ownership and 
types of owners are presented.  
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Table 2.1: Definition of Ownership24
Owner type 
 Variables 
Definition 
Direct ownership  
 
Ultimate ownership 
Direct holding of control (voting) rights by different 
categories of owners. It is measured in percentage terms. 
Sum of direct and indirect percentage ownership of control 
(voting) rights. Indirect ownership could be through cross-
shareholding, pyramids or multiple control chains. Types of 
ultimate owners include family, state, foreigner or legal 
person. Dummy variable has been used to identify the type 
of ultimate owner.  
Ownership 
concentration 
Three proxies have been used: voting rights of the largest 
owner, sum of the voting rights of top three shareholders, 
and sum of the voting rights of top five shareholders. In the 
case of single largest owner, identities of the owner have 
also been specified and dummy variable has been used to 
fathom the effect of different types of the largest single 
shareholder on the leverage ratio. 
Voting rights25 Percentage of shares with voting rights of a company 
controlled by its ultimate owner. If firm A is controlled 
indirectly through another traded firm B, the percentage of 
voting rights of A in the hands of the controlling shareholder 
is equal to the minimum between the voting rights owned by 
the controlling shareholder in B and the voting rights owned 
by firm B in firm A. This algorithm can be generalized to 
more layers of controls and to more complex control 
structures. 
Percentage of shares conferring dividend rights to the holder 
of shares, calculated as following: if a firm A is controlled 
indirectly via another traded firm B, the percentage of cash 
flow rights of A owned by the controlling shareholder is 
equal to the product of cash-flow rights owned by 
controlling shareholder in B times the fraction of cash-flow 
rights owned by firm B in firm A. This algorithm can be 
generalized to more layers of controls and more complex 
control structures. 
 
 of  
controlling shareholder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cash-flow rights of 
controlling shareholder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
24 The Companies Ordinance of Pakistan (1984) and other relevant laws require disclosure of equity 
ownership based on voting rights only.  
25 Du and Dai (2005) define voting right as “Right of a common stock shareholder to vote, in person or by 
proxy, for members of the board of directors and other corporate policies such as the issuance of senior 
securities, stock splits and substantial changes in operations”. Further the definitions of the voting rights 
and cash flow rights of controlling shareholder have been adopted from Paolo (2002). 
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Table 2.1 (continued.) 
 
 Direct owners 
Insiders  Sum of percentage shareholding by managers, directors and 
their family members. 
Associated firms   Sum of percentage shareholding by associated firms, where 
associated undertakings are any two or more companies 
interconnected with each other (a) if there is an 
owner/director/partner of a company who owns equal to 
more than 20 percent voting rights in each of the associated 
firms; (b) if the firms are under common management or 
control or one is the subsidiary of the other; and (c) if the 
undertaking is a Modaraba26
Group 
. 
Sum of shareholding by insiders and associated firms. 
Financial institutions Sum of shareholding by banks, mutual funds, pension funds, 
investment companies, insurance companies, etc. 
Foreigners  Percentage shareholding by foreign shareholders 
Government Percentage shareholding by federal and provincial 
governments, government owned financial and non-financial 
firms, etc. 
 Ultimate Owners 
Family Sum of percentage shareholding, directly and/or indirectly, 
by family. Family is a group of individuals, either by blood 
or by marriage, who owns firm’s equity, individually or as a 
group. Mostly member(s) of a family hold slot of an officer 
or a director.  
State  Sum of percentage shareholding, directly and/or indirectly, 
by federal and provincial governments, municipalities, 
government owned financial and non-financial firms, etc. 
Foreigners Sum of percentage shareholding, directly and/or indirectly, 
by foreigners. 
Legal person Sum of percentage shareholding, directly and/or indirectly, 
by non-listed firms. 
Family (extended) Sum of percentage shareholding by family and legal person. 
                                               
26 Modaraba companies are defined in section 2.2.2. 
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Figure 2.1: Direct Ownership (Mutually exclusive categories) 
 
Institutions
Individuals
Government, 
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Figure 2.2: Direct Ownership (Tree diagram) 
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2.2.2 Summary Statistics 
 
As shown in table 2.2 average size of a firm in terms of total assets is 3.8 billion 
Pakistani Rupee (hereafter PKR), with median assets 940 million PKR (in terms of 
gross sales it is 4.8 billion PKR with median 970 million PKR) . The table shows that 
average (median) debt ratio is 68 (73.5) percent. This ratio suggests that Pakistani listed 
firms are fairly leveraged. Further, the structure of assets is such that tangible assets, on 
average, are little more than half of total assets (52.36 percent). On average ratio of 
market value of common stock to book value of common stock is 85 percent and 
median value is 64 percent. Average dividend payout ratio is 15.3 percent of the net 
profit before taxes. The annual depreciation to asset ratio (NDTS) is 4 percent, and the 
firm profitability measured by return on equity is 11.3 percent on average with 10 
percent median value. 
 
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics (Firm Specific Variables) 
 
Leverage is defined as ratio of total liabilities to total liabilities plus market value of common stock, 
tangibility is ratio of fixed assets to total assets, dividend payout is ratio of total dividend to net profit 
before tax, non-debt tax shield represent ratio of current depreciation to total assets, market-to-book is 
ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity, and risk is measured as standard deviation of 
market value of firm during last four years. All statistics are calculated over the whole set of 306 firms. 
Total assets and gross sales are measured in million of Pakistani Rupees, except risk all other variables 
are presented in percentage terms. 
                   Mean  
     
Median     St. Dev.          Min          Max  
Total Assets  3772 940 10864 5 150656 
Gross Sales  4794 970 18017 0 353833 
Leverage  67.67 73.50 24.02 1.38 100.00 
Tangibility  52.36 53.15 22.58 0.00 98.69 
Dividend Payout  15.26 0.00 35.46 -118.95 500.00 
Non-debt Tax Shield  4.09 3.68 3.78 0.00 76.65 
Return on Equity  11.31 10.00 78.61 -684.30 1242.90 
Market to Book Ratio 84.63 63.96 208.49 70.00 2268.93 
Risk  0.66 0.05 2.10 0.00 22.25 
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Table 2.3: Debt Ratios of Developing and Developed Countries 
 
Debt ratio is defined as total liabilities divided by total liabilities plus net worth. Data for developing 
countries is borrowed from Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001, Table 1), and for 
developed countries is borrowed from Rajan and Zingales (1995, Table IIIa). 
 
 Nr. of Firms Time Period Debt Ratio (%) 
Panel A: Developing countries 
Brazil 49 1985-1991 30.30 
Mexico 99 1984-1990 34.70 
India 99 1980-1990 67.10 
South Korea 93 1983-1990 73.40 
Jordan 38 1983-1990 47.00 
Malaysia 96 1983-1990 41.80 
Pakistan 96 1980-1987 65.60 
Thailand 64 1983-1990 49.40 
Turkey 45 1983-1990 59.10 
Zimbabwe 48 1980-1988 41.50 
Panel B: Developed countries 
United States 2580 1991 58.00 
Japan 514 1991 69.00 
Germany 191 1991 73.00 
France 225 1991 71.00 
Italy 118 1991 70.00 
United Kingdom 608 1991 54.00 
Canada 318 1991 56.00 
 
Table 2.3 shows comparative statistics on leverage ratio for selected developed and 
developing countries. It gives distribution of capital structure in 10 developing countries 
(Panel A) and 7 developed countries (Panel B). It shows that Pakistan falls in the group 
of countries with highly leveraged corporations. Comparison of average leverage ratio 
as shown in table 2.3 with that in table 2.2 shows that it remains quite stable over time – 
65.5 (period: 1980-87), and 67.67 (period: 2002-06). 
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics (Ownership) 
 
Summary statistics of the ownership variables are given in percentage terms. Panel A shows summaries 
on different types of direct owners; Panel B describes ownership concentration in terms of ownership held 
by the single largest shareholder, followed by different types thereof, and shareholding by the top three 
(five) shareholders; Panel C gives summaries on voting rights of different types of ultimate owners, and 
Panel D gives details on cash flow rights of different types of ultimate owner. Abbreviation used:  Std. 
Dev. = Standard deviation, AF = Associated firms, FI = Financial Institutions, NFI = Non-financial 
institutions, For. = Foreigner, State = Government of Pakistan, T1 = the largest shareholder, T3 (5) = sum 
of shareholding by 3 (5) largest shareholders and Family (ext.) = Extended definition of family (Family + 
Legal Person). 
 
Panel A: Direct ownership (in terms of voting rights) 
Owner Type Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Insiders (1) 1526 28.78 25.00 25.79 0 95.70 
AF (2) 1526 15.19 1.50 21.18 0 90.40 
Group  (1 + 2) 1526 43.97 47.34 23.80 0 97.51 
FI (3) 1526 15.60 12.35 13.11 0 85.20 
NFI (4) 1526 29.07 20.10 27.87 0 98.40 
Dispersed (5) 1526 26.56 22.70 18.00 0 100.00 
Foreigner  1526 7.85 0.00 19.18 0 94.90 
State 1526 2.43 0.00 11.97 0 96.30 
Institutions (3 + 4) 1526 44.69 40.60 30.01 0 100.00 
Individuals (1 + 5) 1526 55.31 59.40 30.01 0 100.00 
 
Panel B: Ownership concentration (in terms of voting rights) 
Owner Type Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
T1 1526 28.70 23.04 19.11 4.09 96.34 
   T1-Insiders 584 21.99 17.24 14.39 4.09 76.14 
   T1-AF 444 31.15 26.13 18.08 5.78 96.1 
   T1- FI 256 20.23 20.16 9.4 4.96 84.05 
   T1-For. 187 45.99 44.52 20 8.61 94.34 
   T1- State 55 60.57 60.43 24.42 24.86 96.34 
T3 1526 50.09 46.6 20.74 7.06 99.84 
T5 1526 60.76 60.79 19.47 12.81 99.88 
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Panel C: Ultimate Ownership (in terms of voting rights) 
Owner Type Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Family (1) 890 53.96 53.50 17.01 5.30 97.51 
State 75 62.41 62.76 22.37 24.90 96.30 
Foreigner 200 56.36 53.45 19.50 15.00 94.90 
Legal person (2) 270 46.37 44.73 15.97 9.20 95.90 
Family (extd.) (1+2) 1160 52.20 50.85 17.07 5.30 97.50 
Sum over categories 1435 50.98 50.70 20.26 5.30 97.51 
 
Panel D: Ultimate Ownership (in terms of cash flow rights) 
Owner Type Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Family (1) 890 51.53 50.10 17.88 5.30 97.50 
State 75 57.93 54.40 23.38 24.90 96.30 
Foreigner 200 56.07 53.40 19.63 15.00 94.90 
Legal person (2) 270 41.24 41.72 18.78 3.57 93.60 
Family (extd.) (1+2)  1160 49.13 48.94 18.60 3.57 97.50 
Sum over categories 1435 48.36 48.59 21.12 3.57 97.51 
 
Table 2.4 (Panel A) shows that mean (median) value of Insiders' holding is 28.78 (25) 
percent, whereas associated firms have 15 (1.5) percent shareholding. The two 
categories - insiders and associated firms - together (as group) hold 44 (47) percent, 
almost half of the total shares. Financial institutions' mean (median) holding is 15.6 
(12.35) percent whereas that for non-financial firm is 29 (20) percent. The dispersed 
individuals own 26.6 percent on average (23 percent median) shares in the firms. On 
average foreigners hold 8 percent stake in firms, and the Government of Pakistan holds 
2.5 percent stake. On the whole, individuals hold 55 (59) percent of the shares, whereas 
overall institutions have 45 (41) percent stake in firms' ownership. It may be clarified 
here that insiders and dispersed individuals add up to shareholding by 'individuals', and 
financial institutions and non-financial institutions taken together give total institutional 
holding.  
 
Panel B of table 2.4 shows ownership concentration measured alternatively by 
shareholding by the largest owner, top 3 shareholders and top 5 shareholders. The 
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largest shareholder has further been identified as insiders or associated firms or financial 
institutions or foreigner or government. Average shareholding by the largest owner is 
28.7 percent. Shareholding by top three (five) block-holders has mean value of 50.09 
(60.76). In terms of average shareholding, there is considerable variation among 
different types of the largest owner. Insiders as the largest owner has mean value 22 
percent, associated firms has 31 percent, financial institutions has average shareholding 
20, foreigner has 46 percent, and government has the highest average holding (60.57 
percent shareholding) as the largest owner. 
 
As regards ultimate ownership, for 178 firms (890 observations or 58 percent of total) 
family is the ultimate owner, for 15 firms (75 observations or 4.9 percent of total) state 
is the ultimate largest owner, for 40 firms (200 observations or 13 percent of total) 
foreigner is the ultimate owner, for 54 firm (270 observations or 17.65 percent of total) 
legal person is ultimate controlling shareholder, and the remaining 19 firms (95 
observations or 6.2 percent of total) are widely-held in our sample of 306 non-financial 
listed firms. For extended definition of family (family and legal person together) there 
are 232 firms (1160 observations or 75.8 percent of total) in this category.  
 
Panels ‘C’ and ‘D’ provide summary statistics on ultimate ownership. There are 178 
firms with family as ultimately controlling shareholder (if extended definition of family 
is considered then the number of firms with family as ultimate shareholder increases to 
232), 25 firms with the state as ultimate shareholder and 40 firms with foreigner as the 
ultimate shareholder. There are 52 firms with legal person as ultimate shareholder. 
 
Panel C of table 2.4 shows that mean (median) value of ultimate shareholder's voting 
rights for family controlled firms is 54 (53.5), for firms with state as ultimate owner is 
62 (63), for foreigner as ultimate owner is 56 (54), and for legal person as ultimate 
owner it is 46 (45). For extended definition of family as an ultimate owner mean 
(median) shareholding is 52(51). Panel D of table 2.4 details summary statistics of cash 
flow rights of the ultimate owners.  
 
The distribution of ownership of different types is shown in appendix A1 (percentile 
plots) and A2 (deciles tables). Table in appendix A2 shows that 70 percent of the 
observations for the largest shareholder (proxy for measuring ownership concentration) 
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are below 31.40; however, when we take sum of shareholding of the three (five) largest 
owners the number jumps to 60.17 (71.79). This shows that for most of the firms the 
largest owner is not holding absolute majority of the votes, instead he holds a sizeable 
minority block of voting rights.  
 
2.3 Hypotheses: 
 
2.3.1 Direct Ownership and Capital Structure: 
 
Direct ownership represents direct voting rights of different types owners. Figure 2.1 
shows mutually exclusive categories of direct owners: individuals and institutions. 
There are two subcategories of individuals – insiders and dispersed individuals, and two 
subcategories of institutions – financial institutions and non-financial firms. Figure 2.2 
(tree diagram) further elaborates that ‘government’ and ‘foreign’ shareholders are 
elements of financial and non-financial institutions, and associated firms and insiders 
together form a voting bloc labeled as ‘group’. Following is the detail on definitions of 
direct owners and hypotheses on their prospective relation with leverage ratio. 
 
Insiders represent sum of percentage shareholdings by managers, directors and their 
family27
There is a range of arguments with respect to the impact of insiders’ shareholding on 
capital structure. First, interest of managers/directors is aligned with outside 
shareholders in direct proportion to their shareholdings. Second, insiders have invested 
their non-diversifiable personal wealth (combination of wages and human capital) in the 
firm. Therefore, they would prefer to have minimum debt in order to avoid bankruptcy 
and financial distress cost. This strategy of managers becomes pronounced when they 
are facing shallow labor markets, they are in age bracket where it is difficult to switch 
profession, and their reputation leads them in alternate jobs available to them in the 
market. Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990) offer similar explanation in their study on all-
equity firms and state that if more family members of the 'insiders' category engaged in 
 members.  
 
                                               
27 According to Banking Companies Ordinance 1962, section 5(ff), family members in relation to a 
person means his spouse, dependent lineal ascendant and descendants and dependent brothers and sisters. 
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the firm affairs, then the firms would tend to have low debt in order to protect family28
Associated firms represent percentage shareholding by associated undertakings. 
According to corporate law in Pakistan, associated undertakings are any two or more 
companies interconnected with each other (a) if there is an owner/director/partner of a 
company who owns equal to more than 20 percent voting rights in each of the 
associated firms; (b) if the firms are under common management or control or one is the 
subsidiary of the other; and (c) if the undertaking is a Modaraba
 
human capital. Third, Amihud and Lev (1981), Jensen (1986), and Friend and Lang 
(1988) argue that in a characteristic setting in which managers are entrenched, they 
would prefer to keep leverage as low as possible and maintain the firm as a going-
concern. These arguments highlight possible negative relation between debt and 
insiders' ownership.  
 
H2.1: Shareholdings by insiders affect debt ratio negatively. 
 
29
Salient features of shareholding by associated firms are as follows: One, associated 
firms are alternative sources of funds and their shareholding would reduce reliance on 
debt to finance firm projects. Two, there are executives in associate firms who would be 
vigilant
.  
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28 It is believed that as the shareholding of insiders goes up the number of family members of that 
category would go up to split up the shareholding appropriately for tax savings purposes. 
29 Modaraba is Islamic mode of doing business in which one person brings the money and another pools 
his efforts or skills. It is basically a partnership agreement between equity holder and manager. Refer 
Modaraba Companies and Modaraba (Flotation and Control) Ordinance, (1980) issued by Ministry of 
Law & Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Pakistan. 
30 Lev (1988) argues that institutions have better capacity to oversee the managers. 
 of management in all associated entities, and behave as active monitors. 
Hence, shareholding by associated firms would work as alternative disciplinary device 
to debt in controlling agency cost. Three, associated firms enjoy influence on the 
investee firm’s board and they would like to keep tight control on strategic decision 
making in the firm. For reasons enumerated above, the following may be hypothesized: 
 
H2.2: Shareholdings by associated firms affect debt ratio negatively.  
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Group represents sum of shareholding by insiders and associates shareholding, forming 
a voting bloc, and as such inherits properties of the two constituents as regards influence 
on leverage ratio is concerned.  
 
Financial Institutions: Sum of percentage shareholding by financial institutions, which 
include banks, insurance companies, pension funds, investment trusts, mutual funds, 
development financial institutions, etc.  
 
There are some special characteristics attached to this category of direct shareholders. 
One, these institutions, in comparison to non-financial institutions, are more concerned 
about portfolio diversifications, especially when enforcement of creditors’ rights is 
weak (Burkart and Panunzi, 2006). Two, banks – major players in the financial industry 
– face supervisory investment limits31 on overall equity portfolio of the banks with 
reference to their own equity/assets and investment in one company’s shares. Three, 
financial institutions32
                                               
31 Like other Anglo-Saxon economies Pakistan is market-centered economy where banks are not 
encouraged to play important governance role in the non-financial companies. In this regard the SBP has 
issued ‘Prudential Regulations’ for corporate/commercial banking which set standards and limits for 
banks with regard to their lending and equity holding activities. According to Regulation R-6, para (1.B) 
Acquisition of shares: (a) Banks or Development Finance Institution (DFIs) shall not own shares of any 
company in excess of 5% of their own equity. Further, the total investments of banks in shares should not 
exceed 20% of their own equity. DFIs which are not mobilizing funds as deposits/COIs from general 
public/individuals will be exempt from the requirement of capping their total investment in equities. 
However, DFIs which are mobilizing funds as deposits/COIs from general public/individuals will be 
required to contain their investment in shares up to 35% of their equity. The shares will be valued at cost 
of acquisition for the purpose of calculating bank’s/DFI’s exposure under this regulation. The investments 
of the bank/DFI in its subsidiary companies (listed as well as non-listed) and strategic investments of the 
bank/DFI shall not be included in these limits. The shares acquired in excess of 5% limit due to the 
underwriting commitments will be sold off / off loaded within a period of three months. The condition of 
capping aggregate exposure shall also be applicable on Islamic banks to the extent of 35% of their equity. 
For the purpose of this regulation, shares will also include units of all forms of Mutual Funds excluding 
NIT units till its privatization. 
32 Pakistani banks, dominant players in this category, are discouraged from exercising control in day-to-
day affairs of the companies unless they are strategic investors, which is an investment made for a period 
of 5 years or more. For reference see Prudential Regulations issued by the SBP available at 
www.sbp.org.pk 
 may have dual relationship with firms – they hold both debt and 
equity in firms. This double relation gives additional power to monitor the managers. 
Four, possible dual-relation and capacity of financial institutions to gather and process 
corporate information reduces information asymmetries between investee and financial 
institutions. Given that many factors are at work it remains an empirical matter how 
equity ownership of financial institutions affects debt ratio. 
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Foreign represents sum of percentage shareholding by foreigners. As compared to 
domestic investors, foreign investors, generally, have more investable funds at their 
disposal. They enjoy special corporate tax concessions33
Usually foreign investors acquire ownership stake in large firms (Li, Yue and Zhao, 
2009). Prospective lenders, in order to diversify their loan portfolio, would like to lend 
them yet the loan size
 which, according to Trade-off 
theory, lower interest tax savings on debt.  
 
34
Government represents sum of percentage shares held by government directly or 
through government agencies. Government ownership is based on economic as well as 
political objectives, and the latter may dominate the former. The self budget constraints 
of the government may hamper it to inject more equity in the firms owned by the state. 
Moreover, in the credit market, government owned banks are ever ready to finance 
projects of firms with large government shareholding
 may be deterring lenders from financing their projects. 
Moreover, foreigners, as compared to domestic investors, have more own funds and 
they might be using internal capital markets to finance firm projects. 
 
H2.3: Inverse relation between foreign shareholdings and leverage is expected.  
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33 “Foreign Private Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act, 1976” issued by the Government of 
Pakistan provides basis for special tax concessions to the foreigners, especially to ones who invest in 
industrial undertakings. 
34 The SBP’s ‘Prudential Regulation’ R-1 says “(1) total outstanding exposure (fund based and non-fund 
based) by a bank/DFI to any single person shall not at any point in time exceed 30% of the bank’s / DFI’s 
equity as disclosed in the latest audited financial statements, subject to the condition that the maximum 
outstanding against fund based exposure does not exceed 20% of the bank’s / DFI’s equity. (2) The total 
outstanding exposure (fund based and non-fund based) by a bank/DFI to any group shall not exceed 50% 
of the bank’s / DFI’s equity as disclosed in the latest audited financial statements, subject to the condition 
that the maximum outstanding against fund based exposure does not exceed 35% of the bank’s / DFI’s 
equity. 
35 For reference see Gordon and Li (2003), Sapienza (2004), and Berger and di Patti (2006). 
. In this case disciplining role of 
debt is compromised. Arguing in a similar manner, studies by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994), Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), Khwaja and Mian (2005) highlight positive 
relation between state ownership and leverage. Following is the hypothesis in this 
regard: 
 
H2.4: Positive relation between government ownership and leverage ratio is expected. 
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Apart from above we have three more categories (1) outside individuals which 
represent percentage of shares held by individuals other than insiders; (2) individuals 
who stand for the sum of the percentage shares held by the insiders and dispersed 
individuals; and (3) firms which denote sum of the percentage shares held by the 
financial and non-financial institutions.  
 
2.3.2 Ownership Concentration36
Concentration of ownership controls the agency cost between the shareholders and 
managers by creating incentive for and monitoring capacity of the block holder. 
Changing the risk sensitivity of the investor, ownership concentration internalizes 
monitoring and controls free rider problem (Heinrich, 2002). In order to explore effect 
of equity ownership concentration on the capital structure, three measures of ownership 
concentration have been used: first, shareholding by the largest owner; second, in the 
tradition of La Porta et al. (1998) and Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008), 
shareholding by top three shareholders; and third, in order to give wider coverage, 
leverage is regressed on shareholding by top five shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001; and Brailsford, Oliver and Pua, 2002). Different 
categories
 and Capital Structure: 
 
37
According to La Porta et al. (1998) concentrated ownership could be induced by reasons 
like substantial legal and financial benefits of control, dominant shareholders' capacity 
to better monitor the managers, and to counteract the poor legal protection available to 
small investors, etc. Bolton, Becht and Roell (2005) argue that partial ownership 
concentration and firm control by few large investors solve the collective action 
problem of the shareholders. In fact, as the stake of shareholders in the firm increases so 
does the incentive to engage more in firm affairs. Consequently shareholders become 
more watchful of management activities and try to protect their cash flow rights. 
 of the single largest shareholder have been identified as insiders, associated 
firms, financial institutions, foreigner, and government.  
 
                                               
36 Under the Companies Ordinance of Pakistan (1984), section (236) ‘Form 34’ has been prescribed for 
firms to disclose the pattern of shareholding; however, neither this law nor ‘Code of Corporate 
Governance’ as issued by the SECP, demand that identities of top one or two or three or five, etc. owners 
should be revealed by the listed firms. 
37 The pattern of shareholding is disclosed in the annual financial statements in such a manner that 
identity of the single largest from the details on shareholding by different types of direct owners. 
However, it is not possible to know the identities of the three or five largest shareholders. 
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Therefore, ownership concentration may substitute debt in the sense that it works as an 
alternative disciplinary device to control agency cost. 
 
H2.5: Higher concentration of ownership is associated with a lower leverage ratio. 
 
2.3.3 Ultimate Ownership and Capital Structure: 
 
Equity ownership confers control rights. Ultimate owner acquires control rights 
exceeding his ownership rights. In order to define38 ultimate owner (alternatively 
controlling shareholder), all shareholders with at least 5 percent control rights have been 
analyzed. Ultimate owner is the one who is (a) the largest stakeholder with control 
rights exceeding a predefined threshold at all links of the control chain, and (b) that 
shareholder is not controlled by anybody else. That controlling shareholder could be an 
individual or a group of individuals or state or a legal person. Ultimate shareholder 
acquires control rights directly or indirectly through listed and non-listed firms. In case 
of indirect control, through pyramids, cross-holding39
In contrast to direct shareholding, which is calculated at the first/base level of ownership 
hierarchy, ultimate ownership is calculated at the top level of control chain. Claessens, 
 and dual-class shares, ownership 
chains are traced and control (cash flow) rights are calculated to identify the controlling 
shareholders. 
 
                                               
38 Faccio and Lang (2002) define ultimate shareholder as “a shareholder of a corporation is said to be an 
ultimate owner at a given threshold if he controls it via a control chain whose links all exceed that 
threshold. If a firm has two owners with 12 percent of control rights each, then we say that the firm is half 
controlled by each owner at the 10 percent threshold, but that the firm is widely-held at the 20 percent 
threshold. In the case of a firm with two owners – a family with 20 percent of control rights and a widely-
held corporation with 19 percent of control rights – we would say that this firm is half controlled by each 
owner at the 10 percent threshold, but family-controlled at the 20 percent threshold”. They define control 
chain as “a firm can be controlled by holdings through multiple control chains, even though it is not 
controlled by pyramiding. For example, suppose that Firm A controls 10 percent of B and 100 percent of 
C, which controls 15 percent of B. Since C is fully controlled by A in the control chain A-C-B, there is no 
pyramiding. However, Firm A controls Firm B directly and indirectly through Firm C, with control rights 
of 25 percent. We conclude that Firm A controls Firm B through multiple control chains because: (1) 
Firm B has a controlling owner at the 20 percent level; (2) B is controlled via multiple control chains; and 
(3) all links in each chain involve at least 5 percent of the control rights.. 
39 Chernykh (2005) has defined pyramids and cross-ownership as following: “A pyramid is a group of 
companies with a vertical control chain that has an ultimate owner at its foundation. This arrangement 
allows the ultimate owner to effectively control all companies in a chain by owning just a fraction of their 
equity”. “Cross-holdings or reciprocal holdings – occur when the company directly or indirectly controls 
its own stock. In other words, two or more companies may maintain interlock ownership positions in each 
other”. 
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Djankov, Fan, Lang (2002), while studying the impact of cash flow and voting rights of 
the largest owner, highlight the difference between direct and ultimate owner. In their 
words, “In most cases, the immediate shareholders of a corporation are corporate 
entities, nonprofit foundations, or financial institutions. We then identify their owners, 
the owners of those owners, and so on. We do not consider ownership by individual 
family members to be separate, and we use total ownership by each family group-
defined as a group of people related by blood or marriage-as the unit of analysis”. 
Following these arguments the standard methodology as developed by La Porta et al. 
(1999) and, among others, followed by Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), 
and Barontini and Caprio (2005), has been followed in this dissertation. 
 
Figure 2.3: An Example of Hypothetical Pyramid 
Ultimate 
Owner 
(UO)
B11
CF:(62.5%)
B12
CF:(50%)
A11
CF:(31.25%)
B13
CF:(50%)
A12
CF:(25%)
A13
CF:(12.5%)
V:50%
V:50%
V:50%
V:50%
V:50%
V:50%
V:50%
V:50%
B14
CF:(25%)
V:50%
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Figure 2.3 shows hypothetical diagram of a business group with dominant pyramidal 
structure, except with B11 and B13 (connected with dotted arrows) having 50 percent 
cross-shareholding each. Assume that ultimate owner is a family and there is one-share-
one-vote rule, then control rights of the family are shown along the arrows and cash 
flow rights are shown inside the boxes. Blocks labeled as ‘A’ show firms which fall at 
the end of control chains and blocks labeled as ‘B’ are intermediate firms. Ultimate 
owner sits on the top of control chains. Voting (cash flow) rights of the ultimate owner 
in firm ‘A11’ are 50 (31.25) percent, in firm ‘A12’ 50 (25) percent, in firm ‘A13’ 50 
(12.5) percent. In firms labeled as ‘B’ voting (cash flow) rights in ‘B11’ are 50 (62.5), 
in ‘B12’ and ‘B13’ are 50 (50) percent, and in firm ‘B14’ voting (cash flow) rights 50 
(25) percent. 
 
Different studies have used different thresholds40
An important characteristic of ultimate ownership is the identity of ultimate/controlling 
shareholder. In this dissertation ultimate owners have been categorized
 - La Porta et al. (1999) and Faccio and 
Lang (2002) have used 10 percent and 20 percent voting rights thresholds in their study; 
Claessens et al. (2000) have used 5 percent control rights thresholds; Chernykh (2005) 
have used 25 and 50 percent thresholds alternatively; and Bjuggren, Dzansi, and 
Palmberg (2007) have used 20 percent threshold in their analyses of the investment 
performance of the firms with family as the largest stakeholder. In this study I have used 
three thresholds 10 percent, 25 percent and 50 percent - first is used for broader 
coverage of sample, second level calculates effect of blocking minority and third, the 
conservative level, gives effect of absolute majority. After having implemented the 
threshold levels if there are two or more owners fitting the definition of ultimate owner, 
the one with larger stake has been picked for this study (Claessens et al. 1999).  
 
41
                                               
40 Following provisions of Pakistani corporate law are relevant in this regard: (1) 10 percent or more 
voting rights in a company would designate the holder as 'promoter' of that company, and that promoter 
would have to follow certain rules and regulations, which include mandatory disclosure of shareholding 
to the stock exchange. (2) Anyone who wishes to acquire more than 10 percent but less than 25 percent 
voting rights in a listed company shall make public announcement to the effect of shareholding rights one 
wants to acquire. (3) Acquisition of more than 50 percent voting rights in a company entitles the holder of 
those rights with the control rights of the company. For further reference see "Substantial Acquisition of 
Voting Shares and Takeovers Ordinance, 2002." available at www.secp.gov.pk. 
 as following: 
41 La Porta et al. (1999a), and Facio and Lang (2002) have categorized firms into widely-held firms and 
those with ultimate owner. Further, they have introduced five types of ultimate owners: (1) family or 
individual, (2) state, (3) widely held financial institution, (4) widely held firm, and (5) miscellaneous. 
However, unlike these studies I have focused on only Pakistan's non-financial listed firms, therefore the 
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1) family or individual, 2) state, 3) foreigner, and 4) legal person (a non-listed private 
company for which ownership information is not available). Normally family firms 
have one or more members of the family who are represented on the board of directors 
and/or they occupy slots as top executives of the firm. As regards 'legal person', data 
limitations force us to classify it as a separate category. However, alternatively, 
following Faccio and Lang (2002), ultimate ownership by 'legal person' (unlisted firm) 
has been clubbed together with 'family' as ultimate owner. They argue that unlisted 
‘legal person’, having black-box nature, normally functions as a holding company for 
family assets. This alternative definition reduces types of ultimate owners to 1) family 
or individual, 2) state, and 3) foreigner. However, this alternative procedure may bias 
ultimate ownership measure. Results for both ultimate family and legal person as 
separate categories, and then clubbed together has been discussed. Lastly, there are 
some firms with either highly diffused ownership structure or those for which 
information on the identity of the owners is opaque are labeled as widely held.  
 
Ultimate owner enjoys control over the firm decisions and affect financing choice of the 
firm. The impact of control rights of ultimate owner on leverage ratio may be positive or 
negative. Following are the explanations in this regard: 
 
Controlling shareholders enjoy enormous benefits of control. Therefore, they would 
prefer to issue debt in place of equity for financing firm projects. This would help them 
avoid dilution of their control vis-à-vis other block holders or other equity holders who 
are potential raiders trying to take over the firm. Furthermore, given wide difference 
between control and ownership rights, the asymmetry between liability to suffer the loss 
in bad states and possibility of enjoying excess profits in good states would increase risk 
appetite of the controlling shareholders. Therefore, controlling shareholder would like to 
increase leverage to finance firm projects. In such circumstances asset substitution 
might takes place. Ultimate shareholder may issue debt for self-disciplining purpose 
giving signal about transparency in the use of free cash flows of the firm. These 
                                                                                                                                         
type 'foreigners' has been introduced as an independent class. The category ‘widely-held financial 
institutions’ has been excluded from this study on account of the fact that banking companies in Pakistan 
are not encouraged to invest in non-financial firms as strategic investors. However, when financial 
institutions, banking as well as non-banking financial institutions (insurance companies, pension funds, 
mutual funds, etc.) hold equity stake in non-financial listed firms in Pakistan, it has been possible to trace 
the ultimate ownership of those firms as financial institutions make disclosure of their ownership 
structure. 
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arguments make a case of positive relation between control rights of ultimate 
shareholder and leverage ratio.  
 
Conversely, there are arguments which assert that ultimate shareholder would like to 
reduce leverage. If he is extracting private benefits of control through tunneling42 he 
would like to have minimum debt so that disciplining role of debt would not constrain 
this activity. Du and Dai (2005) has termed it as “reduce-debt-for-tunneling effect”. 
Moreover, if legal system in the country is weak and fails to protect rights of minority 
shareholders then controlling shareholder would prefer to have higher concentration43
                                               
42 Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer (2000) define tunneling as “transfer of resources out of 
a company to its controlling shareholder (who is typically also a top manager)”. They say “tunneling 
comes in two forms. First, a controlling shareholder can simply transfer resources from the firm for his 
own benefit through self-dealing transactions. Such transactions include outright theft or fraud, which is 
illegal everywhere (though often goes undetected or unpunished), but also asset sales and contracts such 
as transfer pricing advantageous to the controlling shareholder, excessive executive compensation, loan 
guarantees, expropriation of corporate opportunities, and so on. Second, the controlling shareholder can 
increase his share of the firm without transferring any assets through dilutive share issues, minority 
freeze-outs, insider trading, creeping acquisitions, or other financial transactions that discriminate against 
minorities”.  
43 La Porta et al. (1998), Bebchuk (1999a,b) and Nenova (2003) highlight downside risk of this 
concentration of equity ownership in the hands of ultimate owner by arguing that they might be 
expropriating minority shareholders as well as debt holders by voting for very risky projects. 
 of 
voting rights in the firm. This motive would impact leverage ratio negatively. Besides, 
higher concentration of ownership may work as an alternate device in controlling 
agency cost thereby lowering importance of debt in this regard. Based upon this 
discussion it may hypothesized that 
 
Family as an ultimate owner is the dominant category. If family is the ultimate 
shareholder of a firm, while balancing the bankruptcy risk against tax benefits of debt, it 
would tend to jealously safeguard its interests in the firms against threat of takeovers by 
other families or firms, and in order to do that it might increase debt levels to that limit 
where its firms loose attraction for possible takeovers. Moreover, families are long term 
investors and firms under their control have longer histories. These factors soften their 
access to credit market. Therefore, it may be hypothesized:  
 
H2.6: Shareholdings by family as ultimate controlling shareholders affect leverage 
ratio positively.  
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Other types of ultimate owner – namely state and foreigners – would impact capital 
structure choice according to the same set of arguments as described in subsection 
‘direct ownership and capital structure’. However, the nature and strength of the impact 
of shareholding by foreigners and state as ultimate owners is left for empirical testing.  
 
2.3.4 Control Variables: 
 
Firm size: It is measured as natural log of gross sales. The information aspect as 
proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1995) argues that bigger firms are more transparent 
and hence risk of undervaluation of stocks are less, encouraging big firms to issue 
equity in place of debt. This implies a negative relation between firm size and leverage 
ratio. On the other hand 'too big to fail' cliché suggests that firm size is expected to have 
positive relation with the leverage ratio. Bigger firms are more diversified and have less 
probability of default as compared to their smaller counterparts (Friend and Lang, 1988; 
and Agarwal and Nagarajan, 1990). Part of the reason lies in the fact that bigger firms 
normally have longer corporate histories in the market. This builds their reputation 
further and they consolidate their access to debt markets, where they can borrow at 
cheaper rates (because average fixed costs of lending to bigger firms are less as 
compared to that for smaller firms). Bankruptcy costs, which have bearing upon 
leverage decision, are less relevant for bigger firms as they are substantially lower as 
compared to their firm value (Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
 
Tangibility: Asset specificity is measured as ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
Tangible assets, unlike intangibles, make it possible for the lender to value them 
correctly as available collaterals and avoid problems of information asymmetry arising 
from value discovery process of intangibles (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This implies 
that a higher proportion of tangible assets makes it easier for the firm to pledge firm 
resources for acquiring debt and reduces the risks of asset substitution (Stulz and 
Johnson, 1985). Moreover, in bankruptcy, tangible assets are more likely to have some 
market value. Therefore, asset tangibility is expected to have positive relation with 
leverage ratio.  
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Profitability: It is measured as ratio of net profit before tax to equity (Carlton and 
Silberman, 1977; and Friend and Lang, 1988). Pecking Order Theory (POT) (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984) purposes that profitability has negative impact on leverage. Firms 
according to POT prefer to employ internal resources, which are built through higher 
profits, over the external ones. Therefore more profitable firms having more reserves 
will have lower leverage ratio. On the other hand, signaling theory says that increase in 
debt in itself is a signal of strength about firm performance, and that creditors are ready 
to lend. Therefore, according to signaling theory profitability has positive relation with 
leverage.  
 
Growth opportunities: These are measured by ratio of market value of stock to book 
value of stock. According to POT there is negative relation between growth 
opportunities and leverage ratio. However, if internal resources of the firm are not 
sufficient to capitalize on those growth opportunities then the firm will exhaust debt 
capacity before issuing equity. Many studies (Titman and Wessels, 1988; and Mehran, 
1992) postulate that in growing firms managers have higher tendency to expropriate 
funds from debt-holders. This, again, asserts a negative relation between growth and 
leverage. Market-timing hypothesis states that managers, facing growth opportunities, 
issue equity when their stocks are overvalued.  
 
Dividend payout: This is the ratio of total dividends to net profit before taxes. There 
are competing explanations as far as relation of dividend payout ratio with leverage is 
concerned. Rozeff (1982), Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986) argue that dividend 
payments control agency costs by reducing free cash flows available to managers and 
bring firm under greater market scrutiny. They argue that there is substitution of non-
dividend monitoring devices by the dividend-monitoring. Higher dividend payout 
projects better future prospects and reduces cost of equity for firm, and it is usually 
followed by ew equity issues. This line of arguments suggests a negative relation 
between dividend payout ratio and leverage.  
 
Firm Risk: This is measured as standard deviation of the market value of common 
share for last four years. More fluctuations in market value of a firm indicate lack of 
stability of firm policies affecting confidence of investors. As more risky firms would 
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find it difficult to get loans on better terms, it may be expected that relation between 
firm riskiness and leverage is negative. 
 
Non-debt tax shield: This is measured as ratio of current depreciation to total assets. 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) revised their 'capital structure irrelevance' hypothesis by 
identifying that when firms have reasonable proportion of taxable income interest tax 
concessions must lead to higher proportions of debt in firm financing. The tax 
deductions for depreciation and investment tax credits can be considered as substitutes 
for tax benefits of debt financing. This implies that firms which have higher levels of 
these non-debt tax shields will have lower levels of debt (DeAnglo and Masulis, 1980). 
 
2.4 The Model 
 
The estimation techniques for panel analyses include constant coefficient model, 
fixed effects model, random effects model and generalized method of moments 
(System GMM)44
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. Leverage as a function of ownership, along with other control 
variables, has been modeled as in the following equations. Equation (2.1) is used to 
analyze effect of different types of direct owners on leverage; equation (2.2) 
estimate effect of ownership concentration on leverage ratio; and equation (2.3) 
estimate how different types of ultimate owners affect financing choice of a firm. 
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  (2.3) 
 
                                               
44 Linear Dynamic Panel-data Estimation Model in Arellano-Bond tradition. 
45 As the identities of top three and top five shareholders have not been included in the analyses, 
therefore, when ‘c’ represents sum of shareholding by top three or five shareholders, the interaction term 
with coefficient ‘f’ drops out of equation (2.2). 
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In above equations ‘i’ represents ith firm, ‘t’ is the time dimension, ‘j’ is the type of 
direct shareholder (insiders, associated firms, group, financial institutions, state, 
foreigner, and dispersed individuals), ‘c’ is the proxy for ownership concentration 
(Top1 or Top3 or Top5), ‘s’ represents type of the single largest owner (insiders, 
associated firms, financial institutions, state, and foreigner), ‘u’ represents type of 
ultimate owner (family, state, foreigner, legal person). Following are the definitions 
of key variables in the above equations  
 
Yi,t:  Leverage 
Xi,t:  Vector of control variables (firm size, asset tangibility, market-to-
book ratio, firm profitability, dividend payout ratio, non-debt tax 
shields). 
Zj:  Direct ownership (voting rights) by owner type j, and coefficient of 
this variable shows effect of shareholding by direct owner j on the 
leverage ratio. 
VRi,t,c:  Ownership of ‘c’ type of proxy for ownership concentration (Top1 
or Top3 or Top5). 
Dj: Dummy variable for type ‘j’ of direct owners. 
VRi,t,c*Dj: Interaction term of voting rights of ‘c’ type of proxy for ownership 
concentration and dummy for ‘j’ type of direct owner. For instance 
‘c’ is the largest owner (Top1) and ‘j’ represents direct 
shareholding of financial institutions then coefficient of this 
variable separate the effect of voting rights of financial institution 
as the largest owner from the voting rights of the largest owner 
without mention of its type. 
Dth: Dummy variable for threshold level ‘th’ (10 percent, 25 percent or 
50 percent of voting rights. 
VRi,t*Dth:  Interaction term of voting rights of ultimate owner (without 
considering type of the ultimate owner) and dummy for 'th' level of 
threshold of voting rights.  
VRi,t*Dth*Du: Interaction term of voting rights of ultimate owner and dummy for 
threshold level (10, 25 or 50 percent voting rights) and dummy for 
'u' type of ultimate owner. For example ‘u’ represents family as the 
ultimate owner with at least 25 percent voting rights (threshold 
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level), then coefficient of this variable separate effect of 
shareholding of family as ultimate owner, given that the 
shareholding is at least 25 percent of the voting rights, from the 
effect of voting rights of ultimate owner (without mention of its 
type) with at least 25 percent voting rights. 
 
In above models disturbance term varies over time and we assume that it is free of serial 
correlation. It has properties like zero mean and σ2 variance. All the equations have 
been estimated using the fixed effects (FE) model46
Results in Table 2.5 show effect of direct ownership by owner type 'j' on leverage ratio. 
Direct ownership by insiders (model 1) is focus category. Results show that 
shareholding by insiders
.  
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
 
2.5.1 Direct ownership and Leverage 
 
47
                                               
46 We have applied 'random effect (RE) model'. Hausman test confirms that FE is preferred over RE. 
47 We have tested our model for quadratic relation between the leverage and insiders' ownership to 
calculate if the 'incentive effect' of insider ownership changes to 'entrenchment effect' at the higher level 
of insider ownership. However, the coefficient of quadratic term is statistically insignificant. Therefore, 
our findings are not consistent with the idea of curvilinear relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm value as proposed by Fama and Jensen (1983), Demsetz (1983), Morck et. at (1988), and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) and (1995). 
 is negatively related to leverage ratio and coefficient is 
statistically significant, and plausible explanations of this negative relation are as 
follows: One, in terms of controlling agency cost, it appears that shareholding by 
insiders work as a substitute to debt. As shareholding by insiders increases the need for 
debt as a disciplining device decreases. Two, managers tend to protect their non-
diversifiable human capital which would be threatened by bankruptcy risk caused by 
issuing debt. Therefore, they would like to have minimum debt. Three, managers prefer 
to avoid performance pressure caused by compulsions of regular debt repayments. Four, 
in the absence of monitoring by debt holders, managers would be extract private 
benefits of control. Therefore insiders prefer less debt. These results are consistent with 
the findings of Friend and Lang (1988), Jensen et. al. (1993), Bathala et. al. (1994), and 
Seetharaman et. al. (2001). However, they do not agree with the findings of Leland and 
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Pyle (1977), Chen and Steiner (1996), and Berger et. al. (1997), finding that managerial 
ownership has positive relation with leverage.  
 
The model 2 in table 2.5 shows that shareholding by associated firms affects leverage 
ratio negatively. This inverse relation asserts that associated firms replace debt as an 
alternative source of funds and as a tool controlling agency cost. Moreover, associated 
firms may be extracting benefits of control by keeping debt ratio as low as possible. 
Similar results hold for overall group (sum of insiders and associated firms) 
shareholdings. This shows that group works as a voting bloc of insiders and associated 
firms. Table 2.5 (model 4) shows that shareholding by financial institutions affect 
leverage ratio positively. Possible reasons for this positive relation include financial 
institutions as equity holders would like the firm to increase debt so that firm may be 
brought under the discipline of debt holder. This is very important when financial 
institutions are not allowed by their regulators to participate in the day-to-day affairs of 
the firm. This is how financial institutions would exploit possible double role - as 
shareholders as well as bondholders – and exercise more control. Another argument is 
that financial institutions, which are constrained by supervisory investment limits, 
would increase their stake, and hence the control, in the firm by encouraging it to 
increase leverage.  
 
Further table 2.5 (models 5 and 6) shows that foreign ownership is negatively related to 
leverage ratio, and government ownership, as hypothesized, is associated with higher 
leverage ratio. However, both these results are statistically not different from zero.  
 
2.5.3 Ownership Concentration and Leverage 
 
Models 1, 2 and 3 of table 2.6 show effect of shareholding by top five, top three and the 
single  largest shareholders, respectively, on the leverage ratio. For all three measures of 
ownership concentration the effect is negative and statistically significant. This shows 
that the tightly held the equity ownership of the firms is the lower is the debt appetite. It 
may be argued, concentration of equity ownership aligns the interest of shareholders 
and manager by creating incentive for big block holders to oversee the activities of the 
management. In both cases disciplinary role of debt, it seems, is replaced by 
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concentration of equity ownership. These findings are consistent with the results of 
Antoniou et al. (2008) for pooled data.  
 
Models 4 to 8 present results for different types of the largest owner and show that only 
financial institutions as the largest owners affect the leverage ratio positively and for all 
other types of the largest owner it is negative. As shown in the table 2.6 the coefficients 
of the interaction terms for insiders, associated firms, government and foreigners as the 
largest owner are statistically insignificant.  
 
2.5.2 Ultimate Ownership and Leverage 
 
In the following pages tables 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 show the impact of ultimate ownership 
structure on leverage ratio for threshold levels 10, 25 and 50 percent respectively. 
Relation between ultimate ownership structure and leverage ratio is estimated by 
interacting three variables: voting rights of the ultimate owner (VR), dummy for a 
particular threshold level (Dth), and dummy variable to identify type of ultimate owner. 
 
As shown in the following table 2.7 ultimate ownership by family (for both narrow and 
extended definitions – Fam and FamE) the coefficient of the interaction terms is 
positive for all threshold levels (10, 25 and 50 percent). The positive coefficients show 
that families use debt as a device to protect their control rights over the firm. They 
increase leverage to shield their firms from takeovers as high leverage ratio would 
lessen chances of takeover by rivals (see Harris and Raviv (1988), and Stulz (1988)). It 
may further be argued that families use debt as a signaling device. On the one hand debt 
issuance may be projected as self-discipline device, especially with regard to free cash 
flows of the firm; and on the other hand, higher debt shows confidence of creditors on 
firm projects. Nevertheless, main reason which for family controlled firms issue debt, in 
place of equity, is that they want to ensure their control over the firm. 
 
For other types of ultimate owner - state, foreigners and legal person - coefficients of 
the interaction terms are statistically insignificant for all threshold levels. 
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Table 2.5: Direct Ownership and Capital Structure: 
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Leverage is dependent variable and equity holding of direct owner (of type j) is the main explanatory 
variable.  Log of sales, asset tangibility (Tang), market to book ratio (M/B), return on equity (RoE), risk, dividend 
payout ratio (DPO), and non-debt tax shield (Ndts) are control variables. Types (j) of direct owner include: Insiders, 
Associated Firms (AF), Group (Insiders + Associated firm)., Financial Institutions (FI), Foreigner, and State 
(Government of Pakistan). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Insider Associate Group FI For State 
ln(s) -1.687*** -1.720*** -1.644*** -1.395** -1.668*** -1.640*** 
 (-2.88) (-2.94) (-2.81) (-2.39) (-2.80) (-2.72) 
Tang 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.107*** 0.097*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 
 (2.81) (2.78) (2.89) (2.64) (2.72) (2.76) 
M/B -1.204*** -1.202*** -1.222*** -1.256*** -1.195*** -1.197*** 
 (-5.97) (-5.97) (-6.08) (-6.28) (-5.92) (-5.93) 
RoE -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (-4.48) (-4.57) (-4.53) (-4.42) (-4.51) (-4.53) 
Risk -2.377*** -2.346*** -2.317*** -2.342*** -2.408*** -2.381*** 
 (-7.39) (-7.28) (-7.21) (-7.36) (-7.47) (-7.38) 
DPO -1.241 -1.270 -1.263 -1.172 -1.262 -1.248 
 (-1.41) (-1.44) (-1.44) (-1.34) (-1.43) (-1.41) 
Ndts 0.160* 0.152* 0.141* 0.118 0.168** 0.165* 
 (1.88) (1.78) (1.66) (1.39) (1.97) (1.94) 
Insider -0.084*      
 (-1.80)      
AF  -0.148**     
  (-2.11)     
Group   -0.144***    
   (-3.16)    
FI    0.318***   
    (5.18)   
Foreigner     -0.044  
     (-0.58)  
State      0.069 
      (0.65) 
Const. 78.285*** 78.425*** 81.849*** 69.501*** 76.243*** 75.465*** 
 (16.76) (16.88) (16.86) (14.86) (16.80) (16.06) 
Obs. 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 
R2 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.12 
F-value 21.16 21.33 22.11 24.51 20.74 20.75 
Within 14.06 14.03 14.11 14.37 13.66 13.94 
Hausman 541.64 456.56 704.79 1392.2 209.55 412.72 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels.  
49 
 
Table 2.6: Ownership Concentration and Capital Structure 
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Leverage is dependent variable and proxy for ownership concentration (c = T1, T3 or T5) is the main 
explanatory variable.  ‘j’ presents type of the largest owner (Insider, associated firm, financial institution, 
state or foreigner). Log of sales, asset tangibility (Tang), market to book ratio (M/B), return on equity (RoE), 
risk, dividend payout ratio (DPO), and non-debt tax shield (Ndts) are control variables. Types (j) of direct owner 
include: Insiders, Associated Firms (Associate), Group (Insiders + Associated firm)., Financial Institutions (FI), 
Foreigner, and State (Government of Pakistan). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 T5 T3 T1 T1-Insider T1-AF T1-FI T1-State T1-For. 
ln(s) -1.695*** -1.730*** -1.668*** -1.679*** -1.657*** -1.609*** -1.666*** -1.674*** 
 (-2.90) (-2.96) (-2.86) (-2.88) (-2.84) (-2.76) (-2.86) (-2.87) 
Tang. 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.100*** 0.097*** 
 (2.69) (2.66) (2.69) (2.66) (2.78) (2.79) (2.69) (2.60) 
M/B -1.193*** -1.195*** -1.190*** -1.185*** -1.199*** -1.234*** -1.191*** -1.191*** 
 (-5.93) (-5.94) (-5.93) (-5.89) (-5.98) (-6.12) (-5.93) (-5.94) 
RoE -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** 
 (-4.54) (-4.53) (-4.62) (-4.61) (-4.71) (-4.71) (-4.61) (-4.59) 
Risk -2.442*** -2.445*** -2.366*** -2.368*** -2.345*** -2.330*** -2.365*** -2.370*** 
 (-7.59) (-7.61) (-7.39) (-7.39) (-7.32) (-7.27) (-7.38) (-7.40) 
DPO -1.221 -1.199 -1.274 -1.262 -1.281 -1.343 -1.275 -1.271 
 (-1.39) (-1.36) (-1.45) (-1.43) (-1.46) (-1.53) (-1.45) (-1.45) 
Ndts 0.166* 0.163* 0.129 0.129 0.121 0.122 0.129 0.132 
 (1.96) (1.92) (1.51) (1.51) (1.41) (1.43) (1.51) (1.54) 
T5 -0.122**        
 (-2.48)        
T3  -0.116***       
  (-2.60)       
T1   -0.188*** -0.204*** -0.162*** -0.206*** -0.188*** -0.175*** 
   (-3.56) (-3.19) (-2.91) (-3.84) (-3.56) (-3.08) 
T1-Insid.    0.031     
    (0.44)     
T1-AF     -0.124    
     (-1.46)    
T1-FI      0.217*   
      (1.87)   
T1-State       0.016  
       (0.08)  
T1-For.        -0.075 
        (-0.65) 
Constant 83.580*** 82.286*** 81.511*** 81.817*** 81.661*** 80.732*** 81.475*** 81.725*** 
 (15.47) (16.18) (17.16) (17.03) (17.19) (16.94) (17.07) (17.16) 
Obs. 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 
R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
F-value 21.57 21.65 22.49 20.00 20.25 20.43 19.98 20.03 
Within 13.95 13.97 14.08 13.99 14.08 14.11 13.99 13.93 
Hausman 290.55 294.98 385.87 459.19 406.93 423.97 322.74 347.09 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels. 
 
 
Table 2.7: Ultimate Ownership and Capital Structure (Dependent Variable: Leverage) 
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Leverage is dependent variable and equity holding of ultimate owner (of type u) is the main explanatory variable. Model 1 shows impact of shareholding by 
ultimate owner (without mention of its type). Dth is dummy for threshold of voting rights (th = 10, 25 or 50 percent), Du = dummy for type ‘u’ of ultimate owner. 
Model 2 to 6 show effect of shareholding by specified type (u) of ultimate owner. Log of sales, asset tangibility (Tang), market to book ratio (M/B), return on equity 
(RoE), risk, dividend payout ratio (DPO), and non-debt tax shield (Ndts) are control variables. Types (u) of ultimate owner include: Family, State, Foreigner, Legal person 
(LP) and Family (extd.) = Family + LP.  
 UO (Model 1) Family (Model 2) State (Model3) 
Threshold 
dummies D10 D25 D50 D10 D25 D50 D10 D25 D50 
ln(s) -1.621*** -1.664*** -1.687*** -1.577*** -1.645*** -1.671*** -1.623*** -1.664*** -1.681*** 
 (-2.78) (-2.85) (-2.88) (-2.72) (-2.82) (-2.86) (-2.79) (-2.85) (-2.87) 
Tang. 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.100*** 0.091** 0.092** 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.099*** 
 (2.60) (2.60) (2.68) (2.47) (2.49) (2.61) (2.59) (2.58) (2.66) 
M/B -1.229*** -1.240*** -1.195*** -1.189*** -1.213*** -1.193*** -1.225*** -1.234*** -1.201*** 
 (-6.13) (-6.16) (-5.94) (-5.93) (-6.02) (-5.93) (-6.11) (-6.12) (-5.96) 
RoE -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (-4.49) (-4.52) (-4.47) (-4.29) (-4.39) (-4.41) (-4.46) (-4.49) (-4.46) 
Risk -2.346*** -2.357*** -2.387*** -2.356*** -2.367*** -2.389*** -2.338*** -2.348*** -2.375*** 
 (-7.33) (-7.35) (-7.43) (-7.39) (-7.39) (-7.44) (-7.31) (-7.32) (-7.39) 
DPO -1.237 -1.209 -1.253 -1.183 -1.147 -1.183 -1.205 -1.172 -1.233 
 (-1.41) (-1.37) (-1.42) (-1.35) (-1.30) (-1.34) (-1.37) (-1.33) (-1.40) 
Ndts 0.136 0.146* 0.160* 0.121 0.138 0.156* 0.137 0.146* 0.160* 
 (1.61) (1.71) (1.88) (1.43) (1.62) (1.84) (1.62) (1.72) (1.88) 
UO -0.179*** -0.124*** -0.046** -0.335*** -0.221*** -0.111*** -0.169*** -0.115*** -0.038 
 (-4.00) (-3.09) (-1.99) (-4.98) (-3.71) (-2.80) (-3.70) (-2.80) (-1.62) 
Family    0.277*** 0.176** 0.098**    
    (3.10) (2.19) (2.01)    
State       -0.24 -0.293 -0.13 
       (-1.08) (-1.32) (-1.33) 
Constant. 85.047*** 82.439*** 77.775*** 84.270*** 81.906*** 77.895*** 85.285*** 82.818*** 77.784*** 
 (16.95) (16.67) (16.92) (16.84) (16.57) (16.97) (16.99) (16.73) (16.93) 
Obs. 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 
R2 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 
F-value 22.97 22.05 21.26 21.63 20.2 19.39 20.55 19.81 19.11 
Within 14.09 13.991 13.976 14.194 14.019 13.996 14.035 13.953 13.986 
(Continued) 
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Table 2.7 (continued) 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels
 Foreigner (Model 4) LP (Model 5) Family (extd.) (Model 6) 
 Threshold 
dummies D10 D25 D50 D10 D25 D50 D10 D25 D50 
ln(s) -1.619*** -1.665*** -1.686*** -1.608*** -1.672*** -1.686*** -1.615*** -1.676*** -1.674*** 
 (-2.78) (-2.85) (-2.88) (-2.76) (-2.86) (-2.88) (-2.78) (-2.88) (-2.87) 
Tang. 0.094** 0.090** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.095** 0.100*** 0.085** 0.083** 0.092** 
 (2.50) (2.39) (2.64) (2.66) (2.54) (2.68) (2.28) (2.22) (2.48) 
M/B -1.230*** -1.243*** -1.195*** -1.223*** -1.243*** -1.195*** -1.207*** -1.219*** -1.203*** 
 (-6.13) (-6.17) (-5.93) (-6.09) (-6.17) (-5.93) (-6.03) (-6.06) (-5.98) 
RoE -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (-4.48) (-4.51) (-4.47) (-4.47) (-4.53) (-4.47) (-4.35) (-4.39) (-4.42) 
Risk -2.349*** -2.365*** -2.388*** -2.347*** -2.357*** -2.388*** -2.353*** -2.369*** -2.381*** 
 (-7.34) (-7.37) (-7.43) (-7.33) (-7.35) (-7.43) (-7.38) (-7.41) (-7.43) 
DPO -1.241 -1.22 -1.254 -1.240 -1.218 -1.251 -1.175 -1.169 -1.21 
 (-1.41) (-1.39) (-1.42) (-1.41) (-1.38) (-1.42) (-1.34) (-1.33) (-1.37) 
Ndts 0.138 0.149* 0.161* 0.126 0.150* 0.159* 0.150* 0.156* 0.170** 
 (1.62) (1.75) (1.88) (1.47) (1.75) (1.87) (1.77) (1.83) (2.00) 
UO -0.174*** -0.112*** -0.045* -0.166*** -0.132*** -0.045* -0.367*** -0.293*** -0.169*** 
 (-3.70) (-2.63) (-1.89) (-3.48) (-3.02) (-1.80) (-4.56) (-4.00) (-3.05) 
Foreigners -0.053 -0.106 -0.01       
 (-0.34) (-0.84) (-0.11)       
LP    -0.095 0.050 -0.005    
    (-0.72) (0.45) (-0.08)    
FamE.       0.272*** 0.241*** 0.149** 
       (2.81) (2.75) (2.45) 
Constant. 85.289*** 82.923*** 77.831*** 85.019*** 82.542*** 77.761*** 84.366*** 82.203*** 78.396*** 
 (16.83) (16.66) (16.83) (16.94) (16.67) (16.90) (16.85) (16.67) (17.07) 
Obs. 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 
R2 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.13 
F-value 20.41 19.67 18.88 20.46 19.61 18.88 21.41 20.55 19.64 
Within 13.938 13.843 13.878 14.082 13.98 13.965 14.177 14.063 14.011 
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2.5.4 Control Variables: 
 
Results of conventional factors determining the capital structure are consistent with 
earlier studies. In following paragraph we give the details. 
 
The size of the firm, measured as natural logarithm of sales, has negative significant 
relation with leverage. Trade-off theory predicts that as the firm grows in size the 
proportion of bankruptcy cost goes down. Therefore smaller firms should have low 
leverage as compared to their large counterparts. Our results are not consistent with this 
theory. We find negative significant effect of firm size on leverage ratio which shows that 
as the firms grow big, their activities become more and more transparent and the 
information asymmetry between the firm and the investors diminishes leaving less room 
for mis-pricing of stock offers. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis proposed by 
Rajan and Zingales (1995). The asset tangibility has positive significant impact on 
leverage ratio. This is an issue of debt capacity and our result implies that firms with 
higher proportion of fixed assets in total assets have advantage in raising debt by offering 
more collateral to the creditors. Growth opportunities are measured by the ratio of 
market-to-book value of common stocks. Coefficient for this variable is negative 
significant showing a pecking order behavior of firms; that is, when firms face new 
projects they would prefer to issue equity in place of debt. The profitability measured by 
return on equity has significant inverse relation with leverage. Explanation could be 
higher retention by the profitable firms indicating that as firms become more profitable 
they build reserves and follow pecking order of utilizing internal resources first before 
opting for external resources. Moreover, stocks of such firms would be in high demand in 
the equity market and managers facing new growth opportunities would time capital 
markets and fetch credit directly by selling equity instead of debt. This negative relation 
of profitability with leverage is consistent with results of Friend and Lang (1988), De 
Jong and Veld (2001), and Flannery and Rangan (2006). As far as dividend payout ratio 
is concerned there is negative yet insignificant relation between dividend payout and 
leverage ratio. This negative relation could be explained in terms of Pecking-order 
theory. The relation of leverage with non-debt tax shields is positive and it is significant 
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for most of ownership identities. This result indicates that firms value the tax shield 
provided by the annual depreciation. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the impact of equity ownership structure has been analyzed on financing 
choices of a firm. A fixed effects model has been used on panel data of Pakistani listed 
firms. Ownership has been explored in three dimensions: direct equity holding, ultimate 
owners' stake, and concentrated ownership. Leverage ratio has been regressed directly on 
direct equity ownership, whereas the impact of ultimate ownership has been calculated by 
using interaction terms between the voting rights (at least equal to 10, 25 and 50 percent 
threshold levels alternatively) and dummy for different types of ultimate owners. Similar 
approach has been applied in studying the impact of shareholding by the largest 
shareholder on leverage ratio. 
 
After controlling for factors like firm size, asset specificity, market-to-book ratio, return 
on equity, firm risk, dividend payout ratio, and non-debt tax shields the study finds that 
ownership by insiders and associated firms have negative impact on leverage ratio. In 
contrast to that, financial institutions’ shareholding is positively related to debt ratio. 
These findings show that shareholdings by insiders substitute role of debt in controlling 
the agency cost between the shareholders and managers. There might be private benefits 
of control for the insiders and they might be avoiding bankruptcy risk of debt. Likewise, 
associated firms' shareholding seems to substitute the financing requirements of a firm 
and those institutions appear to value control considerably. On the other hand, in the face 
of restrictions to participate in the day-to-day affairs of non-financial firm, financial 
institutions through their equity ownership exerts positive impact on leverage ratio. This 
shows that financial institutions promote the firms in which they hold ownership stake to 
issue more debt and follow the discipline imposed by debt covenants. This positive 
relationship between equity holding by financial institutions and debt ratio might reduce 
information asymmetries between the firms and financial institutions due to double 
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relation between the two: lender-borrower relationship, and investor-investee 
relationship.  
 
Ownership concentration is measured as shareholding by the single largest shareholder 
and alternatively by equity holding of top three (five) shareholder. The study finds that 
there is negative relation between ownership concentration and leverage ratio. On the one 
hand this points in the direction that big block-holders substitute for the disciplinary role 
of debt; and on the other hand, they seem to value control over the firm and that they are 
enjoying private benefits of control, possibly at the cost of minority shareholders.  
 
As regards shareholding by ultimate owners, the interaction term for family ownership 
(for both narrow and broad definitions of family) is positive at all threshold levels of 
control rights. This finding highlights three factors: one, family firms use debt as 
signaling device and their willingness to follow the discipline on free cash flows of the 
firm imposed by debt covenants. Furthermore, it shows that families avoid sharing 
control of their firms with (prospective) equity holders and instead of issuing equity they 
go to the debt market for meeting financing needs of their firms. They use debt to deter 
takeovers. 
 
An interesting finding of this study is that insiders as direct shareholder refrain from 
issuing debt whereas ultimate ownership of a family favors debt over equity. Such results 
have implications for corporate governance in Pakistan.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Ownership Structure and Investment Efficiency 
 
3.1 Theoretical Background and Related Literature 
 
Investment is inherently linked to output growth both at macroeconomic as well as firm 
level; and the stronger this relation is the better it would be for the national and firm 
growth, respectively. Many research studies conducted in different fields including, but 
not limited to, development economics, corporate finance and industrial organization 
provide evidence in support of the role of investment in spurring national growth as well 
as firm value. At macro level this argument is supported by empirical studies conducted 
by Auerbach and Summers (1979), Barro (1991), and Levine and Renelt (1992); and at 
firm level studies by Stenbacka and Tombak (2002). However, mere focus on the ‘level’ 
of investment and the rules applied to investment decision making leave a void in 
performance measurement models. Other factors which play their role in deciding 
investment efficiency include operating environment – a set of financial, legal and 
structural constraints (for instance, negative real returns, adverse currency exchange 
regime, low income-saving trap, weak contract enforcement apparatus, and market 
imperfections, etc.). In this regard literature on corporate financial economics and 
corporate governance has tried to explore effects of firm specific factors and market 
micro-structure on corporate investment performance. Such factors include accounting 
variables, governance indicators and ownership structure. 
 
Pioneering work of Berle and Means (1932) on 'separation of ownership and control' 
started the debate on principal-agent problem. Subsequent studies widened the scope of 
research towards ownership structure, capital structure and overall firm performance. The 
main theme of those studies is how to control different types of agency problems – one 
between the managers and shareholders; two, between controlling shareholders and 
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minority shareholders; and three, between debt holders and shareholders. These studies 
highlight the difference between incentives and capacities of different types of 
shareholders, which, subsequently, have bearings on investment and overall firm 
performance. The complexity of analyses grows when heterogeneity of owners, 
concentration of shareholding and types of direct as well as ultimate owners are 
considered.  
 
The issue of finding an appropriate measure of firm performance has been widely 
debated48
Studying international data Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2008) has investigated effect 
of insider ownership and ownership concentration on investment performance of 3,290 
. There are studies which raised questions about the nature of firm performance 
indicators and their sensitivity towards ownership structure or other firm related variables 
(Randøy, Thomsen and Oxelheim, 2006; Bjuggren et al., 2007; and John, Johanna and 
Daniel, 2009). Different performance measures have been used in different studies, and 
they can be categorized into accounting measures and economic measures. Accounting 
measures, taken from the financial statements, include operating profit, earnings before 
tax and interest payments, return on assets, return on capital employed, return on equity, 
return on investment, etc. On the other hand, economic measures of performance include 
economic value added, risk-adjusted rate of return on capital, risk adjusted rate of return 
on assets, and (average) Tobin's Q, etc. An addition to the list of economic measures is 
‘marginal Tobin's Q’, which links the return on investment to cost of capital. 
 
Using marginal Tobin’s Q, Bjuggren et al. (2007) studied the impact of family ownership 
on investment performance for 110 Swedish listed firms with dual class shares. They find 
that family ownership has positive impact on firm performance; however, they argue, 
excess vote over cash flow rights affect marginal Tobin’s q negatively. Their findings 
imply that family control provides for adequate monitoring the management and 
approving those projects only which have positive net present value. Further, they 
prescribe that control enhancing mechanism, like dual class shares, should be checked. 
 
                                               
48 For further details see Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson (1998); Hermalin and Weisbach, (2003). 
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firms, both from English-origin and Continental European countries. They have used 
percentage voting rights as a proxy for entrenchment effect and value of shareholding as 
a proxy for wealth effect of insider ownership. With regard to insider ownership, their 
main findings are that managerial entrenchment affects investment performance 
negatively and wealth effect of insider ownership affects investment positively. They also 
find that institutional ownership has positive impact on investment performance in U.S., 
and shareholding by financial institutions affect the investment performance negatively in 
both Anglo-Saxon countries and in Europe. 
 
Besides exploring determinants of board structure, John et al. (2009) have investigated 
the impact of board related features on investment performance measured by marginal 
Tobin’s Q using panel data of 188 Swedish listed firms. They find that features like 
gender diversity on the board, directorship of CEO and size of the board have negative 
effect on investment performance. However, they argue, when all these features are 
simultaneously included in the regression equation the effects of gender diversity and 
CEO’s directorship become statistically insignificant. 
 
Pakistan, which was British colony during the nineteenth and the first half of the 
twentieth century, has inherited the Anglo-Saxon legal system, especially in the fields of 
business and commerce. Over the last sixty years or so the industrial-legal environment 
has not shown pro-growth efficiency when compared to that of other countries with 
similar age and history in terms of winning freedom from British or other colonial 
powers. Pakistani corporate sector seems to suffer from flaws in governance structure; it 
lacks efficient supervisory environment and suffers from haphazard policy formulation. 
Immediate outcome of these failures is dominance of lopsided ownership structure of 
major corporations as described in section 2.3 in terms of high concentration and strong 
family control over corporate resources. 
 
This study is motivated to explore the relationship between investment and firm value 
and the impact of ownership structure on the investment performance. In order to explore 
these ideas a novel method as proposed by Mueller and Reardon (1993), refined by 
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Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), and applied in studies on Swedish firms by Bjuggren et al., 
(2007) and John et al. (2009), has been followed in this study. This method has 
advantages of being elegantly simple, easy to interpret, and controls for possible 
endogeneity, etc.  
 
The objective of this study is to explore how investment decision making is influenced by 
different types of (a) direct owners like insiders, associated firms, financial institutions, 
foreigners and government; (b) ultimate owners like family, state and foreigner; and (c) 
ownership concentrations measured by shareholdings of the single largest shareholder 
and shareholdings by top three (five) shareholders.  
 
In this regard it is generally hypothesized that ownership and investment performance are 
non-linearly related. To have an insight on this issue a model has been estimated for 
different threshold levels of shareholdings. Keeping in view following provisions of 
Pakistani corporate law three threshold levels of voting rights (10 percent, 25 percent and 
50 percent) have been chosen: one, ten percent or more voting rights in a company would 
designate the holder as 'promoter' of that company, and that promoter would have to 
follow certain rules and regulations, which include mandatory disclosure of shareholding 
to the stock exchange; two, anyone who wishes to acquire more than 10 percent but less 
than 25 percent voting rights in a listed company shall make public announcement; and 
three, acquisition of more than 50 percent voting rights in a company entitles the holder 
with management rights of the company49
                                               
49 For reference see "Substantial Acquisition of Voting Shares and Takeovers Ordinance, 2002." available 
at www.secp.gov.pk 
. La Porta et. al. (1999) has used variety of 
thresholds (10 percent, 20 percent, etc.) to define ultimate control of a family over a firm. 
Other examples include Claessens et. al. (2002); Faccio and Lang (2002) use 20 percent 
cut-off; however, they control for 10 percent as well; Bjuggern et. al. (2007) has used 20 
percent cut-off to define family firm. Lamba and Stapledon (2001) use 15 percent and 25 
percent as cut-off thresholds. Arslan and Karan (2006) take the largest shareholder as the 
variable of interest. 
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3.2 Variables and Hypotheses 
 
Dependent Variable: Growth rate of market value 







 −
−
−
1,
1,,
ti
titi
M
MM .  
Explanatory Variables: Key explanatory variable is ratio of investment to one period 
lagged market value .
1
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I and other variables are constructed by using interaction term 
of ownership dummy with ratio of investment to lagged value of market capitalization. 
 
‘Mi,t’ represents market value of firm of firm 'i' at the end of period 't'. It is calculated as 
sum of market capitalization of outstanding shares and market value of debt. Market 
capitalization is calculated by multiplying average market price of common stock (on cut-
off date50
Both the change in market value of firm (Mi,t – Mi,t-1) and the investment have been 
scaled by the lagged market value (Mi,t-1) to get growth rate of market value and 
investment to ratio of lagged market value of firm, respectively. Finally, for a given 
threshold of voting rights, effect of different types of owners, direct as well as ultimate 
) with total number of outstanding shares. Debt has been proxied by book value 
of debt as corporate bond market is almost non-existence in developing countries like 
Pakistan. 
   
‘It’ denotes investment defined as sum of investable funds on the financial statements 
namely profit ‘Π’, change in debt ΔD, change in equity ΔE, depreciation (Dep), research 
and development expenditures (R&D), and advertising expenses (Adv.) minus the 
leakages from the firms resources namely taxes (Tax) and dividends (Div). The R&D and 
advertising expenses are not readily available for a big chunk of firms; they have been 
proxied by taking 1 percent of the costs of sales.  
 
I = Π - Tax - Div + Dep. + ΔD + ΔE + R&D + Adv  (3.1) 
 
                                               
50 Last working day of June for all firms except for sugar industry in which case the cutoff date is the last 
working day of September as firms are obliged to make their financial statements public at the end of June 
and September, respectively. 
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owners, and ownership concentration has been calculated by interacting dummies for 
different types of owners with ratio of investment to one period lagged market value of 
firm .
1

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
−t
t
M
I . 
 
Following is the list of hypotheses for this part of study:  
 
Insiders: Shareholding by insiders aligns the interest of managers with that of 
shareholders (incentive alignment hypothesis) and exerts positive impact on investment 
performance. This relationship is stable for all thresholds (10 percent, 25 percent and 50 
percent) of voting rights by the insiders. 
 
H3.1:  Equity holding by insider (as direct owners and as the largest owner) affects 
investment performance positively. 
 
Associated firms: Shareholding by associated firms creates a wedge between cash flow 
rights and control rights. Therefore, it may be argued that as shareholding of associated 
firms increases the investment moves away from value maximizing principle. 
 
H3.2:  Negative relation holds between shareholding by associated firms and 
investment performance. 
 
Financial institutions: As referred in section 2.2 of chapter 2, financial institutions, 
especially banks, are not encouraged to participate in day-to-day activities of non-
financial firms of which they are equity holders. Therefore, with small equity stake in a 
firm, financial institutions do not have strong incentive and capacity to to monitor the 
management. However, as equity holding of financial institutions goes up, they become 
dominant shareholders of a firm, they have the incentive to monitor the management but 
they are barred by regulatory restrictions from interfering in daily affairs of the firm. In 
such circumstances managers of the firms might become very strong and may pursue 
goals which do not enhance firm value.  
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H3.3:  The impact of shareholding by financial institutions (as direct owners and as the 
largest owner) on investment performance is non-linear; positive at lower level 
of ownership stake and negative at higher level of ownership stake. 
 
Foreigner: It is assumed that foreigners are better equipped in terms of management 
skills and commitment to make value enhancing project choices. 
 
H3.4:  Foreigners (as direct shareholder, as the largest shareholder and as ultimate 
shareholder) makes investment behavior efficient and value enhancing. 
 
Government: Shareholding by government is marred with lack of monitoring of the 
management which results in increased agency cost of equity. This makes managers in 
state owned firms highly entrenched. Moreover, it may be argued that generally the debt 
holders of state owned corporations are state owned financial institutions; therefore, 
agency cost of debt would also be higher. 
 
H3.5:  Government (as direct shareholder, as the largest shareholder and as ultimate 
shareholder) affects investment performance negatively. 
 
Family: Ultimate ownership by family ensures adequate monitoring of the managers. In 
fact, as described in earlier sections, family, which considers its investment as family 
jewel, tries to protect its control over the firm and exercise monitoring. Moreover, family 
members sit on the board and participate in the management of the firm. All these factors 
control agency cost. 
 
H3.6:  Ultimate ownership by family is positively related to investment efficiency. 
 
Ownership concentration: Higher concentration of shares in the hands of one or few 
shareholders increases their incentive to monitor the firm management. This in turn leads 
to selection of positive net present value projects.  
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H3.6: Tightly held firms show better investment performance. 
 
3.3 Summary Statistics 
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics (Firm Specific Variables) 
 
 Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Mt 4585.10 938.50 14859 7.80 276612.80 
It 811.50 120.50 2792.20 -12211.70 49054.50 
1
1
−
−−
t
tt
M
MM  21.80 11.90 39.00 -69.60 373.90 
1−t
t
M
I  25.70 16.20 38.50 -75.30 373.00 
 
In Table 3.1 Mt represents market value of firm in period ‘t’, It represents investment a 
firm undertakes in period ‘t’, 
1
1
−
−−
t
tt
M
MM  represents growth rate of market value, and 
1−t
t
M
I  
is the investment in period 't' scaled by market value in period ‘t-1’. The table shows that 
average market value of a firm is 4.59 billion Pakistani rupees (PKR) with median value 
938.50 million PKR. Average (median) investment by a firm is 811.50 (120.50) million 
PKR. The average growth rate of market value of a firm is 22 percent with 12 percent as 
the median value. 
 
Definitions and summary statistics of ownership and other relevant variables (different 
types of direct, ultimate and the largest shareholder) are the same as presented in section 
2.2 of chapter 2. For full summary statistics of ownership categories, see Table 2.2. 
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3.4 Methodology 
 
To test the effects of ownership structure on investment performance of Pakistani listed 
firms the methodology of Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003)51 has been adopted. The model is 
rooted in simple criterion of a net present value (NPV) of a project. The model is based 
on the argument that under certain market related conditions (there is perfect competition 
in product markets, production function is characterized by constant-returns-to-scale and 
firms are price takers) marginal return on capital equals average return on capital which is 
equal to the cost of capital (Hayashi, 1982). However, any violation of above conditions 
results in a situation where marginal return is not equal to average return and average 
Tobin’s q misestimates investment performance. In that case principle of equating 
marginal cost of capital with marginal return on capital makes better sense52
t
n
t
t r
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)1(
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1 +
=∑
=
.  
 
The NPV, which is the difference between cash outflows (investment outlays) and present 
value of future cash inflows, prescribes the rule that projects with positive NPV should be 
undertaken and others should be discarded. In other words accept projects only if NPV = 
PV – I > 0, where , and I = investment. 
 
If stock markets are assumed to be fairly efficient then at time‘t’ an unbiased estimate of 
the value of a firm should be equal to present value of investments undertaken by the 
firm. If ‘r’ denotes (pseudo) permanent rate of return on investment and ‘θ’ is the internal 
rate of return then following equality may be stipulated: 
 
tt
t
tt
t Iqm
rIPV ==
θ
       (3.2) 
                                               
51 Their methodology is based on marginal Tobin’s q as developed by Mueller and Reardon (1993). 
52 Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) give example of comparing investment performance of a monopolist with 
that of a competitive firm. They argue that with similar (optimal) level of investment, profits on existing 
stock of assets would be larger for monopolist as compared to profits of rival competitive firm. This 
implies that average Tobin’s q would be bigger for a monopolist as compared to that for a competitive firm. 
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Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) define ‘qm’ as “the change in the market value of the firm, 
PVt, divided by the change in its capital stock (It) that caused it”. If ‘qm’ is equal to one 
then present value is equal to the investment. This implies that if NPV > 0 (qm > 1) then 
managers are passing up the profitable investment opportunities (under investment); and 
if the NPV < 0 (qm < 1) then, from shareholders’ point of view, managers have over 
invested in projects (managerial discretion). 
 
In this setting, market value of firm would increase (decrease) if present value of its 
investments is greater (lesser) than depreciation of assets accumulated from previous 
investments.  
 
µδ +−=− −− 11 . tttt MPVMM      (3.3) 
 
where ‘δ’ is the depreciation rate, ‘Mt’ is current market value of firm, and ‘Mt-1’ is the 
total accumulated assets, and ‘µ’ is the error committed by the market in valuing the firm 
and this has usual properties of having normal distribution with zero mean. After 
replacing PVt in equation (3.3) by ‘It’ from equation (3.2) and rearranging, we get 
following equation: 
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For estimation purposes different specifications of above model have been used. 
Following specification works as benchmark model and estimates investment 
performance of all the listed firms ‘i’ in our data set: 
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For estimating the effect of direct (ultimate) shareholdings by different types of owners, 
interaction terms of 



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
−1t
t
M
I  and dummy for owner type ‘j’ have been included as 
following: 
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where ‘j’ (in case of direct ownership) represents types of direct owners and (in case of 
ultimate ownership) represents type of ultimate owner; ‘k’ represent threshold level (in 
our model there are three threshold levels of voting rights, that is, k = 10 percent or 25 
percent or 50 percent); and Dummykj is binary variable which takes value 1 when 
shareholding by owner type ‘j’ is at least equal to the threshold level ‘k’, and 0 otherwise. 
The coefficient ‘β3’ of interaction term calculates difference in investment performance 
for type of direct (ultimate) owner ‘j’ vis-à-vis when the rest. 
 
Similarly, following equation estimates effects of ownership concentration on investment 
performance. 
 
it
itck
s
it
it
it
it
i
it
itit
M
Dummy
M
I
M
I
M
MM
,1
,,
,1
,
5
,1
,
4
,1
,1, *
−−−−
− +







++−=
− µ
ββα  (3.7) 
 
In above equation ‘c’ represents measure of ownership concentration – measured 
alternatively by shareholding of the single largest shareholder or sum of shareholding by 
top three shareholders, or sum of shareholding by top five shareholders (for details 
section 2.4 of chapter 2); ‘s’ is the type of the single largest owner (insiders, associated 
firms, financial institution, foreigner, and government) and in case of shareholding by top 
three or five shareholders the subscript ‘s’ drops out. Lastly, dummy variable can be 
explained with the help of an example: let ‘c’ represents the single largest owner, ‘k’ 
stands for 25 percent threshold level of voting rights and s represents ‘financial 
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institution’ then Dummyk,cs would be equal to one when the largest owner is a financial 
institution with at least 25 percent equity stake in the firm, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, 
coefficient ‘β5’ would calculate difference in investment performance for ownership by 
financial institution as the largest owner for given threshold level of voting rights vis-à-
vis when the ownership is different for all other firms. 
 
3.4.1 Model Specification and Other Tests 
 
Above equations can be estimated using different regression models namely pooled-
ordinary least squares (OLS) model, fixed effects model, or random effect model. 
However, model selection is done with the help of tests like 'F' (Chow) test which 
compares efficiency of OLS pooled data model to the fixed effects model, Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange Multiplier test tells if firm-specific intercepts are different from each other 
(comparing random effects model with OLS pooled data model), and Hausman 
specification test is applied to compare fixed effects with random effects model. The 
specification tests results (reported in the appendix A3.2) show that firms have 
heterogeneous characteristics and that the fixed effects model is the most appropriate one. 
 
Next, in order to test for first-order autocorrelation in the residuals Durbin-Watson test 
statistic for the fixed effects model with firm-specific time trends has been calculated53. 
D-W test statistic for panel data is 2.056 (which is almost equals to 2) showing that there 
is no first-order autocorrelation in the residuals and as such there is no need to apply 
dynamic panel analyses. In order to test for group-wise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect 
regression model a modified version of Wald test54
                                               
53 Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan (1982) modified the Durbin-Watson test for first order 
autocorrelation in residuals for the balanced panel data. 
54 Greene (2000). The stata command for test is xttest3. 
 has been applied.  
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3.5 Empirical Results: 
 
Table 3.3 shows investment efficiency according to the base model as set in equation 
(3.5). This model calculates marginal ‘q’ directly by regressing 'growth rate of market 
value' on 'ratio of investment to one period lagged market value’. The estimate of 
marginal ‘q’ is 0.80 which implies that managers are entrenched; they are using their 
discretion and over-invest in projects.  In terms of NPV rule, management of an average 
firm listed on the KSE is not able to enhance firm value adequately to the benefit of 
shareholders. 
 
Table 3.2: Investment performance (Base Model) 
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‘Growth rate of market value' is dependent variable and 'ratio of investment to lagged market value’ is 
explanatory variable. The estimates are based on fixed effect model. 
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 Constant Obs. R2 Firms F-value Within 
0.800*** 1.327 1527 0.55 306 1493.57 1.613 
(38.65) (1.57)    (0.00) (0.00) 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels.  
 
In the following sections results have been presented for different types of direct and 
ultimate owners, and ownership concentrations, each tested for three different levels of 
control thresholds (10, 25 and 50 percent). However, results for threshold level of 25 
percent of voting rights are mainly discussed in the following section. 
 
3.5.1 Direct Ownership and Investment Performance 
 
As discussed earlier, insiders, associated firms, group, financial institutions, foreigners 
and the state are the main types of direct owners. Table 3.3 presents results in this regard. 
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Insiders: In this study it has been tested if control rights of insiders enhance investment 
efficiency, which would, in turn, contribute towards value of the firm. Table 3.3 (models 
1, 2 and 3) shows that shareholding by insiders (managers, directors and their family 
members) affects investment performance positively, for all threshold levels of voting 
rights. With insiders' shareholding at least 25 percent, the coefficient of interaction term 
is statistically significant and the estimated marginal ‘q’ is 0.83 as compared to 0.76 if the 
shareholding of insiders is below 25 percent. These results are consistent with hypothesis 
(H3.1) and they are also consistent with the findings of Bjuggren et al. (2008) for 
Swedish listed firms. It may be argued that shareholding by insiders reduce agency cost 
by aligning interests of the managers with the shareholders. As the relationship is 
consistently positive for all threshold levels of voting rights, it shows that incentive 
alignment dominates managerial entrenchment.  
 
Associated Firms: Table 3.3 (models 4, 5 and 6) show that effect of shareholding by 
associated firms is negative and statistically significant for 50 percent level of voting 
rights. The coefficient of the interaction term is -0.265, which implies that estimated 
marginal ‘q’ is 0.56 as compared to 0.83 if shareholding of insiders is below 50 percent. 
This shows that at higher levels of shareholdings by associated firms investment decision 
making fails to enhance market value of firm. Possible reason for this negative impact of 
associated firms' shareholding on investment performance is that as shareholdings by 
associated companies rise they influence management to pass up profitable projects. For 
10 and 25 percent threshold levels of voting rights coefficients are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Group is a voting block representing the sum of the voting rights of insiders and 
associated firms. Table 3.3 (models 7, and 8) show that marginal ‘q’ is 0.82 (0.82) when 
shareholding of group is at least 25 (10) percent as compared to 0.68 (0.65) when the 
group shareholding is less than 25 (10) percent. This considerable contribution supports 
the hypothesis that group shareholding affects investment performance positively. 
However, when ownership of the group rises to 50 percent or more (model 9 of Table 
3.3) the impact of group shareholding becomes statistically insignificant.  
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Financial institutions' shareholding appears to have non-linear relation with investment 
performance. Table 3.4 (models 10, 11 and 12) shows that ownership by financial 
institutions has positive relation with investment performance at 10 percent threshold 
level; however, it changes direction from positive to negative at 25 percent threshold 
level of voting rights.  When voting rights are 10 percent or above, the estimated 
marginal ‘q’ is 0.86 as compared to 0.75 if the shareholding of financial institutions is 
below 10 percent voting rights. When shareholding of financial institutions is more than 
25 percent marginal ‘q’ is 0.65 as compared to 0.80 when the ownership stake of 
financial institution is less than 25 percent. The coefficient of interaction term at 50 
percent threshold level, however, is statistically insignificant.  
 
One possible explanation for change in positive effect of ownership stake by financial 
firms (for 10 percent or more voting rights) into negative effect (for 25 percent or more 
voting rights) is imposition of regulatory restrictions on their participation in firm affairs. 
It may be argued that for 10 percent threshold of voting rights of financial institutions, 
other equity holders would have dominant control in the firm and they do efficient 
investment decisions by effectively monitoring the management. However, when 
financial firms acquire equity stake equal to or more than 25 percent they become one of 
the dominant shareholders yet they are not able to monitor the managers effectively. This 
lack of monitoring makes the management entrenched which renders the investment 
inefficient. 
 
Foreign shareholding: Table 3.4 (models 13, 14 and 15) shows that foreign 
shareholding is positively attached to investment performance at 10 percent and 25 
percent levels of ownership; however, the coefficients are statistically insignificant. At 50 
percent or more ownership stake by foreigners, the effect on investment performance is 
negative yet again it is statistically insignificant.  
 
Government shareholding: In accordance with popular belief, ownership stake by the 
government has negative effect on the investment performance of the firms. Table 3.4 
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(model 16, 17 and 18) shows that the coefficient of the interaction term with regard to 
state ownership is negative; however, it is statistically significant at ownership 25 percent 
threshold only. The estimated marginal ‘q’ at 25 percent is 0.49 as compared to 0.80 
when the ownership stake of government is less than 25 percent. For 10 and 50 percent 
threshold levels of voting rights the coefficient is statistically insignificant 
 
 Table 3.3: Direct ownership and investment performance 
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Table 3.3 reports results of regression of growth rate of market value (dependent variable) on ratio of investment to lagged market value, and 
interaction term of this ratio with dummy for type ‘j’ of direct shareholder (insiders, associated firms (AF), group (Insider + Associated firms), 
financial institutions (FI), foreigners, and state). ‘K’ represents threshold level of voting rights. Marginal q is calculated by adding β2 and β3. 
  Insiders Associated firms (AF) Group 
 Model        (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7)         (8)      (9) 
Threshold 10 25 50 10 25 50 10 25 50 
 
1−t
t
M
I
 0.727*** 0.760*** 0.765*** 0.789*** 0.803*** 0.826*** 0.653*** 0.680*** 0.797*** 
(19.03) (23.66) (28.25) (29.07) (33.70) (38.23) (10.02) (12.95) (25.21) 
Insiders 0.101** 0.067* 0.078*       
  (2.25) (1.65) (1.95)       
AF    0.023 -0.014 -0.265***    
    (0.58) (-0.30) (-3.99)    
Group       0.162** 0.140** 0.004 
        (2.37) (2.48) (0.09) 
Constant 1.481* 1.422* 1.572* 1.316 1.335 1.412* 1.390* 1.418* 1.333 
  (1.75) (1.68) (1.84) (1.56) (1.58) (1.68) (1.65) (1.68) (1.57) 
Obs. 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 
R2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 
F-value 751.80 749.11 750.4 746.55 746.24 763.88 752.43 753 746.18 
Within 1.635 1.622 1.629 1.613 1.612 1.654 1.636 1.64 1.596 
(continued) 
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 Table 3.3 – Continued. 
 
  Financial institutions Foreigner State 
 Model     (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Threshold 10 25 50 10 25 50 10 25 50 
 
1−t
t
M
I
 0.748*** 0.819*** 0.801*** 0.793*** 0.797*** 0.806*** 0.803*** 0.803*** 0.802*** 
(26.9) (37.35) (38.63) (34.93) (35.69) (37.35) (38.57) (38.69) (38.60) 
FI 0.107*** -0.150*** -0.232       
  (2.76) (-2.61) (-0.93)       
Foreigner    0.037 0.016 -0.083    
     (0.69) (0.27) (-1.10)    
State       -0.238 -0.376* -0.314 
        (-1.46) (-1.77) (-1.26) 
Constant 1.183 1.557* 1.337 1.286 1.322 1.319 1.444* 1.466* 1.379 
  (1.40) (1.84) (1.58) (1.52) (1.56) (1.56) (1.70) (1.73) (1.63) 
Obs. 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 
R2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
F-value 754.64 753.72 747.13 746.71 746.23 747.51 748.53 749.63 747.95 
Within 1.583 1.64 1.614 1.593 1.585 1.602 1.621 1.625 1.618 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels.
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3.5.2 Ownership Concentration and Investment Performance 
 
Ownership concentration is measured alternatively by shareholdings of the single largest owner, 
and sum of shareholdings of top three (five) shareholders. Furthermore, effect of shareholdings 
by different types of the single largest shareholder is also estimated. Table 3.4 presents results in 
this regard. 
 
Table 3.4 (model 1, 2 and 3) shows that effects of shareholdings by the single largest owner on 
investment performance in nonlinear. It is positive for threshold level of 10 and 25 percent 
voting rights and negative for 50 percent voting rights. The coefficient of interaction term is 
significant at 10 percent threshold and marginally significant at 50 percent threshold level. It 
may be argued that at lower level of voting rights there is alignment of interest of the single 
largest owner and interest of the management; however, as the voting rights of the single largest 
owner are equal to more than 50 percent of voting rights entrenchment effect dominates 
incentive alignment effect. Marginal ‘q’ is 0.81 (0.72) when the largest shareholder has 10 (50) 
percent or more voting rights as compare to 0.53 (0.81) when voting rights of the largest owner 
is less than 10 (50) percent. 
 
Table 3.4 (models 4 to 18) presents effects of different types of the largest single shareholder on 
investment performance. Model 4, 5 and 6 of Table 3.5 show that ‘insider’ as the largest 
shareholder affects investment performance positively; however, this effect is statistically 
significant at 25 percent threshold level of voting rights only. This shows incentive alignment of 
the largest owner with that of management. Marginal ‘q’ in this case is 0.89 when shareholding 
of ‘insider’ is equal to or more than 25 percent of the voting rights, as compared to 0.78 when 
shareholding of ‘insider’ is less than 25 percent of voting rights. 
 
Table 3.4 (models 7, 8 and 9) shows that equity ownership of associated firms as the single 
largest owner has positive effects on investment performance at 10 percent threshold level and 
negative impact on investment performance at 25 and  50 percent threshold levels. However, it is 
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significant at 50 percent threshold only. Estimate of marginal ‘q’ at 50 percent threshold level is 
0.61 as compare to 0.81 when voting rights of associated firm is less than 50 percent. 
 
Table 3.4 (model 10, 11 and 12) shows that shareholdings by financial institution as the single 
largest shareholder affect investment performance negatively at lower thresholds (10 and 25) and 
positively at higher (50) threshold. However, it is statistically significant when voting rights of 
financial institution as the single largest owner are equal to or more than 50 percent voting rights.  
 
Table 3.4 (model 13, 14 and 15) shows that shareholdings by foreigner as the single largest 
shareholder affect investment performance positively at all thresholds levels (10, 25 and 50); 
however, it is statistically significant for 10 and 25 percent thresholds of voting rights. Estimated 
marginal ‘q’ is 0.98 when voting rights of foreigner as the single largest shareholder are equal to 
more than 10 percent as compared to 0.78 when they are less than 10 percent. Likewise, 
marginal ‘q’ is 0.93 when foreigner is the single largest shareholder are equal to more than 25 
percent as compared to 0.79 when they are less than 25 percent. Coefficient for 50 percent 
threshold level of voting rights is statistically insignificant. 
 
Models 16, 17 and 18 of Table 3.4 show that state as the largest shareholder affect investment 
performance negatively and the coefficient of interaction term is statistically significant for all 
threshold levels. Estimated marginal ‘q’ is 0.81 (0.81) (0.81) when voting rights of the 
government are equal to more than 10 (25) (50) percent, as compared to 0.48 (0.48) (0.50) when 
voting rights of the government as the largest owner are less than 10 (25) (50) percent. 
Therefore, it may be argued that, in terms of market value of firm, government ownership 
influences investment decision making negatively and destroys firm value. 
 
Result regarding shareholdings by top three (five) shareholders have been reported in the 
appendix A3.3, which shows that the impact is nonlinear and the coefficients of interaction terms 
are statistically insignificant except for shareholdings by top five shareholders for 25 percent 
threshold of voting rights. 
 Table 3.4: Ownership concentration and investment performance 
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(1) This table reports results of regression of growth rate of market value (dependent variable) on ratio of investment to lagged market value, and 
interaction term of this ratio with dummy of the largest owner (and type of the largest owner). Fixed effect model has been used. (2) Abbreviations: 
‘K’ represents threshold level of voting rights, ‘C’ indicates concentration of shareholding, and ‘S’ represents type of the largest owner  (T1 = 
shareholding of the single largest owner, T1_Insider = insider, T1_AF. = associated firm, T1_FI = financial institutions, T1_for. = foreigner, and 
T1_state = government).  
  T1 T1_Insider T1_AF 
 Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Threshold 10 25 50 10 25 50 10 25 50 
1−t
t
M
I
 0.527*** 0.796*** 0.814*** 0.790*** 0.781*** 0.797*** 0.785*** 0.811*** 0.808*** 
(6.09) (28.61) (36.36) (29.35) (34.69) (38.07) (31.30) (35.83) (38.28) 
T1 0.287*** 0.008 -0.090        
 (3.24) (0.21) (-1.63)        
T1_Insider      0.022 0.105** 0.098     
      (0.54) (2.12) (0.85)     
T1_AF         0.046 -0.065 -0.202** 
         (1.05) (-1.23) (-2.01) 
Constant 1.472* 1.332 1.355 1.376 1.484* 1.333 1.348 1.306 1.377 
 (1.74) (1.57) (1.60) (1.62) (1.75) (1.58) (1.59) (1.54) (1.63) 
Obs. 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 
R2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Firms 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 
F-value 757.86 746.22 749.12 746.50 751.19 746.97 747.39 747.84 750.69 
Within 1.636 1.563 1.623 1.602 1.598 1.608 1.616 1.618 1.623 
(Continued) 
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 Table 3.4 – Continued. 
 
  T1_FI T1_For. T1_State 
 Model (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)    (18) 
Threshold 10 25 50 10 25 50 10 25 50 
1−t
t
M
I
 0.804*** 0.802*** 0.800*** 0.781*** 0.790*** 0.796*** 0.813*** 0.813*** 0.812*** 
(37.55) (38.35) (38.68) (36.02) (36.97) (37.60) (38.63) (38.65) (38.59) 
T1_FI -0.065 -0.105 0.962*        
 (-0.86) (-0.85) (1.66)        
T1_For.      0.197*** 0.136* 0.069     
      (2.80) (1.72) (0.71)     
T1_State         -0.331*** -0.338*** -0.315*** 
         (-3.12) (-3.16) (-2.91) 
Constant 1.396 1.355 1.282 1.085 1.181 1.300 1.283 1.278 1.225 
 (1.64) (1.60) (1.52) (1.28) (1.39) (1.53) (1.52) (1.52) (1.45) 
Obs. 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 
R2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Firms 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 
F-value 746.99 746.98 749.25 754.90 749.47 746.73 756.99 757.27 755.58 
Within 1.615 1.615 1.623 1.564 1.575 1.602 1.652 1.653 1.646 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels. 
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3.5.3 Ultimate Ownership and Investment Performance 
 
Table 3.5 presents results regarding the impact of shareholding by different types of ultimate 
owners on investment performance of a firm. Models 1, 2 and 3 of Table 3.6 show that 
shareholding by the ultimate owner (without mention of the identity of ultimate owner) affects 
investment performance positively for 10 percent and 25 percent thresholds of voting rights and 
negatively for 50 percent threshold of voting rights. However, the coefficient of interaction term 
is significant for 10 and 50 percent thresholds only.  
 
Models 4, 5 and 6 of table 3.5 show that shareholding by family as ultimate owner has positive 
bearings on the investment performance. Estimated marginal ‘q’ is 0.83 (0.83) (0.83) when 
shareholding is equal to or more than 10 (25) (50) percent shareholding as compared to 0.75 
(0.75) (0.77) when shareholding is less than 10 (25) (50) percent voting rights. These results 
imply that family as ultimate owner remains vigilant of the management and contributes 
positively in the investment decision making. When extended definition of family is used then 
the effect of shareholding by family (extd.) still remains positive, however the coefficient of 
interaction term is significant for 25 percent threshold level only. 
 
Table 3.5 (models 7, 8 and 9) shows that state as ultimate shareholder exerts significant negative 
effects on investment efficiency as it does as a direct shareholder and as the largest owner. The 
estimated marginal ‘q’ is 0.50 (0.50) (0.46) when shareholding by the state as ultimate owner is 
equal to or more than 10 (25) (50) percent, as compared to 0.81 (0.81) (0.81) when shareholding 
of the state as ultimate owner is less than 10 (25) (50) percent. These findings show that the state 
as ultimate controlling shareholder damages investment performance.  
 
Table 3.5 (models 10, 11 and 12) shows that legal person as ultimate shareholder affects 
investment performance negatively at all threshold levels of voting rights. However, the effect 
the statistically significant at 50 percent threshold of voting rights. The estimated marginal ‘q’ is 
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0.58 when shareholding by legal person is equal to or more than 50 percent, as compared to 0.82 
when shareholding of the legal person is less than 50 percent. 
 
Table 3.5 (models 13, 14 and 15) show that foreigners as ultimate shareholder have positive 
effect on investment efficiency. Estimated marginal ‘q’ is 0.93 (0.93) (0.90) when shareholding 
by foreigner as ultimate owner is equal to or more than 10 (25) (50) percent, as compared to 0.78 
(0.78) (0.79) when shareholding of foreigner as ultimate owner is less than 10 (25) (50) percent. 
This implies that foreigners as controlling shareholders monitor managers adequately and 
contribute in investment decision making in such a manner that shareholder value is increased. 
 Table 3.5: Ultimate ownership and investment performance 
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(1) This table reports results of regression of growth rate of market value (dependent variable) on ratio of investment to lagged market value, and 
interaction term of this ratio with dummy for different types of ultimate owners. Fixed effect model has been used. (2) Abbreviations: UO = Ultimate 
owner, UO_Family = shareholding by family as ultimate owner, UO_State. = shareholding by government as ultimate owner, UO_LP = 
shareholding by legal person ultimate owner, UO_for. = shareholding by foreigner as ultimate owner, UO_FamE = shareholding by family 
(extended definition) as ultimate owner, and obs. = observations. 
  Ultimate owner (UO) UO_Family UO_State 
 Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Threshold 10 25 50 10 25 50 10 25 50 
1−t
t
M
I
 0.407** 0.448*** 0.824*** 0.747*** 0.745*** 0.769*** 0.814*** 0.814*** 0.813*** 
(2.50) (4.07) (23.27) (22.28) (22.50) (27.05) (38.56) (38.58) (38.70) 
UO 0.399** 0.362*** -0.036         
  (2.43) (3.26) (-0.85)         
UO_Family     0.085** 0.088** 0.064      
      (2.00) (2.10) (1.59)      
UO_State        -0.311*** -0.316*** -0.351*** 
         (-3.16) (-3.19) (-3.33) 
Constant 1.304 1.336 1.269 1.370 1.378 1.445* 1.297 1.293 1.247 
  -1.54 -1.59 -1.49 (1.62) (1.63) (1.70) (1.54) (1.54) (1.48) 
Obs. 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 
R2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Firms 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 
F-value 752.72 758 746.97 750.61 751.05 748.98 757.24 757.50 758.51 
Within 1.626 1.627 1.61 1.626 1.629 1.613 1.656 1.657 1.657 
(Continued) 
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  UO_LP UO_Foreigner UO_FamE 
 Model (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Threshold 10 25 50 10 25 50 10 25 50 
1−t
t
M
I
 0.812*** 0.808*** 0.816*** 0.783*** 0.783*** 0.793*** 0.748*** 0.733*** 0.797*** 
(35.49) (35.41) (38.22) (35.76) (35.78) (37.12) (16.11) (16.28) (26.21) 
UO_LP -0.066 -0.048 -0.233***         
  (-1.22) (-0.89) (-2.92)         
UO_For.    0.148** 0.153** 0.103    
     (2.24) (2.31) (1.21)    
UO_FamE         0.065 0.084* 0.005 
          (1.25) (1.68) (0.13) 
Constant 1.307 1.310 1.322 1.135 1.118 1.243 1.380 1.406* 1.337 
  (1.54) (1.55) (1.57) (1.34) (1.32) (1.46) (1.63) (1.66) (1.57) 
Obs. 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 
R2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Firms 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 
F-value 747.84 747.05 755.65 751.75 752.12 747.81 747.91 749.31 746.19 
Within 1.611 1.609 1.623 1.582 1.582 1.561 1.596 1.609 1.579 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels.
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
Marginal Tobin's q evaluates investment performance by comparing cost of capital with 
return on investment. Employing marginal q as a measure of investment performance this 
study finds that return on investment for the average Pakistani firm is less than its cost of 
capital. The study is primarily focused on estimating the impact of (a) shareholding by 
different types of direct owners – insiders, associated firms, group, financial institutions, 
foreigners and government; (b) shareholding by different types of ultimate owners – 
family, state, and foreigner; and (c) concentrated ownership, on investment performance 
of Pakistani listed firms. In order to account for non-linearity in the relationship between 
ownership structure and investment performance, all the hypotheses have been tested for 
three different levels of ownership stake; 10 percent or more, 25 percent or more and 50 
percent or more. Using model in the tradition of Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) this study 
reports marginal q, which has been calculated using the fixed effects model.  
 
The main findings of this study largely lend support to the theoretical predictions. 
Shareholdings by different types of direct owners affect investment performance 
differently. Ownership by 'insiders' has positive impact on the investment performance. 
This implies that as ownership stake of managers, directors and their family members 
goes up the interest of the shareholders get aligned with the interest of managers. This 
results in efficient investment decisions about capital stock accumulation. The associated 
firms have negative impact on firm performance which implies that related companies 
engage the management of the firm in value reducing investment projects; however, these 
factors are significant at higher ownership stake (50 percent or more control rights) only. 
Group ownership, which is sum of shareholding by insiders and associated firms, cast 
positive net impact on investment performance for low and medium levels of group 
ownership; however, for higher ownership levels the negative effect of associated firms' 
shareholdings dominate the positive impact of insiders' shareholdings. The impact of 
shareholding by financial institutions at low levels is positive and turns negative as it 
rises to medium and high levels of voting rights. This may be attributed to the restrictions 
imposed on financial institutions in participating in the affairs of the firms. Government 
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shareholding renders the investment decision making inefficient whereas foreigners exert 
positive impact on investment performance.  
 
Ownership concentration, proxied by the shareholdings of the largest owner, affects 
investment performance. The relationship between shareholding and investment 
performance is non-linear; it is positive for 10 and 25 percent thresholds and negative for 
50 percent threshold levels of voting rights. This implies an incentive alignment effect of 
moderate shareholding by the single largest owner is dominated by the entrenchment 
effect as that largest owner becomes holder of absolute majority of controlling rights. 
Further, analyses of identities of the largest owner reveal that insider and foreigner as the 
largest owners have positive impact on investment performance, whereas the state as the 
largest owner affects investment performance negatively. 
 
As regards ultimate ownership, shareholding by family and foreigner as ultimate owners 
affect investment performance positively whereas the state as ultimate shareholder has 
negative impact on firm value in terms of marginal q. These findings imply that family 
and foreigner participate effectively in investment decision making, whereas state 
control, which is punctuated with entrenched management, results in return on 
investment which is less than the cost of funds used to finance that investment. 
 
Given that adequate information is available, the possible lines of further inquiry may 
incorporate details on other corporate governance aspects like board structure and 
performance, level and adequacy of financial disclosure, and quantification of the 
possible wedge between cash-flow and control rights.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
 
4.1 Theoretical Background and Related Literature 
 
Jensen and Meckling define agency relationship as a “contract”, “which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to agent” (1976, p 310). Later on Jensen 
purports “Corporate managers are the agents of shareholders, a relationship fraught with 
conflicting interests. Agency theory, the analysis of such conflicts, is now a major part of 
the economics literature” (1986, p 323). In short, agency theory deals with the problem 
that principals (shareholders) and agents (managers) share same goal while reconciling 
their tolerance for risk. However, as soon as shareholders delegate control to the 
managers to run the firm, conflict arises between the two groups. In fact shareholders 
would like the managers to work in a manner which maximizes shareholder value; 
whereas self-interest of the managers dominates and they make those corporate decisions 
which ensures their personal gains and strengthens their control over the firm.  
 
Agency cost, which is mainly the sum of monitoring cost and bonding cost incurred by 
the shareholders and managers, respectively, is the primary outlay for resolving the 
conflict between the principal and the agent. This agency cost can be minimized in 
different ways, so called internal and external mechanisms, which include: by 
encouraging managers to acquire ownership stake in the firm (incentive alignment 
hypothesis); by acquiring debt so that managers, facing the bankruptcy threat, are left 
with little amount of free cash flow at their discretion (free-cash flow and financial 
distress hypotheses); by concentrating shareholding in few hands especially institutions 
who can be more watchful as compared to other shareholders and thereby affect firm 
performance (Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); Crutchley, Jensen, Jahera and Raymond, 
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(1999)); by regular dividend payments so that market starts monitoring the managers; 
activism of the shareholders and boardroom efficiency, etc. Corporate governance 
literature suggests that these techniques are meant to enhance firm performance. 
 
In 1932 publication of book “The Modern Corporation and Private Property” by Berle 
and Means set the stage for research on corporate performance and ownership structure. 
Since then theoreticians and empirical researchers in corporate finance and industrial 
organization have been analyzing the fundamental relation between firm performance 
with financing modes and types of investors a firm has. However, the challenge of 
research is such that when one tries to untangle one thread he ends up confusing the 
other. Reasons for this profound confusion are numerous, theoretical as well as empirical. 
From theoretical stand point the relationship between the agents and principals is quite 
complex and it is a function of evolving dynamics of the environment in which they 
interact. From empirical point of view there are issues involving selection of estimation 
technique(s), broadening and paneling of datasets, endogeneity and simultaneity of 
variables, weak assumptions about linear simplification of nonlinear relationships, 
homoscedasticity and assumptions about normality of variables, etc. 
 
As in earlier chapters, focus of this study is to explore effects of direct ownership, 
ultimate ownership and ownership concentration on firm performance. This study is 
undertaken assuming both ownership and leverage are determined jointly with firm 
performance. I find that insiders, both as direct and largest shareholder, have positive 
effect on the firm performance whereas shareholding by associated firms is inversely 
related to firm performance. Regression results show that shareholdings by financial 
institutions have negative effects on firm performance; however, they are significant only 
when financial institutions are the largest shareholders. Foreigners as direct and largest 
shareholder have positive yet insignificant impact on firm performance. Government as 
direct and largest shareholder affects firm performance positively, yet the coefficient is 
insignificant. However, when government is the ultimate shareholder, it has significant 
negative effect.  
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A brief review of literature has been presented in this section in two parts: first part 
reviews literature on the impact of ownership structure on firm performance and other 
part takes account of existing literature on the interaction of capital structure and firm 
performance. 
 
4.1.1 Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
 
Different types of investors differ from one another not only in terms of their investment 
objectives but also in terms of their capacity to monitor the management (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985). There are host of studies which explore relation between firm performance 
and equity holdings by management, blockholders, families, institutions, foreigners, and 
government, etc. These studies offer substantial contribution to corporate governance 
literature and highlight importance of other factors like characteristics of corporate board, 
activism by shareholders, share trading activities in the equity markets, and competition 
in markets for corporate managers, etc.55
Pioneering research by Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed that managerial 
shareholding exert positive impact on firm performance by creating incentive structure 
for the managers. They argue that a configuration in which interests of managers and 
shareholders are aligned reduces the agency problem. Studies by Demsetz (1983) and 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) studied relationship between managerial shareholding and firm 
performance. They raised questions about linearity of relationship. Further studies by 
Cho (1998), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) have underscored the issue of 
endogeneity of ownership structure. The former study finds that performance affects 
ownership structure not vice versa; whereas, measuring ownership alternatively in terms 
of fraction of shares held by managers and fraction of shares held by the five largest 
owners, Demsetz and Villalonga assert that companies adjust their “ownership 
systematically in ways that are consistent with value maximization” (2001, p.1176). 
Therefore, it may be argued that there is no systematic significant relation between 
ownership structure and firm performance. However, Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) 
.  
 
                                               
55 For reference see Walsh and Seward (1990), and Shleifer and Vishney (1997). 
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study Greek corporate sector, and Ganguli and Agarwal (2008) study Indian mid-cap 
companies and they find that ownership concentration influences firm performance 
treating the former as endogenous variable. These studies assume that ownership 
structure is determined endogenously. 
 
Furthermore, Mehran (1995), using data on 153 large and small industrial USA firms, 
have analyzed shareholding by different types of owners – shareholding by CEO, 
managers and directors, outside directors, outside block holders, etc. Using Tobin’s Q 
and return on assets as measures of firm performance, he finds that only CEO ownership 
is value enhancing; ownership by managers and directors does not have significant effect, 
and block holders do not affect firm value at all.  
 
In the same vein, Fama and Jensen (1983), Loderer and Martin (1997), Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro (2002), and Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa and Hashimoto (2005) have investigated 
factors which affect firm value. Studying determinants of corporate performance, they 
have explored effect of ownership stake of insiders – executives, founders, directors and 
immediate family members – a group of shareholders with direct managerial control of 
the firm. These studies have given mixed conclusion: the impact of insiders’ shareholding 
on firm performance may work both ways: Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that 
insiders take adequate risk while adopting policies which are consistent with the value 
maximizing principle; whereas according to Fama and Jensen (1983), the fact that 
substantial amount of insiders’ wealth is tied in firm projects makes them fairly risk-
averse, which, in turn, may induce them to pass up firm value enhancing investment 
opportunities.  
 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) apply piece-wise linear regression technique and find 
that profitability – measured by Tobin’s Q – has nonlinear relation with the fraction of 
shares by firm management. They find that firm value increases as management 
ownership rises to 5 percent, it falls as management ownership goes up to 25 percent, and 
it rises again with higher levels of managerial ownership. Other studies by Stulz (1988), 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), Holderness et al. (1999), and Short and Keasy (1999) 
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also postulate that relationship between ownership structure and firm performance is not 
linear. There seems to be wider consensus that firm performance goes up, falls down and 
then rises again as the fraction of shares held by management rises. This nature of 
relationship is thought to explain the interaction of entrenchment effect and wealth effect 
of managerial ownership. 
 
Studies by Agarwal and Knoeber (1996), and Crutchley et al. (1999), Tsai and Gu (2007) 
have explored the impact of institutional ownership on firm performance and they argue 
that this relationship is positive. An interesting study by Loderer and Martin (1997) finds 
(using simultaneous equations models) that ownership does not predict performance; 
however, that performance has a negative impact on institutional ownership. 
 
Whitley and Czaban (1998) argue that when firms are privatized by selling shares to 
foreigners, this transfer of ownership results in major organizational restructuring of the 
privatized firms which in turn affects the firm performance. While studying the impact of 
foreign shareholding Useem (1998) states that foreign shareholders change the market 
competition by pushing other firms to restructure their operations in the direction of 
shareholder value maximization. Makhija and Spiro (2000), using data of 988 newly 
privatized Czech firms (an emerging market), argue that foreign shareholders have better 
monitoring abilities; therefore, foreign shareholding enhances firm value. 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) explored interaction of legal system and finance using data from 49 
countries, including Pakistan. They have studied the impact of ownership concentration 
on firm value after controlling for macroeconomic factors in their regression. They find 
that developing economies, like Pakistan, with weak legal protection for small investors 
and with smaller capital markets have more concentrated ownership.  
 
Using data for 1301 corporations in eight East Asian economies, Claessens, et al. (2002) 
have studied the cash flow and voting rights of the ultimate/largest owner in terms of 
incentive alignment and entrenchment effect, respectively. They find that cash flow rights 
of the largest owner are positively related to firm value (incentive alignment effect), and 
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voting rights of the largest owner are negatively related to firm value (entrenchment 
effect). On exploring identities of the ultimate owner, they find that their results are 
driven by family control. While exploring interaction of ultimate control of the state and 
ultimate control of private investor, Chernykh (2005) finds nonlinear relation between 
ultimate ownership by state and firm performance. 
 
There are a few studies focused on corporate performance in Pakistan. Javid and Iqbal 
(2007) have constructed a composite index of corporate governance using information 
regarding corporate board, ownership structure and disclosure. However their sample size 
is very small – 50 listed top performing firms and that induces a bias in their study. Their 
composite index, however, indicates that better corporate governance adds value to the 
firm. Cheema and Bari (2003) did comparative statistical analyses on corporate 
governance in South Asian economies - India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. 
Ibrahim (2006) has written an essay on corporate governance issues in Pakistan, broadly 
focusing on legal dimension only. 
 
4.1.2 Capital Structure and Firm Performance 
 
With regard to corporate governance of a firm there are three main players – managers, 
shareholders and debt-holders. In case shareholders occupy management slots or 
managers hold substantial fraction of the equity, the agency cost of outside equity is 
reduced. The seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) set 
foundations for the role of debt in constraining the managers so that they may work in the 
interest of shareholders and enhance firm value. In the words of Myers “A high debt ratio 
can be dangerous, but it can also add value by putting the firm on diet” (2001, p 98). 
 
Highlighting the managers' incentive structure Mehran (1992) has argued that when 
'outside monitoring' is low managers have incentive to under-lever the firm to avoid 
bankruptcy risk. On the other hand, Jensen (1986) argues that in order to protect the 
interest of shareholders, firms with prevalent moral hazard problems, would tend to have 
higher debt ratio which would force the managers to work for value maximization of the 
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firm. Therefore, the conclusion on the relationship between leverage and firm 
performance is inconclusive.  
 
Bajaj, Chan and Dasgupta (1998) promote a model, which allows for moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems such that capital structure and firm performance are affected 
by monitoring mechanism and ownership structure of a firm. While exploring effect of 
ownership structure on capital structure and firm performance, Driffield, Mahambare and 
Pal (2005) have tried to deal with the simultaneity between capital structure and firm 
performance by applying three-stage least squares. They find that higher ownership 
concentration is positively associated with leverage.  
 
Similarly, Berger and di Patti (2006), while studying the banking industry in U.S., 
highlight the issue of simultaneity between capital structure and firm performance. They 
argue that agency cost of outside equity is measured by the loss in firm value caused by 
self-interest of the managers who are optimizing their own utility functions at the cost of 
interests of the shareholders. They further state that capital structure affects agency costs 
and thereby influences firm performance. 
 
There are two countervailing arguments that tax shield enhances firm value of levered 
firm but financial distress cost of debt reduces firm value. Chou and Lee (2007), using 
data of Taiwanese firms, find that there is curvilinear relation between return on equity 
and leverage ratio; it increases as leverage ratio goes up and then falls for high levels of 
leverage ratio. Zeitun and Tian (2007) analyzed effect of Jordanian firms’ leverage ratio 
on firm performance. Using return on assets and Tobin’s Q as performance measure, they 
find that capital structure is negatively related with firm performance.  
 
In sum, putting any measure of firm performance on the left-hand side of the equation 
and covariates like ownership structure and leverage, along with other control variables, 
on the right-hand side of the equation is marred with host of theoretical and empirical 
issues. Motivating this study it may be argued that corporate sector of Pakistan 
(characterized by family control, concentrated equity ownership, and weaknesses in 
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corporate governance) offers an interesting opportunity to test a range of hypotheses on 
the relation between ownership structure and firm performance.  
 
4.2 Data and Variables 
 
4.2.1 Variables  
 
While researching firm performance there are three issues which need to be considered 
carefully: (a) selecting appropriate firm performance measure; (b) listing dependent and 
explanatory variables and projecting expected nature of relationship; and (c) dealing with 
reverse causality between ownership structure and firm performance, and simultaneity 
between leverage and firm performance. 
 
Dependent Variables: Two-stage least squares technique has been applied in this study 
with two equations in the first stage and one in the second stage. There are two dependent 
variables for two equations in the first stage (ownership and leverage), and in the second 
stage firm performance measure, main dependent variable, is placed on the left hand side 
of the equation. 
 
As regards firm performance measures there is a long list of candidates – accounting 
based measures, which include return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), earnings 
before taxes and interest (EBIT); and market based measures, which include market value 
added (MVA), economic value added (EVA), and Tobin's-Q. This study explores firm 
performance using Tobin's Q, which is defined as ratio of market value of firm to book 
value of assets. Market value of firm is the sum of market value of equity and book value 
of debt. 
 
Explanatory Variables: Ownership is main explanatory variable and, as stated in earlier 
chapters, it has been explored in three dimensions: direct ownership, ownership 
concentration, and ultimate ownership. Definition of ownership is mainly based on voting 
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rights. Vector of control variables include leverage, log of assets, asset tangibility, quick 
ratio, and firm risk. 
 
4.2.2 Summary Statistics 
 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of firm specific variables. As shown in the table 
average size of a firm in terms of total assets is 3.80 billion Pakistani Rupee (hereafter 
PKR), with median assets 940 million PKR (in terms of gross sales it is 4.8 billion PKR 
with median 970 million PKR) . Further, the table shows that average (median) value of 
Tobin’s Q – firm performance measure – is 1.14 (0.98). Average (median) debt ratio is 68 
(73.50) percent suggesting that Pakistani listed firms are fairly leveraged. Further, the 
structure of assets is such that tangible assets, on average, are little more than half of total 
assets (52.36 percent). Quick ratio, an indicator of the ease with which a firm is able to 
pay off its immediate liabilities, has average (median) values as 87 (61). Firm risk 
(measured by the standard deviation of the last four years’ market value of stocks) has 
average 0.66 and median value 0.05. The mean (median) effective tax rate is 22.12 
(12.31) percent. Average dividend payout ratio is 15.30 percent of the net profit before 
taxes. The annual depreciation to asset ratio (NDTS) is 4 percent, and the firm 
profitability measured by return on equity is 11.30 percent on average with 10 percent 
median value. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
(Firm specific variables) 
 
All statistics are calculated over the whole set of 306 firms. Total assets and gross sales are measured in 
million of Pakistani Rupees; Tobin's q is ratio of market value of equity and book value of debt to total 
assets; risk is measured as standard deviation of market value of firm during last four years; and rest of 
variables are presented in percentage terms. 
 
Variables Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Total Assets  3772 940 10864 5 150656 
Gross Sales  4794 970 18017 0 353833 
Tobin's q  1.14 0.98 0.58 0.20 6.62 
Leverage  67.67 73.50 24.02 1.38 100.00 
Tangibility  52.36 53.15 22.58 0.00 98.69 
Quick Ratio  87.04 61.06 110.77 0.49 1522.76 
Risk  0.66 0.05 2.10 0.00 22.25 
Effective Tax Rate56 22.12   12.31 100.95 -300.00 1600.00 
Dividend Payout  15.26 0.00 35.46 -118.95 500.00 
Return on Equity  11.31 10.00 78.61 -684.30 1242.90 
Non-debt Tax Shield  4.09 3.68 3.78 0.00 76.65 
Asset Turnover  119.47 100.75 107.94 0.00 1487.50 
 
Detail on sources of data has been given in section 2.2 of chapter 2. Definitions and 
summary statistics of ownership and other relevant variables (different types of direct, 
ultimate and the largest shareholder) are presented in section 2.2 of chapter 2. For full 
summary statistics of ownership categories, see Table 2.2. 
 
                                               
56 In order to control for outliers the model in section 4.4 has been tested by controlling for top/bottom 1 
percent and top/bottom 5 percent values of the variables of interest (especially effective tax rate, dividend 
payout ratio and return on equity), and generally the results are robust to extreme values. 
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4.3 Hypotheses 
 
4.3.1 Direct Ownership and Firm Performance: 
 
Direct ownership represents direct voting rights of immediate shareholders by category 
of owner. As stated in chapter 2, section 2.2 categories of direct owners include insiders, 
associated firms, group, financial institutions, foreigners and the state. 
 
Insiders, the focus category of direct owners, is defined as percentage of voting rights 
held by managers, directors and their family members. Convergence of interest 
hypothesis suggests that ownership by this category of shareholders aligns their interest 
with that of shareholders. Therefore, following hypothesis may be set in this regard: 
 
H4.1: Equity ownership by insiders affects firm performance positively. 
  
Shareholding by associated firms57
Group, sum of voting rights of insiders and associated firms, is supposed to work as a 
voting block. The impact of equity holdings of group on firm value depends on the 
strength of effects of the constituent parts (insiders and associated firms). However, it 
may be postulated that groups parallel the idea of big firms which have a pool of 
financial, technical and human resources at their disposal. Therefore, groups, taken as 
well diversified portfolio of assets and liabilities, are better able to absorb losses in one 
part and smooth out the dividends to other member firms. Nonetheless, empirical 
 may work in either direction - positive or negative. If 
associated companies are seeking rent through their equity holding in the firm – 
siphoning or misallocating resources of investee firm and passively participating in its 
control and decision making process then shareholding by such associated companies 
would affect firm value negatively. However, if associated companies actively participate 
in the management of investee firm then they would add value to the investee firm. 
 
                                               
57 Definition of associated firms is prescribed in the Companies Ordinance (1984) of the Government of 
Pakistan, and it is based upon minimum 20 percent voting rights with the associated/related firm. Further 
detail is provided in section 2.2 of chapter 2. 
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analyses in the following section would help in determining the nature of relationship 
between equity ownership by group and firm performance measured by Tobin’s q.  
 
Financial institutions have the advantage of gathering and analyzing detailed 
information about companies which could be their real or potential borrowers. This 
information advantage not only helps them in making better investment decisions but also 
adds to their monitoring capacity. However, it may also be argued that main investment 
objectives of financial institutions – non-strategic investors – invest in equities for the 
sake of diversifying their portfolio. Moreover, as far as banks are concerned, banking 
sector supervisor (SBP) discourages banks from engaging in day-to-day affairs of the 
firms they hold the shares of. Given these competing arguments regarding the nature of 
relationship between equity holding by financial institutions on firm performance, the 
determination of direction and strength of relationship is left to empirical analyses. 
 
Shareholding by foreign investors brings not only the foreign capital and technical 
advantage to the firm but also enhances market confidence in that firm in the sense that 
foreign investors have better business skills, better access to international capital market, 
and would be better able to survive business cycles thereby adds to the firm value.  
 
H4.2: Foreign shareholding affects firm performance positively. 
 
Government ownership is based on economic objectives as well as political ambitions, 
and the latter usually dominate the former at the cost of interests of other stakeholders of 
the firm and the taxpayers. Moreover, the managers of public companies have no 
incentive to enhance the efficiency of the firm as they have no threat of job loss. Free of 
almost all monitoring, they have ample opportunities to extract private benefits of control 
and misappropriate the firm resources.  
 
H4.3: Government shareholding affects firm performance negatively. 
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4.3.2 Ownership concentration: 
 
Like in previous chapters, ownership concentration is measured in terms of shareholding 
by the single largest owner and, alternatively by the equity holding of top three and top 
five shareholders. 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) have argued that countries with weak legal protection to the 
investors would have more concentrated shareholding of the firms. According to them 
shareholding concentration provides not only substantial legal and financial benefit of 
control and enhanced capacity to monitor the managers but also it works to safeguard 
against poor legal protection available to small investors. Pakistan has inherited common 
law background from the British colonial rule; however, unlike Anglo-American model 
of diffused shareholding, the corporate ownership structure is rather concentrated. 
Moreover, the rights of minority shareholders are not very well protected58
                                               
58 Corporate law in Pakistan (Companies Ordinance of Pakistan 1984, XLVII ) states that one should have 
at least 20 percent shareholding in a firm before seeking remedy from the court of law against any 
misconduct in business by rest of the shareholders. In order to lodge complain to the corporate supervisor 
(SECP) one should represent at least 10 to 20 percent shareholding of the firm. There is no section in the 
law or in the Code of Corporate Governance dealing with rights of the shareholders with shareholding less 
than 10 percent, therefore, it may be concluded that minority shareholders go without any legal protection. 
.  
 
Apart from above it may be argued that as the ownership stake of the shareholders 
increases the incentive to engage more and more in the firm affairs increases. This would 
add to the monitoring of the firm managers so that their efficiency may be enhanced. We, 
therefore, expect a positive relation between the ownership concentration and firm value. 
 
H4.4: Ownership concentration affects firm performance positively.  
 
H4.4a: Insider and foreigner as the single largest owner affect firm performance 
positively (Incentive alignment hypothesis) whereas financial institution and the state 
affect firm performance negatively (rent extraction and passive voter hypothesis). 
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4.3.3 Ultimate Ownership 
 
The definition of ultimate shareholder and the types thereof remain the same as in chapter 
2. Being the largest and controlling shareholder(s) of the firm, ultimate shareholders' 
interests would be aligned with the management, especially in case of family having the 
largest and controlling stake. Family as an ultimate shareholder is expected to have 
positive bearings on the firm performance as they tend to protect their interests in the 
firm which they might consider as family jewel. Moreover, there are higher chances that 
family members are directly engaged in the day-to-day functioning of the firm. For 
foreigners as ultimate owner we may draw similar argument. However, government as an 
ultimate shareholder might affect the performance of the firm negatively due to weak 
oversight of the management, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and using corporate resources 
for political expediency. Following are the proposed hypotheses: 
 
H4.5: Ultimate control of family on a firm affects its performance positively. 
H4.6: State as ultimate owner of a firm affect its performance negatively. 
H4.7: Foreigners as ultimate owners of a firm have positive effects on firm performance. 
 
4.3.4 Other Explanatory variables: 
 
Leverage is measured as the ratio of book value of debt to market value of equity plus 
book value of debt. A positive sign of leverage in our model would assert that higher debt 
level reduces agency cost of outside equity and, therefore, forces the managers to take 
care of the interest of the shareholders. Another explanation is that as a firm accumulates 
more and more profits it may tend to substitute debt for equity, and for such a successful 
firm access to debt market (with all its tax saving and other benefits) increases. On the 
other hand, negative sign of market leverage highlights that income effect of increased 
profitability is stronger than substitution effect in the sense that better performing firms 
invest their profits back into the pool of investible funds thereby decreasing debt holding. 
Firms do this in order to protect shareholders' rights to free cash flows of the firm. 
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Firm size is another determinant of firm performance. It is measured as natural log of 
total assets. A positive affect of the size of firm on its performance shows that the firm is 
enjoying economies of scale. On the other hand, if firm size has negative affect on firm 
performance then the firm may be over-sized. 
 
Asset tangibility (Tang) is ratio of the fixed assets to total assets and it could have 
positive or negative relationship with firm performance. A negative relation of asset 
specificity with the firm performance may be an indicator that the firm has over invested 
in fixed assets which may not have secondary markets, whereas positive relation between 
asset tangibility and firm performance is indicative of market's confidence on the nature, 
size, utility and marketability of the fixed assets. 
 
Quick ratio (QR) or acid-test ratio, the ratio of current assets minus inventories to 
current liabilities, measures the ease with which a firm is able to meet its short-term 
liabilities using its most liquid assets. The higher the quick ratio, the greater is the margin 
it adds to firm performance. 
 
Risk measured by the standard deviation of the last four years' market value of common 
stock. Assuming that market is occupied by stable, risk-averse and long term investors 
then market would like the stock price to remain stable; that is, riskiness of the firm is 
low. This implies that the relation between Tobin's q and firm risk is expected to be 
negative. 
 
4.4 Methodology 
 
4.4.1 Endogeneity 
 
In traditional setting of regression equation right-hand side variables (regressors) 
determine the left-hand side (dependent) variable. However, it could be true that 
dependent variable tends to explain one or more explanatory variables. Those explanatory 
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variables which are also explained by the dependent variable are called endogenous 
variables. In fact some regressors are endogenous because they correlate with the 
residuals and they come at the cost of creating bias in estimation. If the model suffers 
from endogeneity problem then OLS estimators would give biased and inconsistent 
parameter estimates59. There are various techniques to deal with this problem. Among 
others, one such technique is two-stage least squares - instrument variables regression 
(2SLS-IV) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)60
Discussing endogeneity between ownership and firm performance Demsetz (1983) 
argues that in pursuit of maximization of firm value ownership is determined 
endogenously. Other studies by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Cho (1998) support 
this argument. They state that increasing returns to scales may prompt the managers 
towards equity issues and that may increase diffuseness of equity ownership. Therefore, it 
is not always the case that ownership dispersion and firm value are negatively related
. 
 
In order to handle endogeneity problem, ownership and capital structure have been 
jointly determined with firm performance. Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 2SLS 
technique has been used to estimate two simultaneous equations. 2SLS is basically a least 
squares technique, and, unlike OLS, it is robust to endogenous variables. However, 2SLS 
estimates are not efficient asymptotically. 
 
61
Capital structure is also suspected to be endogenous to firm performance. It may be 
argued that better performing firms (earning high profits) may like reduce their debt 
levels so that they set themselves free from the restrictions imposed by the debt 
covenants. This is especially true for firms with block holdings by insiders or families. 
Moreover, better firm performance reduces the cost of equity capital. These arguments 
explain that firm performance affects capital structure choice. Looking at the flipside, it 
may be argued that, apart from its tax advantage, debt reduces agency cost of outside 
.  
 
                                               
59 Woolridge (2003). 
60 As a matter of fact 2SLS-IV is a version of GMM. 
61 This is one of the most convincing arguments countering Berle and Means (1932) proposition that firms 
perform badly as their ownership becomes more and more diffused. 
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equity by pushing managers to run the firm in manners consistent with wealth 
maximization principle. However, highly leveraged firms face financial distress cost 
which may have bearings on the firm value. In sum, it may be stated that firm 
performance and leverage are both cause and effect for one another. 
 
4.4.2 Two-stage Least Squares Estimation Technique 
 
This study is based on instrumental variables two-stage least squares within estimators 
(fixed effects) model for panel data. Basically the estimators are two-stage least squares 
generalizations of simple panel-data estimators for exogenous variables. Following are 
the simultaneous equations:  
 
tiiia LdOcXbaQ ,... ε++++=      (4.1) 
 
where Qa stands for average Tobin's Q; X represents vector of determinants of firm 
performance, and it includes log of sales, tangibility, firm risk, and quick ratio; O 
represents ownership variables; and L represents leverage.   
 
Ownership (O) and leverage (L) have been instrumented as following  
 
tii YL ,1 . ηβα ++=        (4.2) 
tii ZO ,2 . νγα ++=        (4.3) 
 
where Y and Z are vectors of determinants shared by leverage and ownership, and 
their elements includes log of assets, market-to-book ratio, asset turnover, dividend 
payout, effective tax rate, and non-debt tax shields 
 
Firm level characteristics have been used as instruments for both leverage and ownership 
equations. The validity of the instruments may be discussed in terms of Sargan-Hansen 
test statistics (in econometrics terms) and by seeking references from the literature. As 
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regards the literature, empirical studies by Titman and Wessels (1988); Barclay and 
Smith (1995); Booth et al. (2001); and Antoniou et al. (2008) find that firm specific 
characteristics like firm size, dividend payout, tax rate, profitability, and non-debt tax 
shields are major determinants of the corporate capital structure choice. Likewise, studies 
on the relation between ownership structure and firm performance (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Crespi Cladera, 1998; Bebchukk, 1999a and 1999b) have used firm size, growth 
opportunities, dividends, asset turnover, and profitability as the factors influencing firm 
ownership. Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008) purport that factors like firm size, asset 
tangibility, growth opportunities, business risk, etc. are common determinants of 
ownership and capital structures. Following these studies equations (4.1 to 4.3) have been 
formulated. Additionally, Sargan-Hansen test statistics, reported in the subsequent parts 
of this chapter, validate instruments used in those structural equations.  
 
4.4.3 Testing Endogeneity (Model) 
 
Before applying 2SLS model on panel data, it would be necessary to test endogeneity. 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (hereafter DWH) test, a two-step testing method, is used in this 
regard62
tili EL ,. ωσκ ++=
. The DWH test procedure is as follows: 
 
Taking endogenous variables - ownership and leverage - one by one and regressing them 
against a list of exogenous variables, residuals (ω and τ) are saved, and then in the 
second stage those estimated residuals are placed among other explanatory variables on 
the right-hand side of the structural equation (4.6).  
 
       (4.4) 
tili EO ,. τπδ ++=        (4.5) 
ti
j
titimia WQ ,,2,1 ).().(. ψτλωλθλ ++++=        (4.6) 
where 
                                               
62 For reference see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) 
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E: Vector of ‘l’ exogenous variables which include firm size, tangibility, 
quick ratio, risk, market-to-book ratio, non-debt tax shield, asset turnover, 
effective tax rate, and dividend payout 
W: vector of ‘m’ explanatory variables which include ownership type, 
leverage, size, tangibility, quick ratio, and Risk.  
ti,ω : Estimated residuals for (market) leverage  
j
ti ,τ : Estimated residuals for ownership type ‘j’  
 
For the given model if the coefficient of the residuals – ‘ω’ and ‘τ’ – is statistically 
significant, it may be concluded that OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent. 
Therefore, DWH test provides basis for using 2SLS in order to get estimates of firm 
performance, ownership and leverage relation63
As 2SLS regression technique has been applied, therefore order (identification) and rank 
conditions
. 
 
4.4.4 Test of Over-identifying Restrictions 
 
64
The null hypothesis for testing the orthogonality conditions (over-identifying conditions) 
is that the excluded variables (instruments) are valid instruments; that is, they are 
uncorrelated with the error terms. The failure of the null hypothesis
 need to be taken care of. The order condition for identification involves 
excluded exogenous variables and endogenous variables in our estimation equation in 
such a manner that the number of former should not be less than the later. The rank 
condition for identification requires that there must be at least one variable in the second 
equation which is not included in the first equation and must have a non-zero coefficient. 
 
65
 
 casts doubts about 
the validity of the instruments used.  
                                               
63 For reference on how to apply 2SLS see Cong, R. (2004), available at www.stata.com 
64 Wooldridge (2003). 
65 STATA module 'xtoverid' command with cluster option reports an over-identification statistic that is 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and within-group correlation and as stated earlier, rejection of null 
hypothesis renders validity of instruments, used in 2SLS model, objectionable. 
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4.5 Empirical Results 
 
4.5.1 Testing Endogeneity of Leverage and Ownership 
 
For our model, with both leverage and ownership considered endogenous variables 
simultaneously, second stage results are shown in appendix A4.1 – A4.3 for direct, 
concentrated and ultimate ownership, respectively. The coefficients of estimated 
residuals of leverage (ω) are statistically significant for sixteen out of eighteen models; 
similarly, coefficients of residuals of ownership variables are statistically significant for 
seventeen out of eighteen models. Therefore, it may be argued that leverage and 
ownership are endogenous to the firm performance equation and that 2SLS-IV66
                                               
66 The first stage regression results are reported in the Appendix A4.5. In the first stage of the 2SLS-IV 
regression endogenous covariates (ownership and leverage) are estimated and then the predicted values of 
those endogenous covariates have been used in the second stage of the 2SLS-IV regression. The first stage 
results show that coefficients of firm size, risk, asset turnover and non-debt tax shield are statistically 
significant for most of the owners’ types and coefficients of quick ratio, risk, asset turnover and non-debt 
tax shield are statistically significant for leverage equation. 
 
 is a 
better estimation technique than OLS.  
  
4.5.2 Control Variables: 
 
The coefficient of  ln(a) –  proxy for firm size – is negative and statistically significant 
which shows that as the firm size increases the performance of the firm, measured by 
Tobin's Q, goes down. This result is consistent with the findings of Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985), Agarwal and Knoeber (1996) and Agarwal and Ganguli (2008). The coefficient 
of tangibility (Tang) is negative and insignificant for most of the categories of 
ownership. The coefficient for quick ratio (QR) is negative and statistically significant 
which implies that the market has a negative view on assets which are easily convertible 
to cash. The coefficient for risk is positive for all ownership types and it is statistically 
significant for most of them.  
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Leverage: The coefficient of leverage (Lev.), suspected of being endogenous, is negative 
for all ownership types and it is statistically significant for most of them. The negative 
sign shows that less levered firms have higher market value. Possible explanation for this 
inverse relationship is that when the firms earn profits they, following Pecking-order 
theory, either recycle profits to finance new ventures or they payoff their debts so that the 
shareholders may benefit from greater dividend disbursements in the future.  
 
4.5.3 Direct ownership and firm performance67
Associated Firms: Shareholding by related companies (model 2 - Table 4.2) exerts 
negative
 
 
Insiders: This is probably the most researched category when it comes to testing effect of 
ownership structure on firm performance. Model (1) in Table 4.2 shows that coefficient 
of ‘insiders’ is positive and statistically significant. This implies that agency problem 
between the shareholders and managers is partially resolved by insiders' shareholding - 
firm performance improves by 6.8 percent for every unit increase in shareholding by the 
insiders. This is obviously the result of convergence of interest of the managers with that 
of other stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Our results are consistent with 
findings of Monsen, John and David (1968), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Leach and 
Leahy (1994), Mehran (1995), and Loderer and Martin (1997). 
 
68
The combined effect of the insiders’ shareholdings and associated firms' shareholding 
comes under the category of group. Table 4.2 (model 3) shows that shareholding by 
‘group’ has positive significant effect on firm performance. Possible explanation for this 
 significant effect on firm performance.  This implies that associated firms 
siphon the investee firm’s resources.  
 
                                               
67 To check robustness of firm performance measure, 2SLS regression has been run with return on equity 
(RoE), in place of Tobin’s q, as dependent variable and the results are reported in the appendix in tables 
A4.6 (for direct owners) and A4.7 (for ultimate owners). Generally, the results are robust in terms of 
direction of relationship, with slight variations in strength of relationship. 
68 We have tested the model for different levels of associated firms' shareholding starting from 5% to more 
than 50%; however the direction of relationship throughout remains negative. 
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positive impact is that group works as a unified whole and better able to allocate firm 
resources efficiently.  
 
Shareholdings by financial institutions, as shown by model (4) in Table 4.2, have 
negative yet statistically insignificant impact on firm performance. Model 5 in Table 4.2 
shows that foreign shareholding affects firm performance positively; however, that 
effect is statistically insignificant. Direct shareholding by the state is value enhancing as 
far as the direction of relation between voting rights with Government of Pakistan and 
firm performance measure (Tobin's q) is concerned; however, statistically the estimate is 
not different from zero. 
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Table 4.2: Direct Ownership and Firm Performance 
(Dependent variable: Average Tobin’s q) 
Table reports regression results with (average) Tobin’s q as dependent variable and equity holding of type 
‘j’ of direct owner as main explanatory variable. Leverage (Lev.), log of assets (ln(a)), asset tangibility 
(Tang.), quick ratio (QR), and firm risk are control variables. Types of direct owner (j) include: Insider, 
Associated Firms (AF), Group (Insiders + Associated firm), Financial Institutions (FI), Foreigner and the 
State (Government of Pakistan). Sargan represents Sargan-Hansen test statistic for over-identifying 
restrictions. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Insider AF Group FI Foreigner State 
Lev. -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.011** -0.008 -0.012 -0.013 
 (-2.62) (-4.79) (-2.40) (-1.20) (-1.56) (-0.81) 
ln(a) -0.266*** -0.056 -0.207*** -0.166** -0.179* 0.548 
 (-3.00) (-1.59) (-2.86) (-2.16) (-1.80) (0.76) 
Tang. -0.003 -0.001 -0.003** -0.002 0.003 -0.005 
 (-1.55) (-0.90) (-2.10) (-1.18) -0.73 (-0.71) 
QR -0.077*** -0.096*** -0.090*** -0.087*** -0.080** 0.00 
 (-2.77) (-4.79) (-4.22) (-4.28) (-1.98) (-0.00) 
Risk 0.069*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.082*** 0.109** 0.189 
 (2.91) (3.43) (3.27) (3.40) (2.26) (1.11) 
Insider 0.068***      
 (2.67)      
AF  -0.056*     
  (-1.83)     
Group   0.046**    
   (2.29)    
FI    -0.04   
    (-1.45)   
Foreigner     0.159  
     (1.54)  
State      0.562 
      (0.86) 
Constant 2.143*** 3.950*** 1.547** 3.584*** 1.791* -2.979 
 (4.33) (6.14) (2.29) (6.67) (1.93) (-0.43) 
Obs. 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 
F-value 13.85 22.83 21.30 28.77 6.62 1.44 
Within 4.49 7.86 7.21 9.99 2.15 0.46 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Sargan 2.33 13.26 3.89 11.34 3.76 2.84 
p-value 0.50 0.00 0.27 0.10 0.29 0.42 
 t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels. 
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4.5.4 Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance: 
 
Three alternative measures – shareholding by the single largest owner, shareholding by 
top three shareholders, and shareholding by top five shareholders – have been used to 
estimate the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance. Table 4.3, models 
(1) to (3) show that ownership concentration is inversely related with firm performance. 
This negative impact shows that high concentration in the hands of single largest or top 
three or top five shareholders points towards entrenchment effect, yet coefficient for all 
three measures of ownership concentration are statistically insignificant.  
 
However, when we look deeper into the identities of the largest owner, Table 4.3, models 
(4) to (8) show that shareholding by insider, foreigner and state – as the largest owner – 
has positive relation with Tobin’s q, whereas associated companies and financial 
institutions as largest owner exert negative impact on firm performance. Table 4.3 shows 
that coefficients for foreigner and state as the largest owner are statistically insignificant. 
 
These results show that when corporate management acquires ownership stake such that 
that they become the largest equity holder in the firm, their interest gets aligned with the 
interest of other stakeholders. In fact block holding by the management controls 
opportunistic behavior of the managers. Associated firms, as the largest shareholder, 
exert negative impact on firm performance. On the one hand, associated firms may be 
taken as passive voters who may not be vigilant of the management; and on the other 
hand, associated companies being controlling shareholders may be misappropriating firm 
resources. Similarly, financial institutions as the largest equity owner also affect firm 
performance negatively, which again may be explained in terms of passive-voter 
hypothesis. As explained earlier, since financial institutions are discouraged from 
participating in day-to-day affairs of the investee firms, they are not able to effectively 
monitor the management which results in negative impact on firm performance. 
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Table 4.3: The largest owner and Firm Performance 
(Dependent variable: Average Tobin’s q) 
Table reports regression results with (average) Tobin’s q as dependent variable. Main explanatory variable 
is proxy ownership concentration (shareholding of top five (three) or the largest owner) as shown in 
Models 1 to 3. In Models 4 to 8, dummy for type of the largest owner has been interacted with the voting 
rights of the largest owner. T5 (T3) represents sum shareholding of top five (three) shareholders and T1 
represents shareholding of the largest owner. Types of the largest owner are Insider (T1-Insid), Associated 
firm (T1-AF), financial institution (T1-FI), foreigner (T1-For.) and State (T1-State). Leverage (Lev), log of 
assets (ln(a)), asset tangibility (Tang.), quick ratio (QR), and firm risk are control variables. Sargan 
represents Sargan-Hansen test statistic for over-identifying restrictions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 T5 T3 T1 T1-Insid T1-AF T1-FI T1-For. T1-State 
Lev. -0.020*** -0.015 -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.025* -0.019*** 
 (-3.90) (-1.14) (-5.79) (-2.65) (-5.69) (-3.32) (-1.77) (-3.23) 
ln(a) -0.014 0.08 -0.049 -0.250*** -0.048 -0.206*** 0.069 -0.051 
 (-0.23) -0.34 (-1.51) (-2.90) (-1.58) (-3.78) -0.41 (-0.97) 
Tang. -0.003 -0.009 -0.002** -0.003* -0.001 -0.004** 0.014 -0.002 
 (-1.64) (-0.83) (-2.04) (-1.70) (-1.08) (-2.50) -0.87 (-1.03) 
QR -0.121*** -0.161 -0.104*** -0.112*** -0.118*** -0.101*** -0.162* -0.101*** 
 (-4.15) (-1.50) (-6.70) (-4.54) (-6.27) (-4.64) (-1.91) (-3.44) 
Risk 0.02 -0.083 0.054*** 0.069*** 0.053*** 0.062*** 0.03 0.052** 
 (0.53) (-0.41) (3.97) (3.14) (3.68) (3.24) (0.51) (2.02) 
T5 -0.05        
 (-1.09)        
T3  -0.165       
  (-0.71)       
T1   -0.01      
   (-0.77)      
T1-Insid.    0.075**     
    (2.48)     
T1-AF     -0.035*    
     (-1.71)    
T1-FI      -0.120***   
      (-3.66)   
T1-For.       0.418  
       (1.05)  
T1-State        0.319 
        (1.10) 
Constant 5.804** 10.361 3.167*** 3.343*** 3.239*** 4.209*** -0.613 2.249*** 
 (2.17) (0.98) (7.79) (8.15) (10.25) (8.63) (-0.18) (2.99) 
Obs. 1525.00 1525.00 1525.00 1525.00 1525.00 1525.00 1525.00 1525.00 
F-value 16.03 2.01 37.53 15.92 33.10 20.59 2.44 10.37 
Within 5.54 0.67 12.87 5.27 11.48 6.52 0.79 3.56 
p-value 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Sargan 7.36 0.64 21.30 4.46 20.06 1.75 2.13 16.39 
p-value 0.06 0.89 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.63 0.55 0.00 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels. 
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4.5.5 Ultimate ownership and Firm Performance 
 
Results in Table 4.4 show the impact of shareholding by different types of ultimate 
owners on firm performance for different threshold levels of voting rights (10 percent, 25 
percent and 50 percent). Model (1), (2) and (3) show that voting rights of the ultimate 
owners, without any regard to the identity of the ultimate owner, have positive significant 
relation with Tobin’s q. This implies that, in general, ultimate owners exercise their 
control rights in manners consistent with value maximization principle. 
 
Models (4) to (18) show results for different identities of ultimate owner and they show 
that equity holding of family as ultimate shareholders, for both definitions of family, has 
positive significant impact on firm performance for all threshold levels of voting rights. 
These findings imply that family control is value enhancing. In fact business families are 
strategic investors who have tied up their family wealth in their business, and they place 
family members on the board of directors and in the management of the firms under their 
control who exercise effective control over the firm management. In sum, longer histories 
of business families, which play important role in markets for suppliers of raw material 
and funds, and commitment of the family to superior entrepreneurship results in positive 
impact on firm value. 
 
Ultimate shareholdings by foreigners have nonlinear relation with firm value. However, 
coefficient for ultimate shareholding is statistically insignificant for all threshold levels. 
Equity stake of state as ultimate shareholder affects firm value negatively for all 
threshold levels and the coefficients are statistically not different from zero. 
 Table 4.4: Ultimate Ownership and Firm Performance (Dependent variable: Average Tobin’s q) 
Table reports regression results with (average) Tobin’s q as dependent variable. In Models 1 to 3 main explanatory variable is equity holding by the 
ultimate owner, and in models 4 to 18 interaction term for different types of ultimate owner become main explanatory variable (dummy for type of the 
largest owner has been interacted with the voting rights of the ultimate owner). UO represents shareholding of ultimate owner. Types of ultimate owner 
are Family (UO_Family), State (UO_State), Foreigner (UO_Foreigner), Legal person (UO_LP), and Family with extended definition (UO_FamE). 
Leverage (Lev), log of assets (ln(a)), asset tangibility (Tang.), quick ratio (QR), and firm risk are control variables. Sargan represents Sargan-Hansen test 
statistic for over-identifying restrictions. 
 Ultimate owner (UO) UO_Family UO_State 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Threshold 10 25 50 10 25 50 10 25 50 
Lev. -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.017** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019* 
 (-2.63) (-2.82) (-2.52) (-3.80) (-3.73) (-3.09) (-2.67) (-2.67) (-1.92) 
ln(a) -0.204*** -0.182*** -0.319** -0.190*** -0.177*** -0.236** -0.023 -0.023 -0.008 
 (-3.03) (-3.02) (-1.98) (-3.45) (-3.58) (-2.54) (-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.09) 
Tang. -0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0,000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (-0.11) (0.15) (0.61) (-0.82) (-0.88) (-0.12) (-1.16) (-1.16) (-1.10) 
QR -0.086*** -0.083*** -0.097*** -0.084*** -0.083*** -0.092*** -0.079* -0.079* -0.064 
 (-3.91) (-3.69) (-2.70) (-3.63) (-3.76) (-2.86) (-1.88) (-1.88) (-1.14) 
Risk 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.064** 0.060*** 0.064*** 0.056** 0.068** 0.068** 0.077 
 (3.64) (3.58) (2.01) (3.06) (3.37) (2.02) (1.99) (1.99) (1.65) 
UO 0.045** 0.041** 0.049*       
 (2.47) (2.48) (1.72)       
UO_Family    0.067*** 0.056*** 0.052**    
    (3.26) (3.50) (2.31)    
UO_State       -0.472 -0.472 -0.303 
       (-1.11) (-1.11) (-1.58) 
Const. 1.096 1.214 2.687*** 1.560*** 1.770*** 2.908*** 4.240*** 4.202*** 3.394*** 
 (1.37) (1.60) (4.78) (2.90) (3.83) (5.99) (3.21) (3.26) (4.06) 
Obs. 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 
F-value 21.23 20.75 7.34 19.21 21.16 9.59 6.81 6.81 3.81 
Within 7.07 6.92 2.40 6.17 6.77 3.09 2.31 2.31 1.19 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Sargan 3.65 3.57 1.19 2.16 1.94 2.47 5.56 5.56 0.58 
p-value 0.30 0.31 0.76 0.54 0.59 0.48 0.14 0.14 0.90 
              (Continued) 
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 Table 4.4 (Continued) 
 UO_For. UO_LP UO_FamE 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Threshold 10 25 50 10 25 50 10 25 50 
Lev. -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.017*** 
 (-3.49) (-3.66) (-4.69) (-5.44) (-5.13) (-5.56) (-3.27) (-2.74) (-3.29) 
ln(a) -0.101* -0.064** -0.073** -0.042 -0.038 -0.039 -0.172*** -0.175*** -0.226*** 
 (-1.76) (-2.00) (-2.03) (-1.34) (-1.09) (-1.06) (-3.40) (-3.38) (-2.59) 
Tang. 0.008 -0.008 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003* -0.003* -0.001 
 -0.81 (-0.58) -0.7 (-1.02) (-0.32) (-1.63) (-1.92) (-1.87) (-0.58) 
QR -0.090*** -0.108*** -0.100*** -0.107*** -0.116*** -0.106*** -0.084*** -0.077*** -0.088*** 
 (-3.17) (-4.83) (-4.94) (-6.45) (-5.85) (-6.37) (-4.24) (-3.53) (-3.28) 
Risk 0.064*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.046*** 0.041** 0.050*** 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.064*** 
 (2.62) (3.28) (3.12) (3.02) (2.30) (3.32) (4.05) (3.93) (2.76) 
UO_For. 0.202 -0.085 0.075       
 (1.06) (-0.42) (1.63)       
UO_LP    -0.036 -0.061** -0.022    
    (-1.56) (-2.14) (-1.10)    
UO_FamE       0.044*** 0.045*** 0.037** 
       (2.80) (2.90) (2.18) 
Const. 1.161 3.744* 2.457*** 3.241*** 3.531*** 2.902*** 1.627*** 1.530*** 2.922*** 
 (0.68) (1.88) (5.89) (9.91) (8.67) (11.67) (3.01) (2.71) (7.30) 
Obs. 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 
F-value 13.13 26.75 21.70 33.51 25.76 33.40 26.68 23.55 13.61 
Within 4.44 9.16 7.26 11.56 8.73 11.64 8.81 7.69 4.52 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sargan 9.64 19.07 13.72 18.56 12.23 16.76 3.46 2.68 2.51 
p-value 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.33 0.44 0.47 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels.
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
In financial theory relationship of firm performance with ownership structure and capital 
structure has been studied widely yet we have mixed conclusions only. Mostly, the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm value has been studied without 
considering possibility of their joint determination. This study adds to the existing 
literature in the following ways: one, it provides extensive coverage of ownership 
structure in three possible dimensions – direct ownership, ultimate ownership and 
ownership concentration; two, unlike recent studies, capital structure has been treated as 
an endogenous variable simultaneously with ownership structure by applying two-stage 
least squares instrumental variables estimation technique.   
 
Applying DWH test, it has been empirically tested that capital and ownership structures 
are endogenous and that 2SLS-IV, as compared to OLS, is a better technique as it gives 
consistent and unbiased estimates. The results show factors like leverage, size of the firm, 
and liquidity have significant negative effect on firm performance. 
 
The study finds that ownership structure, which is the focus of this study, affects the firm 
performance. The results show that insiders, both as direct shareholders and as the largest 
shareholders exert positive significant effect on firm value. This points towards 
convergence of interest when corporate management hold equity stakes in the firm 
directly and as the single largest owner. In contrast to insiders, associated firms, both as 
direct shareholders and as the single largest shareholder has damaging effect on firm 
value. Based upon these results it may be argued that such related firms act passively as 
regards monitoring of the managers is concerned and they may be misappropriating firm 
resources by voting for value decreasing projects. Similarly arguments may be presented 
for financial institutions as direct as well as the largest shareholder. Financial institutions 
are additionally handicapped by the statutory limits on their participation in the affairs of 
non-financial firms. Foreigner and state as direct as well as the largest shareholding have 
positive yet statistically insignificant impact on firm performance.  
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As regards ultimate ownership, results show that family control as ultimate owners is 
firm value enhancing at all threshold levels (10 percent, 25 percent and 50 percent of 
voting rights). In contrast government as ultimate owner affects firm performance 
negatively; however, the coefficient is statistically insignificant at all levels of voting 
thresholds. Foreigners as ultimate shareholders have nonlinear relation with firm value 
and, like for state control, the coefficient is statistically insignificant at all levels of voting 
thresholds. 
 
Future research may be extended to financial institutions as well. Moreover, availability 
of adequate data on other aspects of corporate governance like board structure and 
activities, extent of financial disclosure and transparency would allow extending the 
analyses further. 
113 
Chapter 5 
 
Summary 
 
This thesis is an empirical investigation of equity ownership structure of Pakistani listed 
firms. In broader terms, the domain of this research is corporate governance. The 
dissertation includes three essays investigating the effects of equity ownership on (a) 
financing choices, (b) investment efficiency, and (c) overall firm performance. Equity 
ownership has been studied in three dimensions (i) direct ownership, (ii) ultimate 
ownership, and (iii) ownership concentration.  
 
First essay investigates the impact of equity ownership structure on capital structure and 
the results show that equity holding by insiders is inversely related to debt ratio. This 
implies that managerial shareholdings work as a substitute to the disciplinary role of debt. 
Further explanation for this negative relation is that managers, as shareholders of the 
firm, extract private benefits of control and they avoid debt because it imposes discipline 
on free cash flows of the firm. Shareholdings by associated firms also affect debt ratio 
negatively which shows that related firms also avoid debt for the similar disciplinary 
reasons imposed by the debt contracts. Furthermore, they may be working as alternate 
source of funds for financing investee firms’ projects. Shareholdings by financial 
institutions affect leverage ratio positively. In order to reduce information asymmetries 
and to exercise adequate control through alternative channels (as the debt holders) 
financial institutions benefit when investee firms acquire more debt. Ultimate ownership 
by family is associated with high debt ratio. It may be argued that families value control 
and use debt as a shield against takeover threats. Moreover, they may be using debt as 
signaling device to demonstrate their willingness to follow the disciplining role of debt. 
 
In the second essay the impact of equity ownership structure on investment performance 
has been explored in terms of marginal Tobin’s q. The results show that equity holdings 
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by insiders affect investment performance positively and this shows convergence of 
interest of managers with that of outside shareholders. An interesting finding is that 
shareholdings by the state affect investment performance negatively. This suggests that 
privatization of public corporations would add value to them. Family and foreigners as 
ultimate shareholders affect investment performance positively; however, the effects are 
statistically significant for 10 and 25 percent thresholds of voting rights only.  
 
The third essay is about the relationship between ownership structure and average 
Tobin’s q – a measure of overall firm performance. Empirical testing (DWH test) shows 
that ownership and leverage are endogenous to firm performance. Two-stage least 
squares instrumental variables regression technique has been applied to deal with 
endogeneity problem. Results in chapter four suggest that equity holdings by insiders are 
positively related to Tobin's q, indicating convergence of interests of managers and 
outside shareholders. The shareholdings by financial institutions are negatively related to 
firm performance which may be due to regulatory restrictions on financial institutions not 
to participate in day-to-day affairs of investee firms. Further, ownership stake of family 
as ultimate owner contributes to firm value at all levels of control thresholds.  
 
The overall perspective of this thesis is that equity holdings by insiders align their interest 
with that of outside shareholders. The insiders seem to enjoy private benefits of control; 
nevertheless, they make value enhancing investment decisions and contribute toward firm 
performance. Furthermore, study shows that firms with families as ultimate owners prefer 
more debt, which it may be using to protect its control over firm against the takeover risk. 
Moreover, ultimate control of families adds value to the firm.   
 
This study tries to fill the gaps in literature on corporate governance and industrial 
organization, especially in the context of a developing economy. Further inquiries in the 
same direction would potentially provide more evidence on the important role equity 
ownership structure plays in harnessing good governance environment. Future research in 
this rather neglected field would lend scholastic assistance to policy makers and 
regulators. 
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Appendix to Chapter 2 (Ownership and Capital Structure) 
 
Appendix A2.1: Percentile plots  
(Direct ownership ) 
 
The following figure shows percentile plot of shareholding by the mutually exclusive 
categories of direct shareholders.  
 
 
(Ownership concentration) 
The following figure shows percentile plot of shareholding by the largest shareholder 
and shareholding by three (five) largest shareholders. 
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Appendix A2.2: Tables of deciles  
 
 The following table shows deciles of different types of direct owners, ownership concentration and ultimate owners.  
Abbreviations: FI = financial institutions, NFI = non-financial institutions, Govt.= government, Dispersed = dispersed 
individuals, Top1 = The largest owner, Top3 (5) = sum of shareholding by the three (five) shareholders, CFR = Cash 
flow Rights, and VR = Voting rights. 
Deciles D10 D20 D30 D40 D50 D60 D70 D80 D90 
Direct Ownership 
Insiders 0.00 1.35 5.50 12.95 25.00 34.20 46.00 55.00 65.00 
Associates 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.59 10.87 20.99 32.85 50.10 
Group 3.13 24.80 33.58 41.28 47.30 51.60 57.29 63.96 74.07 
FI 0.40 3.70 6.40 9.30 12.40 17.25 21.80 26.80 32.80 
NFI 0.00 0.80 5.60 12.75 20.10 30.30 45.50 57.90 72.60 
Foreign 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.10 34.10 
Govt. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.20 
Dispersed 6.70 11.15 15.50 19.15 22.70 28.50 33.20 39.96 48.80 
Individuals 12.70 22.20 33.20 46.25 59.40 69.90 77.70 85.95 94.40 
Institutions 5.60 14.05 22.30 30.10 40.60 53.75 66.80 77.80 87.30 
Ownership concentration 
Top1 10.28 13.75 16.24 19.28 23.04 27.05 31.40 43.19 57.22 
Top3 24.58 31.35 36.67 41.03 46.60 53.32 60.17 69.65 81.34 
Top5 34.51 41.59 48.53 54.64 60.79 67.27 71.79 79.71 88.22 
Ultimate ownership (without mention of type of ultimate owner) 
CFR 21.98 30.80 38.30 42.52 48.27 52.50 59.60 67.25 76.10 
VR 26.70 34.54 41.70 46.00 50.70 54.51 60.46 68.45 77.17 
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A2.3: Correlation Matrix (Firm specific variables, direct ownership) 
 
  Lev. ln(s) Tang. M/B RoE Risk DPO Ndts Insid. Asso. Group FI NFI For. GoP Disp. Inst. Ind. 
Lev. 1.000                  
ln(s) -0.301 1.000                 
Tang. 0.366 -0.245 1.000                
M/B -0.391 0.266 -0.183 1.000               
RoE -0.138 0.111 -0.124 -0.295 1.000              
Risk -0.366 0.444 -0.083 0.253 0.082 1.000             
DPO -0.252 0.214 -0.108 0.108 0.062 0.128 1.000            
Ndts 0.031 0.016 0.223 -0.032 -0.010 -0.001 0.034 1.000           
Insid. 0.176 -0.280 0.227 -0.159 -0.032 -0.254 -0.048 0.038 1.000          
Asso. -0.087 0.107 -0.107 0.037 0.004 0.021 0.012 0.000 -0.501 1.000         
Group 0.113 -0.207 0.151 -0.139 -0.031 -0.257 -0.042 0.041 0.637 0.348 1.000        
FI 0.026 0.068 0.044 -0.010 0.009 0.087 0.016 -0.007 -0.288 0.003 -0.309 1.000       
NFI -0.346 0.353 -0.266 0.221 0.086 0.335 0.103 -0.031 -0.725 0.608 -0.244 -0.068 1.000      
For. -0.335 0.273 -0.270 0.252 0.094 0.211 0.128 -0.059 -0.324 -0.118 -0.456 -0.109 0.535 1.000     
GoP -0.081 0.166 -0.033 0.077 0.035 0.369 0.022 0.030 -0.191 -0.082 -0.279 -0.026 0.307 -0.056 1.000    
Disp. 0.264 -0.197 0.056 -0.109 -0.094 -0.218 -0.102 -0.001 -0.097 -0.227 -0.308 -0.209 -0.460 -0.284 -0.183 1.000   
Inst. -0.310 0.358 -0.229 0.202 0.084 0.349 0.103 -0.033 -0.801 0.567 -0.362 0.375 0.899 0.450 0.274 -0.517 1.000  
Ind. 0.310 -0.358 0.229 -0.202 -0.084 -0.349 -0.103 0.033 0.801 -0.567 0.362 -0.375 -0.899 -0.450 -0.274 0.517 -1.000 1.000 
 
1)    Upper block includes firm specific variables, and lower block includes ownership categories. 
2)   Abbreviations used: Lev. = leverage, ln(s) log of sales, Tang.= Asset tangibility, M/B=Market to book ratio, RoE = Return on equity, Risk = Standard 
deviation of last four years market value of common stock, DPO = Dividend payout, Ndts = Non-debt tax shield, Insid. = Insiders (Managers, Directors and 
Family members), Asso. = Associated Firms, Group = Insiders + Asso., FI = Financial Institutions, NFI = Non-Financial Institutions, For. = Foreigners, GoP 
= Government of Pakistan, Disp. = Dispersed shareholders, Inst. = Institutions, and Ind. = Individuals 
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A3.1: Correlation Matrix (Firm specific variables) 
 
 Mt It 
1
1
−
−−
t
tt
M
MM  
1−t
t
M
I
 
Mt 1.000    
It 0.740 1.000   
1
1
−
−−
t
tt
M
MM  -0.009 0.191 1.000  
1−t
t
M
I  -0.029 0.224 0.722 1.000 
 
Abbreviations used: Mt = Market value in current period, It = Investment in current period,  
1
1
−
−−
t
tt
M
MM
 = Growth rate of market 
value, 
1−t
t
M
I
= Current investment to market value (lagged by one period) ratio. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 (Ownership and Investment Efficiency) 
 
A3.2: Model Specification Test (Model: grmvi,t = Xb + ui +ei,t) 
The following table shows models specification test for above equation. Results show 
that the fixed effects model is the most appropriate model for estimating marginal 
Tobin’s q. (grmv is growth rate of market value.) 
Test Statistics Remark 
RE vs OLS 
Breusch and Pagan LM Test       chi2(1)  32.76  RE better than OLS  
             H0: Var(u) = 0      P-value  0.00 
FE vs OLS 
F (Chow test) for data pooling.  
F test: H0:ui=0   
 F(305, 1223)   1.61  FE better than OLS  
                 P-value  0.00 
Hausman Test: FE vs RE 
H0: Difference in FE and RE  
coefficients is not systematic 
    chi2(1)  14.60  FE better than RE  
             
      P-value  0.00 
 
A3.3: Ownership concentration and investment performance 
 
This table presents effect of shareholding by top three (five) shareholders on the investment performance 
for 10, 25 and 50 percent threshold of voting rights. The results show that coefficient of the all interaction 
terms are statistically insignificant, except for sum of top five shareholders at 25 percent threshold level.  
  Top3 Top5 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
x2imvl 0.803*** 0.716*** 0.818*** 0.799*** 0.555*** 0.788*** 
 (38.42) (10.89) (28.59) (38.45) (4.28) (32.26) 
Top3_10 -0.027      
 (-1.00)      
Top3_25   0.091     
   (1.34)     
Top3_50    -0.001    
    (-0.95)    
Top5_10     0.023   
     (0.53)   
Top5_25      0.250*  
      (1.91)  
Top5_50       0.001 
       (0.93) 
Constant 1.315 1.350 1.351 1.331 1.315 1.381 
 (1.55) (1.60) (1.60) (1.57) (1.56) (1.63) 
Obs. 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 
R2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Firms 306 306 306 306 306 306 
F-value 747.28 748.17 747.18 746.49 750.23 747.13 
Within 1.609 1.600 1.537 1.611 1.621 1.609 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels
 Appendix to Chapter 4 (Ownership and Firm Performance) 
 
A 4.1: Correlation Matrix (Firm specific variables) 
 
Abbreviations: Tobin’s q = Measure of firm performance, Lev. = leverage, ln(a) log of assets, Tang.= Asset tangibility, QR = Quick ratio, Risk 
= Standard deviation of last four years market value of common stock, M/B=Market to book ratio, ETR = Effective tax rate, ATO= Assets 
turnover, DPO = Dividend payout, and Ndts = Non-debt tax shield,  
 
  Tobin's Lev. ln(a) Tang. QR Risk M/B ETR ATO DPO Ndts 
Tobin's 1.000           
Lev. -0.151 1.000          
ln(a) -0.141 -0.197 1.000         
Tang. 0.066 0.366 -0.076 1.000        
QR -0.157 -0.460 0.043 -0.389 1.000       
Risk 0.191 -0.366 0.548 -0.083 0.095 1.000      
M/B 0.238 -0.293 0.052 -0.133 0.007 0.220 1.000     
ETR -0.006 -0.027 0.010 -0.028 0.007 0.002 -0.009 1.000    
ATO 0.169 -0.349 -0.004 -0.362 0.018 0.111 0.153 0.038 1.000   
DPO 0.008 -0.252 0.172 -0.108 0.081 0.128 0.037 0.164 0.119 1.000  
Ndts 0.017 0.031 -0.037 0.223 -0.093 -0.001 -0.007 -0.016 0.033 0.034 1.000 
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A4.2: Direct Ownership (Testing Endogeneity - 2nd Stage DWH Results) 
ti
j
titimia WQ ,,2,1 ).().(. ψτλωλθλ ++++=  
(1) This table reports regression results of second stage of the DWH test for testing endogeneity. Residuals 
(Ω and  τ) for leverage and ownership respectively) estimated from the first stage are used in the second 
stage of the DWH test and table shows that residuals are statistically significant for 10 out of 12 equations. 
Therefore, it may be argued that leverage and ownership variables are endogenous to Tobin’s q.  
(2) Abbreviations: log of assets (ln(a)), asset tangibility (Tang.), quick ratio (QR), firm risk (Risk). And 
Leverage (Lev). Types of direct owner (j) include: Insider, Associated Firms (AF), Group (Insiders + 
Associated firm), Financial Institutions (FI), Foreigner (For.) and State (Government of Pakistan).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Insider AF Group FI For. State 
ln(a) -0.266*** -0.056** -0.207*** -0.166*** -0.179*** 0.548*** 
 (-5.76) (-2.28) (-4.30) (-2.75) (-4.94) (4.60) 
Tang. -0.003*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002 0.003** -0.005*** 
 (-2.97) (-1.29) (-3.15) (-1.50) -2.01 (-4.33) 
QR -0.077*** -0.096*** -0.090*** -0.087*** -0.080*** 0.00 
 (-5.32) (-6.87) (-6.33) (-5.44) (-5.44) (0.01) 
Risk 0.069*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.082*** 0.109*** 0.189*** 
 (5.58) (4.92) (4.90) (4.32) (6.22) (6.71) 
Lev. -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.011*** -0.008 -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (-5.03) (-6.88) (-3.60) (-1.52) (-4.29) (-4.90) 
Insid. 0.068***      
 (5.12)      
AF  -0.056***     
  (-2.63)     
Group   0.046***    
   (3.44)    
FI     -0.040*   
    (-1.84)   
For.     0.159***  
     (4.22)  
State      0.562*** 
      (5.24) 
Ω 0.007** 0.015*** 0.005 0.002 0.006* 0.007** 
 (2.56) (4.66) (1.50) (0.30) (1.93) (2.31) 
τ-Insid. -0.067***      
 (-5.07)      
τ-AF  0.056***     
  (2.62)     
τ-Group   -0.045***    
   (-3.39)    
τ-FI    0.043**   
    (1.99)   
τ-For.     -0.167***  
     (-4.44)  
τ-State      -0.545*** 
      (-5.08) 
Const. 2.143*** 3.950*** 1.547*** 3.584*** 1.791*** -2.979*** 
  (8.31) (8.81) (3.44) (8.48) (5.31) (-2.61) 
R2 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.27 
F-value 47.44 44.32 45.13 44.41 49.26 54.69 
Within 15.909 15.797 15.71 15.62 16.049 16.55 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels. 
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A4.3: The Largest Owner (Testing Endogeneity -2nd Stage DWH Results) 
ti
j
titimia WQ ,,2,1 ).().(. ψτλωλθλ ++++=  
(1) This table reports regression results of second stage of the DWH test for testing endogeneity. Residuals 
(ω and  τ) for leverage and ownership respectively) estimated from the first stage are used in the second 
stage of the DWH test and table shows that residuals are statistically significant for 11 out of 12 equations. 
Therefore, it may be argued that leverage and ownership variables are endogenous to Tobin’s q.  
(2) Abbreviations: Leverage (Lev), log of assets (ln(a)), asset tangibility (Tang.), quick ratio (QR), and firm 
risk. Types of the largest owner (T1) (j) include: Insider, Associated Firms (AF), Financial Institutions (FI), 
Foreigner (For.) and State (Government of Pakistan). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  T1 T1_Insid T1_AF T1_FI T1_For T1_State 
ln(a) -0.049* -0.250*** -0.048* -0.206*** 0.069* -0.051** 
 (-1.66) (-5.12) (-1.87) (-6.05) (1.87) (-2.06) 
Tang. -0.002** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.004*** 0.014*** -0.002** 
 (-2.25) (-2.99) (-1.28) (-3.99) (3.94) (-2.20) 
QR -0.104*** -0.112*** -0.118*** -0.101*** -0.162*** -0.101*** 
 (-7.41) (-8.01) (-7.43) (-7.42) (-8.68) (-7.32) 
Risk 0.054*** 0.069*** 0.053*** 0.062*** 0.030** 0.052*** 
 (4.39) (5.54) (4.36) (5.18) (2.32) (4.30) 
Lev. -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.025*** -0.019*** 
 (-6.40) (-4.67) (-6.74) (-5.31) (-8.02) (-6.86) 
T1 -0.010      
 (-0.85)      
T1-Insid  0.075***     
  (4.38)     
T1-AF   -0.035**    
   (-2.03)    
T1-FI    -0.120***   
    (-5.85)   
T1-For.     0.418***  
     (4.75)  
T1-State      0.319** 
      (2.33) 
ω 0.012*** 0.007** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.018*** 0.013*** 
 (3.96) (2.28) (4.32) (2.77) (5.75) (4.36) 
τ-T1 0.012      
 (0.96)      
τ-T1-Insid  -0.074***     
  (-4.34)     
τ-T1-AF   0.033*    
   (1.90)    
τ-T1-FI    0.125***   
    (5.99)   
τ-T1-For.     -0.417***  
     (-4.74)  
τ-T1-State      -0.308** 
      (-2.25) 
Const. 3.167*** 3.343*** 3.239*** 4.209*** -0.613 2.249*** 
 (8.61) (14.38) (12.15) (13.80) (-0.79) (6.35) 
R2 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23 
F-value 43.48 46.30 44.02 49.05 46.85 44.83 
Within 15.397 15.814 15.762 16.015 15.710 15.608 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels. 
141 
A4.4: Ultimate Ownership (Testing Endogeneity - 2nd Stage DWH Results) 
ti
j
titimia WQ ,,2,1 ).().(. ψτλωλθλ ++++=  
(1) This table reports regression results of second stage of the DWH test for testing endogeneity. Residuals 
(ω and  τ) for leverage and ownership respectively) estimated from the first stage are used in the second 
stage of the DWH test and table shows that residuals are statistically significant for all 12 equations. 
Therefore, it may be argued that leverage and ownership variables are endogenous to Tobin’s q.  
(2) Abbreviations: log of assets (ln(a)), asset tangibility (Tang.), quick ratio (QR), firm risk (Risk), and 
Leverage (Lev). Types of ultimate owner (UO) (j) include: Family (Fam.), Foreigner (For.), Legal person 
(LP), State (Government of Pakistan) and Extended definition of family (FamE = Fam + LP). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  UO UO-Fam UO-For. UO-LP UO-State UO-FamE 
ln(a) -0.198*** -0.189*** -0.101*** -0.043 -0.023 -0.168*** 
 (-4.50) (-5.63) (-3.30) (-1.61) (-0.82) (-4.53) 
Tang. -0.000 -0.001 0.008 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003** 
 (-0.17) (-1.32) (1.53) (-1.16) (-3.06) (-2.56) 
QR -0.087*** -0.083*** -0.090*** -0.107*** -0.079*** -0.085*** 
 (-6.03) (-5.89) (-5.96) (-7.60) (-4.95) (-5.81) 
Risk 0.069*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 0.047*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
 (5.42) (5.01) (4.93) (3.62) (5.26) (5.40) 
Lev. -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.013*** 
 (-4.19) (-6.19) (-6.57) (-6.53) (-7.04) (-4.53) 
UO 0.044***      
 (3.64)      
UO-Fam  0.068***     
  (5.33)     
UO-For.   0.202**    
   (1.99)    
UO-LP    -0.038*   
    (-1.95)   
UO-State      -0.472***  
     (-2.93)  
UO-FamE      0.043*** 
      (3.69) 
ω 0.006* 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.007** 
 (1.96) (3.60) (3.98) (4.33) (4.54) (2.22) 
τ-UO -0.043***      
 (-3.54)      
τ-UO-Fam  -0.067***     
  (-5.21)     
τ-UO-For.   -0.202**    
   (-1.98)    
τ-UO-LP    0.043**   
    (2.15)   
 τ-UO-State     0.477***  
     (2.96)  
τ-UO-FamE      -0.042*** 
      (-3.52) 
Constant 1.131** 1.534*** 1.161 3.254*** 4.240*** 1.637*** 
 (2.12) (4.62) (1.28) (11.81) (8.46) (4.05) 
R2 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 
F-value 45.46 47.85 43.85 44.13 44.71 45.63 
Within 15.624 15.919 15.434 15.676 15.660 15.526 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels. 
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A4.5: Direct Ownership and Firm Performance: 2SLS 1st stage results 
(Dependent variable: Ownership) 
 
(1) The following table shows results of the first stage of the 2SLS regression.  
(2)  Abbreviations: Insid. = Insiders (Managers, Directors and Family members), AF = Associated Firms, 
Group = Insiders + AF, FI = Financial Institutions, State = Government of Pakistan, ln(a) = log of assets, 
Tang. = Tangibility, QR = Quick Ratio, Risk = Standard deviation of last four years market value of 
common stock, ETR = Effective tax rate, ATO = Asset turnover, DPO = Dividend payout, and Ndts = Non-
debt tax shield.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) 
  Insid. AF Group FI For. State Leverage 
                
ln(a) 2.537*** -0.050 2.487*** -2.112*** 0.747** -1.096*** 0.456 
 (4.29) (-0.13) (4.12) (-4.69) (1.98) (-4.07) (0.48) 
Tang. 0.007 0.013 0.020 0.024 -0.036** 0.004 0.049 
 (0.32) (0.84) (0.86) (1.37) (-2.43) (0.36) (1.31) 
QR -0.260 0.225 -0.035 -0.001 -0.088 -0.167 -1.734*** 
 (-0.85) (1.10) (-0.11) (-0.00) (-0.45) (-1.20) (-3.51) 
Risk -0.007* 0.324** 0.317* -0.018 -0.248** -0.213** -3.019*** 
 (-1.73) (2.46) (1.68) (-0.12) (-1.98) (-2.38) (-9.53) 
ETR 0.055 -0.003 0.052 0.064 -0.000 0.005 -0.015 
 (0.60) (-0.05) (0.55) (0.91) (-0.00) (0.13) (-0.10) 
ATO -0.617* 0.563* -0.054 -1.020** 0.226* -0.011 -6.833*** 
 (-1.84) (1.66) (-0.10) (-2.49) (1.66) (-0.05) (-7.86) 
DPO 0.139 -0.207 -0.069 -0.347 -0.384 0.001 -1.195 
 (0.25) (-0.57) (-0.12) (-0.83) (-1.10) (0.00) (-1.36) 
Ndts -0.023* -0.111*** -0.135** 0.136*** 0.023 0.010 0.295*** 
 (-1.94) (-3.15) (-2.50) (3.38) (0.69) (0.41) (3.46) 
Const. 11.765** 14.290*** 26.056*** 29.717*** 4.513 10.046*** 72.442*** 
 (2.53) (4.60) (5.50) (8.42) (1.52) (4.75) (9.68) 
        
Obs. 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 
R2 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.15 
Firms 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 
F-value 4.52 2.59 5.32 5.67 1.66 4.18 26.85 
Within 69.771 124.044 60.027 34.569 95.155 71.277 12.534 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels. 
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A4.6: Direct Ownership and Firm Performance 
(Dependent variable: Return on Equity) 
 
(1) The following table shows effect of shareholdings by different types of direct owners on the firm 
performance measured by ‘return on equity’.  
(2) Abbreviations: Insid. = Insiders (Managers, Directors and Family members), AF = Associated Firms, 
Group = Insiders + AF, FI = Financial Institutions, For. = Foreigners, and State = Government of Pakistan, 
Lev. = Leverage, ln(a) = log of assets, Tang. = Tangibility, QR = Quick Ratio, Risk = Standard deviation of 
last four years market value of common stock. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) 
  Insid. AF Group FI For. State 
Lev. -5.294*** -7.455*** -5.357*** -5.904*** -4.860*** -4.975 
 (-4.24) (-4.80) (-4.58) (-2.97) (-2.68) (-1.23) 
Ln(a) -27.140 12.108 -4.513 9.004 -15.776 154.483 
 (-1.29) (1.00) (-0.25) (0.41) (-0.69) (0.87) 
Tang. 0.229 0.663 0.270 0.388 1.548 -0.237 
 (0.50) (1.28) (0.69) (1.03) (1.53) (-0.14) 
QR -7.494 -9.882 -10.793** -11.913** -7.094 12.267 
 (-1.13) (-1.42) (-2.05) (-2.05) (-0.77) (0.35) 
Risk -14.190** -14.698** -16.232*** -16.648** -5.032 15.073 
 (-2.52) (-2.41) (-3.60) (-2.43) (-0.46) (0.36) 
Insid. 12.198**      
 (2.02)      
AF  -19.977*     
  (-1.88)     
Group   4.383    
   (0.89)    
FI    -0.069   
    (-0.01)   
For.     34.458  
     (1.45)  
State      133.468 
      (0.83) 
Const. 211.238* 719.15*** 218.560 350.484** 106.622 -1,049.78 
 (1.79) (3.23) (1.31) (2.29) (0.50) (-0.61) 
Obs. 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 
Firm 306 306 306 306 306 306 
R2 4.85 4.08 6.41 6.55 2.56 0.52 
F-value 0.56 0.46 0.82 0.85 0.29 0.05 
Within 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.96 1.00 1.00 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels. 
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A4.7: Ultimate ownership (VR ≥ 25%) and firm performance  
(Dependent variable: Return on Equity) 
 
(1) The following table shows effect of shareholdings by different types of ultimate owners (UO) on the 
firm performance measured by ‘return on equity’. The model is estimated for 25 percent threshold of voting 
rights of the ultimate owner. 
(2) Abbreviations: Family (Fam.), Foreigner (For.), Legal person (LP), State (Government of Pakistan) and 
Extended definition of family (FamE = Fam + LP). Lev. = Leverage, ln(a) = log of assets, Tang. = 
Tangibility, QR = Quick Ratio, Risk = Standard deviation of last four years market value of common stock. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Fam25 GoP25 For25 LP25 FamE25 
Lev. -5.60*** -6.25*** -6.24*** -7.68*** -5.19*** 
 (-5.05) (-4.53) (-4.28) (-5.15) (-4.67) 
ln(a) -11.430 14.927 9.058 17.436 -5.432 
 (-0.86) (1.08) (0.86) (1.49) (-0.40) 
Tang. 0.522 0.221 1.945 0.903* 0.307 
 (1.25) (0.41) (0.45) (1.73) (0.81) 
QR -8.488 -8.693 -10.378 -16.232** -8.594 
 (-1.44) (-1.10) (-1.41) (-2.45) (-1.52) 
Risk -15.1*** -14.9** -16.3*** -21.2*** -14.4*** 
 (-2.98) (-2.33) (-3.01) (-3.57) (-2.99) 
UO25*Fam 10.261**     
 (2.38)     
UO25*GoP  -66.173    
  (-0.83)    
UO25*For.   24.146   
   (0.36)   
UO25*LP    -19.468**  
    (-2.04)  
UO25*FamE     6.006 
     (1.47) 
Const. 142.1 530.3** 111.6 547.5*** 166.9 
 (1.15) (2.19) (0.17) (4.00) (1.14) 
Obs 1525 1525 1525 1525 1525 
Firms 306 306 306 306 306 
F-value 5.96 3.61 4.57 4.83 6.49 
Within 0.67 0.46 0.59 0.55 0.80 
p-value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 
t-stat in parenthesis, *** significant at 10%; ** at 5%; * at 1% levels. 
 
 Deutscher Abstract 
 
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht die Auswirkungen der Eigentümerstruktur auf 
Finanzierungsstruktur, Investmenterfolg sowie Gesamterfolg eines Unternehmens. 
Zudem wird auf Agency Konflikte im Zusammenhang mit Corporate Governance Bezug 
genommen. Zu diesem Zweck wurde die Eigentümerstruktur auf drei verschiedenen 
Ebenen analysiert: direkte und letztendliche Eigentumsstruktur sowie 
Eigentumskonzentration. Der Studie liegen Paneldaten von mehr als 300 börsennotierten 
Unternehmen in Pakistan, beobachtet über den Zeitraum 2002 bis 2006, zugrunde. 
 
Der erste Essay untersucht den Einfluss der Eigentümerstruktur auf die Wahl der 
Finanzierungsart der Unternehmen. Das bemerkenswerte Ergebnis dieser Analyse ist, 
dass ein inverser Zusammenhang zwischen dem Eigenkapitalanteil von Insidern sowie 
verbundenen Unternehmen und dem Verschuldungsgrad besteht. Dies deutet darauf hin, 
dass risikoaverse Insider sowie verbundene Unternehmen versuchen, Restriktionen im 
Zusammenhang mit Fremdkapital zu vermeiden. Unternehmen, die letztendlich von 
Familien kontrolliert werden, weisen einen höheren Verschuldungsgrad auf, was darauf 
schließen lässt, dass Familien Unternehmenskontrolle höher bewerten und mittels 
Fremdkapital versuchen sich vor feindlichen Übernahmen zu schützen. 
 
Während der zweite Essay den Einfluss der Eigentümerstruktur auf den Investmenterfolg 
im Sinne von Tobin’s marginalem q analysiert, widmet sich der dritte Essay dem Einfluss 
der Eigentümerstruktur auf den Gesamterfolg der Unternehmen im Sinne von Tobin’s 
durchschnittlichem q. Bei letzterer Untersuchung wurde die Eigentumsstruktur sowie der 
Leverage als endogen angenommen, weshalb eine two-stage least squares Regression 
durchgeführt wurde. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ein positiver Zusammenhang zwischen 
Eigentumsanteilen im Besitz von Managern und der Investitionseffizienz sowie dem 
Gesamterfolg der Unternehmen besteht, wobei eine Konvergenz der Interessen von 
Insidern und externen Investoren stattzufinden scheint. Auf der anderen Seite stehen 
Eigentumsanteile im Besitz des Staates in Zusammenhang mit einem geringeren 
Investmenterfolg, was den Schluss nahe legt, dass Privatisierungen Werte schaffen. 
 Schließlich besteht auch ein negativer Zusammenhang zwischen Eigentumsanteilen, die 
von Finanzinstitutionen gehalten werden, und dem Gesamterfolg von Unternehmen. 
Letzteres könnte darauf zurückzuführen sein, dass regulatorische Restriktionen 
Finanzinstitutionen daran hindern in die Unternehmenspolitik einzugreifen. Betrachtet 
man die letztendlichen Eigentümer der Unternehmen, so zeigt sich, dass Unternehmen in 
Familienbesitz sowohl eine höhere Investitionseffizienz als auch einen höheren 
Gesamterfolg aufweisen. 
 
Die Hauptresultate dieser Forschungsarbeit lassen sich wie folgt zusammenfassen: 
Eigentumsanteile im Besitz von Insidern führen dazu, dass sich die Interessen von 
Insidern und externen Investoren annähren; die Unternehmenskontrolle durch Familien 
steht in Zusammenhang mit einem höheren Verschuldungsgrad sowie mit einer erhöhten 
Wertschöpfung. Aus diesen Ergebnissen lassen sich wesentliche Folgerungen für gute 
Corporate Governance in sich entwickelnden Volkswirtschaften ziehen und sie leisten 
einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Corporate Governance Literatur. 
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